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Abstract
The 2012 Freedom House Report reveals that only 12 percent of Sub-Saharan African
countries are totally free or democratic compared to 71 percent in the Americas and 85 in
Western Europe (see figure 1, Chapter 1). This descriptive statistic shows how poorly most
countries in Africa are doing when it comes to embracing democratic culture. Free, transparent
and fair elections; respect for human rights; protection of the rights of minorities; majority rule;
separation of powers; and elimination of systemic corruption constitute major tenets of
democracy. In many African countries, basic human rights are often violated and abused. In most
cases, both the economic and political powers are confiscated and held in the hands of small
groups of corrupt elites who through the use of force preside over the destiny of their countries.
Since the adoption of multiparty systems in some African countries in the 1990s, most elections
have been marred by violence and/or boycotts by political opponents who continue to question
not only the fairness and the transparency of such elections but also the validity of the electoral
systems of their countries. Is it legitimate to say that among the various types of electoral
systems, one particular type is more prone to conflicts than the other systems? (Staffan 2005,
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2002, Boix 2002, Reilly and
Reynolds 1999). Addressing such a question requires a thorough discussion of the consequences
of electoral systems for elections and electoral behaviors in Africa.
In this dissertation the author hypothesizes that (H1): In Africa, countries that use
majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than are
countries that use proportional electoral systems, (H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian
electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use
mixed electoral systems, and (H3): In Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems are more
likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems.

These hypotheses will be tested by using both primary qualitative and secondary
quantitative data analyses in order to answer the research question: “In Africa, why do some
countries tend to experience post-election conflict while others do not?” This dissertation focuses
on the first twenty years (1990-2010) of the move to democracy in Africa. With elections as the
unit of analysis, and using the dataset on African electoral violence and the Cingranelli-Richards
(CIRI) Human Rights dataset, this dissertation intends to use a most different systems design on
six countries included in the Afrobarometer studies: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Togo, and Senegal. Among these six countries, Ghana and Togo use a majoritarian electoral
system, Benin and Guinea-Bissau use a proportional representation electoral system, and Guinea
and Senegal use a mixed electoral system
If these hypotheses are sustained, the results would indicate that reforming the electoral
system to accommodate the needs of the populace in countries with frequent electoral conflicts
would be the one way not only to cope with current post-election conflicts, but also to help
prevent future ones. Other implications include, but are not limited to, identifying ways to help
promote substantive and representative democracies in Africa based on the findings of both the
quantitative and qualitative phases of the study.
Keywords: Election, Democratization, Human Rights, Africa, Electoral Conflicts, Election
Management, Electoral Systems
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. A Brief Background
By the 1960s, most of the African countries gained their independence from the European
colonial powers, including Great Britain, Belgium, and France. A little window of democratic
opportunity that was opened with decolonization was sabotaged by the rise of military coups as
well as authoritarian civilian regimes that suppressed all opposition and established one-party
states across the continent. Military coups not only were the norm, but also remained the only
mechanism that guaranteed regime change in Africa. However, in the 1990s, many African
countries previously under autocratic rule experienced what Huntington (1993) called the “Third
Wave of Democratization.” Political liberalization was initiated in those countries. Political
oppositions began to emerge, and multiparty systems—that were previously forbidden after the
decolonization—were once again re-established.
The process of moving from one-party systems to multiparty systems was facilitated by
strategic coordination by opposition parties. The learning that went into developing such
coordination often took the experience of three or more elections. According to Freedom House,
a democratic country is a country that holds free, transparent, and fair elections; respects human
rights; and protects the rights of minorities. Not only is a democracy ruled by majority, but also it
must adhere to the principle of separation of powers and elimination of systemic corruption.
Unfortunately, these necessary—but not sufficient—conditions for the emergence and
consolidation of democracy are not respected in many African countries. With the exception of
Mauritius, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2011 Democracy Index classifies the few so-called
1
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African democracies, including Cape Verde, South Africa, Botswana, Mali (before the 2012
military coup), Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Tunisia, Senegal,
Uganda, Liberia, Mozambique, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Niger, Burundi, and Egypt, as
flawed democracies for their overall democracy score ranging between 8 and 3.95.1 The
remaining African countries that have a score less than 3.95 are classified in the category of
authoritarian regimes. The overall democracy score is based on indicators of democracy,
including electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation,
political culture, and civil liberties and ranges from 10 to 1 (Economist Intelligent Unit 2011).
Since 1990, however, many elections in Africa had been marred by acts of violence. The
most palpable examples of African [violent] post-elections violence include, but are not limited
to, the 1998 and 2005 Togo presidential elections, the 2007 Kenya elections, the 2008 Zimbabwe
elections, and the 2010 Cote d’ Ivoire presidential elections (Straus and Taylor 2012). As of now,
in spite of the mediation of good offices by both the regional and international actors, viable
solutions have not been found to these conflicts. Preventive approaches to post-election conflicts
will potentially provide long lasting solutions. This thesis proposes to contribute to finding ways
and means to effectively prevent post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa.
Because of the complexity of current conflicts in Africa, and in order to actually address all
the facets of the research question, this study will use a mixed method approach, a combination
of cross-national quantitative methods and in-depth comparative case studies. Should the
hypotheses put forward in this study be supported, the results would indicate that reforming

1

These scores are the averages of the five indicators of democracy listed below. Each indicator ranges from 10 to 1,
the higher the score the better the level of democracy. The instrument used here to analyze the types of regimes in
the world ranges from 10 to 1 with 10 indicating a more democratic regime and 1, a non-democracy. Based on that
instrument and according to the Economic Intelligence Unit, any country that falls within [{10, 8}, {8, 3.95}, and
{3.95, 1}] is considered a full democracy, flawed democracy, and authoritarian regime, respectively.
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electoral system in each of these countries would be one way not only to cope with immediate
post-election conflicts but also to help prevent future ones.
This major approach of the study is similar to that employed by Mozaffar and Vengroff
(2001)’s “whole system approach.” Those authors view “institutional change in democratizing
countries as the outcome of strategic decisions about structurally configurative and operationally
interconnected rules by actors seeking to promote their interests in multiple arenas” (p. 612)2.
Such an approach has been used successfully in Senegal (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2001); in
Mexico (Craig and Cornelius 1995); in Taiwan (Chao and Myers 2000, Solinger 2001, Tien
1996); and in South Korea (Juan 2000, Lee 1999, Mo and Brady 1999). In each of these
democratizing countries, electoral reforms were incrementally implemented at all levels as part
of a nested game not only to accommodate the needs of all political actors including the political
oppositions, but also to ensure political stability, regime legitimacy, and “credibility of the
electoral process at home and abroad” (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2001: 612). The next section
presents the problem and the reasons why Africa is selected as the main continent, and Benin,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo as areas (countries) of concentration of the
study.

1.2. Statement of the Problem
The 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)—a quantitative measure of good
governance—shows that Africa is underperforming when it comes to good governance. The Mo
Ibrahim Foundation’s measures of good governance include safety and rule of law, political

2

Strategic decisions are decisions that affect the whole political system, resources and actors involved, as well as the
interaction between both protagonists and antagonists.
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participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development.
According to the IIAG, a score above 70 is an indicator of a country that has good governance.
Africa’s overall good governance score of 51.2 indicates that the continent is still lagging
behind. However, there is some degree of variation among African nations. For example, while
Mauritius has a good governance score of 82.8 out of 100, Somalia scores less than 10. Even
though the continent scores moderately on safety and rule of law (53.3) and on human
development (56.7), its low scores on political participation and human rights (47.6) and
sustainable economic opportunity (47.3) reveals a clearer picture of African democracy (Mo
Ibrahim Foundation 2012).
Since 2007, there has been a substantial decline in African political participation and a drop
in the number of full “electoral democracies” in Sub-Saharan Africa from 24 in 2005 to 19 in
2012 (The Economist 2012) (see for example, Freedom House 2012). The numbers provided by
the IIAG and Freedom House are disturbing and alarming given that free and fair election
process, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture
are the major tenets of democracy (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
2012, The Economist 2012).
During the last two decades, many African countries including Burundi, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan (before the secession and formal division
into the present day Sudan and South Sudan),Togo, and Zimbabwe have been experiencing postelection conflicts (Straus and Taylor 2012). These conflicts have been characterized by varying
degrees of intensity and frequency across the continent.

4
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While some electoral conflicts were violent, others were not. For example, since 1990,
countries such as Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Zambia never had high levels of
electoral violence. However, while high levels of electoral violence occurred occasionally in
countries such as Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Lesotho, to name a few, some other African
countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo,
and Zimbabwe usually experienced high electoral violence since the adoption of multiparty
democracy in 1990 (Straus and Taylor 2012). For example, the most recent post-election
conflicts in Africa occurred in Cote d’Ivoire after the 2010 presidential elections. Within a period
of only six months after the elections there were “serious violations of international law
including potential war crimes against humanity by armed forces on both sides. Scores of women
were raped during the post-election period, and the death toll is estimated to be at least 3000”
(Human Rights Watch 2011). There were also involuntary displacements of thousands of people
and destruction of physical materials, including roads and buildings. In addition, towns and
villages were burned (Rousselot 2011).
Because of the gravity of crimes committed in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, the former
president, Laurent Gbagbo, was arrested and is now on trial in The Hague for crimes against
humanity. The Ivorian post-election conflicts erupted not only as a result of electoral
improprieties, such as fraud, and manipulation of elections’ results by both the Ivorian
Independent Electoral Commission and the country’s Constitutional Court, but also because of
unresolved and deep-rooted issues, such as identity, citizenship (Ogwang 2011, Badmus 2009),
and land (Peifer 2008, Bruhwiler 2003). Many African conflicts escalate into violence because of
these and other underlying issues, such as unemployment and dire living conditions (Kingdon
and Knight 2007, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).
5
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In South Africa, despite the two recent elections of 2004 and 2009, which were believed to
occur with minor irregularities and conflicts, the 1994 and 1999 parliamentary elections were
recorded as occurring with large-scale electoral violence, including violent harassment and
violent repression (Straus and Taylor 2012). The 2011 estimate shows that unemployment
remains very high (24.9 percent) (CIA 2013). The country is still struggling to deal with the
long-term legacy of apartheid that is the lack of empowerment of the disadvantaged people. In
spite of such problems, South Africa remains one of the few democracies in Africa and enjoys a
Freedom House political rights score of 2 and a civil liberties score of 2 (Freedom House 2012).
However, the disproportional use of force by security forces on August 16, 2012 on miners, who
were fighting for their rights at Marikana Platinum Mine in the northern part of the country,
raises serious concerns for the future of democracy in South Africa. The death toll of the August
2012 horror was estimated at 44 (Amnesty International 2012) or 34 dead and 78 wounded
(Freedom House 2012). The occurrence of this non-election-related violence and the existence of
other factors, including high unemployment rate and lack a growing middle class in the country
show how fragile the South African democracy is.
Apart from electoral violence and political instability, another critical intervening variable
that needs to be looked at when studying post-election conflict is the types of electoral systems.
Electoral systems are crucial in determining how the political system must function within a
particular country. Farrell (2011) contends that “electoral systems determine the means by which
votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (p. 4). Politicians
in this context include both candidates from political parties3 and independents. Electoral
3

According to GSDRC (2012), political parties are one of the primary institutions/tools for ensuring political
competition, democratic accountability and distribution of both political and economic powers in a country. Political
parties play a paramount role in linking civil society and state. They are critical in shaping both domestic and
foreign policy debates within a country. Above all, political parties are main drivers of democracy.
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systems basically determine who is elected and who is not; which political party gains power and
which does not (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008). In fact, they are mechanisms set up to
convert individual preferences into representatives or some forms of decision-making groups.
The existing literature on electoral systems suggests the existence of four main electoral
system families: plurality/majority systems, proportional representation (PR) systems, mixed
systems (Mixed), and other systems (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008) or five types of electoral
systems: single-member plurality (SMP); majority electoral system, which includes the tworound systems and the alternative vote; the list systems of proportional representation; mixedmember systems; and the single transferable vote (Farrell, 2011). In order to put an emphasis on
their outcomes this thesis classifies electoral systems into three main types—majoritarian (MA),
proportional representation (PR), and mixed systems (Mixed).
In majoritarian electoral systems, either the candidate with the highest votes wins the election
(plurality system) or the candidate with the absolute majority (greater than 50% of the votes)
wins elections (majority system). They aim at maintaining and enhancing stable government,
stable political systems and what Lindberg (2005) calls “stable legislative majorities” (p. 44).
These systems are designed to favor bigger parties at the expenses of smaller ones.
Theoretically, the majoritarian system leads to a two-party system in which elections are viewed
in terms of zero-sum game where the winner takes all. However, there are some few countries
that use the majoritarian systems but have more than two major parties. For example, Canada has
three major parties plus a regional component. Whenever parties start viewing elections strictly
in terms of competition, they are open to anything including post-election political instability.
In addition, the implementation of this system in any countries (especially in divided
societies) leads to a lot of wasted votes for minorities’ votes are not translated into seats. This
7
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situation makes it very difficult for small parties to be represented with the exception that they
are concentrated in one region or constituency. However, in a two round system smaller parties
can participate in the first round then strategically use their support in the final round. This
strategy often operates at the presidential level. An example of this strategic voting occurred in
the 2010 presidential elections in Cote d’Ivoire.
Proportional representation systems are assumed to decrease the disproportionality between
the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats gained by a party in parliament.
Theoretically, with the exception of South Africa where a single party (the African National
Congress [ANC]) has been winning sizable majority since the end of the apartheid regime, PR
distributes parliamentary seats in proportion to the percentage of votes won.4 The distinguishing
characteristic of PR systems is that they use multi-member districts: the higher the district
magnitude (size), the greater its proportionality (Reynolds et al. 2008). It is also determined by
the number of competing parties.
To ensure the representativeness of their population, countries using PR systems reserve
seats for minorities, including racial groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, and women. A
common practice in many of these countries is that a minimum threshold is established to allow
smaller parties some representation while at the same time exclude extremist parties or radical
groups. For example, in Germany’s Bundestag, the threshold of representation is five percent and
in Turkish parliament, this threshold is ten percent. However, not all countries that have PR
systems use a threshold to allocate seats in parliaments. The good example is South Africa.
Lindberg (2005) terms the practice of PR a “representative justice” (p. 45). The ultimate goal of

4

For example, out of 400 parliamentary seats, the ANC won 252 seats in 1994, 266 seats in 1999, 279 seats in 2004,
and 264 seats in 2009. See African Election Database. (24 February 2011). Elections in South Africa. African
Election Database. Accessed 22 September 2013, from http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html
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such systems is the reduction of conflicts by seeking inputs from different groups and parties and
possibly allowing them to be partners in a coalition government.
Reynolds et al. (2008) argues that “proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the
use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national or
regional basis” or “voters rank-order candidates in multi-members districts” (p. 29). The point of
rank-ordering candidates on a party list is that, based on the percentage of votes won—with the
understanding that voters will cast their ballots for the party and not the individual candidates—
which determines the number of seats in parliament. The members of parliament (MPs) are then
chosen according to their place on the list (e.g. Israel). For national elections, the number one on
the list is assumed to be the Prime Minister (PM) candidate.
Mixed systems are often used in emerging democracies. It is the combination of some
elements of both the majoritarian systems and proportional systems. In these systems, the PR
element plays an important role in compensating a potential disproportionality that emerges as a
result of using the majoritarian systems.
In this dissertation, the selection of six cases—Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal,
and Guinea—are based on the level of electoral violence. The focus is particularly on extreme
cases of countries with low/never high electoral violence (Benin and Ghana) or usually high
electoral violence (Togo and Guinea-Bissau). These countries either use the majoritarian
electoral systems (Ghana and Togo), the proportional electoral systems (Benin and GuineaBissau), or the mixed electoral system (Senegal and Guinea) (African Election Database 2011).
While Guinea experiences high electoral, Senegal experiences low electoral violence.
In post-colonial Africa, Togo was the first state to undergo a military coup. In addition, the
country was one of the many African countries to experience a bloody and failed democratic
9

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

transition in the 1990s. Since then, Togo has been experiencing post-election political violence
(Bekoe 2012, Straus and Taylor 2012). Political violence in Togo is a result of the fact that the
country is “still in the grip of an autocracy, with the incumbent regime holding on tenaciously to
power and denying other political parties the space for political actualization” (Adejumobi,
Hambok, Nordlund, Rukambe, and Dowetin 2007: 19). Consequently, there is a gap in the
representation of the Togolese political opposition in the National Assembly, the country’s
legislative body. Despite the death of the long term dictator, President Eyadéma Gnassingbé,
who ruled Togo for 38 years (1967-2005), his ruling party is still holding on to the presidency.
This state of things hinders any prospects of a democratic alternation in the country.
Another country with a high level of electoral violence is Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau had
its first multiparty and free elections in 1994, and President Joao Bernado Vieira was
democratically elected to serve a five-year term (African Election Database 2012). However, in
1998, the country was embroiled in a civil war that ousted President Vieira in 1999 (CIA World
Factbook 2013, African Election Database 2012). Since then, because the country has been
experiencing frequent military coups, not a single president of Guinea-Bissau served his full
term. The most disturbing political development that will mark the history of the country was the
2012 military coup that occurred at the height of the presidential elections. This coup prevented
Guinea-Bissau from holding the second-round of the presidential elections. In addition to its
governance overall score of 39.8 out of 100, the country scores very poorly (40.0) when it comes
to its handling of political participation and rights (IIAG 2012). Guinea-Bissau also uses the PR
system to translate votes into seats or policy preferences.
After 40 years under the rule of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), Senegal is often cited as
being among Africa’s “most stable democracies” (CIA World Factbook 2013). The election of a
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longtime opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade in the 2000 presidential elections marked a positive
step in the country’s prospect for democracy. However, during his second term in office and
through legislative actions, President Wade amended the constitution of Senegal several times in
order to weaken his political opponents and hold on to power for a third time (Mbow 2008). This
act provoked discontent in the Senegalese population, which not only took the matter to the
streets but also voted him out in the 2012 presidential elections (CIA World Factbook 2013). The
death toll in the 2012 violent street protests in the country was estimated at six people (BBC
2012). In spite of this relatively minor incident, Senegal will be used as a case of a country with
a low level of electoral conflict, a country that uses a mixed electoral system.
Besides Senegal, another relevant African country that uses a mixed electoral system is
Guinea. After the death of the long serving Guinean president in December 2008, General
Lansanah Conteh, Captain Dadis Moussa Camara filled a power vacuum through a military
coup. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community of the West African State
(ECOWAS) and the African Union, and international organizations, including the United
Nations (UN), not only strongly condemned the military takeover in the country but also warned
against a potential contagion effect and a return of military dictatorships in West Africa (Human
Rights Watch 2011, Nengak 2010, Soares 2009). Camara, who vowed that he would leave power
after a transitional period of six years to a democratically elected civilian president, became
obsessed with power and wanted to contest the presidential elections set for 2010 in Guinea. A
pro-democracy rally in protest against Camara’s inordinate ambition to stay in power was met
with bloody military repression, which claimed at least 157 lives, 1,253 injured, and scores of
women sexually assaulted and raped in the football stadium (Soares 2009). An assassination
attempt that followed the 2009 stadium horrors ousted the leader of the junta, Captain Camara.
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None of the candidates who contested the 2010 presidential elections in Guinea was able to
secure the absolute majority of votes needed to win the elections during the first round. The two
run-off candidates were Cellou Dalein Diallo with 43.69 percent of the votes and Alpha Condé
with 18.25 percent of the votes (African Election Database 2012, Nengak 2010). Although
Condé was far behind the front-runner Diallo, he forged a strong coalition with the other twentytwo candidates and finally won the second round of the presidential elections. The aftermath of
the elections was marred by violent clashes between supporters of the two contenders who
claimed victory (Nengak 2010). However, the recognition of Condé as the president-elect by
Diallo de-escalated the post-election tension between supporters of the political rivals and ended
the conflict in Guinea.
Unlike Guinea, the situations in Benin and Ghana are quite different. Benin and Ghana have
been relatively peaceful countries. Since 1990, neither country has had high electoral violence.
Between 1990 and 2010, both countries had already held at least five multiparty and free
elections with no major incidents. A score of 2 for civil liberties of both Benin and Ghana and a
score of 2 to 1 for political rights of Benin and Ghana, respectively, give both countries a “free”
democratic status (Freedom House 2012). That variation raises two fundamental questions: Why
do some African countries tend to experience post-election conflicts while others do not? And
how can post-election conflicts be prevented in contemporary Africa?
In this dissertation, the author tries to answer these questions by looking at a combination of
factors, including countries’ electoral systems, electoral management commissions, and election
monitoring mechanisms. The author contends that long lasting solutions to post-election crises
require preventive approaches. The author also argues in this thesis that having an electoral
system that produces results that mirror the composition of the populace (social cleavages in
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society) of the country is one of the effective preventive approaches to post-election conflicts. In
addition to PR systems that are the most appropriate to bring about democracy in pluralist
societies such as many countries in Africa, the prevention of post-election conflicts across the
continent is also dependent on a thorough understanding of and a strict compliance with and
enforcement of electoral rules by all political actors. Table 1.1 below summarizes the
characteristics of the six countries selected for the study.

Table 1.1: Summary of Selected Cases
Electoral systems

Low level of violence

High level of violence

Majoritarian systems

Ghana

Togo

Proportional systems

Benin

Guinea-Bissau

Mixed systems

Senegal

Guinea

1.3. Why Study Post-Election Conflicts?
First of all, what is post-election conflict? And why study it? These two questions have not
been the main preoccupations of many social scientists and practitioners in the field of conflict
resolution and analysis. However, since 1990, the focus has been on elections as a tool of
transfer of power from authoritarian rulers to democratic ones. This focus has helped to spur a
tremendous amount of literature on elections and electoral systems design (Hoglund 2009). From
the academic standpoint, studying post-election conflicts will therefore fill a gap in the literature.
In this thesis, post-election conflict is simply defined as any dissatisfaction of those who have
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vested interests in an election (incumbent or coalition government, opposition political parties,
candidates and their supporters, and other external actors) over the outcome of the election. Such
outcome may include political violence, which takes several forms such as armed revolution,
civil strife, institutionalized military repression, intimidation and periodic arrest, and
assassination of political leaders and their supporters.
In addition, the concept of post-election conflicts is worth studying for various practical
reasons. First and foremost, post-election conflicts can undermine the legitimacy of the incoming
government and/or tarnish or smear the image of the outgoing one should the latter try to
maintain power by violent means or highjack the electoral process. Bekoe (2012) concurs and
argues that electoral violence is “usually a brief, time- and event-bound period of violence, with
generally low levels of tension but with enormous bearing on a country’s democratization
process and institutional reform priorities and on its leaders’ legitimacy” (p. 4). But what is
legitimacy?
O’Donnell (2006) states that “across most of the globe today, the ultimate claim of a political
regime to be legitimate—or at least acceptable—rests on the kind of popular consent that
purportedly finds expression in the act of free voting” (p. 6). In synthesizing O’Donnell’s quote,
one can use the term “legitimacy” to simply mean popular acceptance of authority that is
democratically elected via free, fair and transparent elections. This notion brings in the issue of
legality. Are the leaders governing under the popularly and mutually acceptable rules by all
parties?
Leaders may also use the avenue of a military coup d’état or manipulate the electoral process
and rig elections, or a combination of both strategies. The use of these unethical and illegal
tactics may have negative consequences on the legitimacy of countries’ leaders and heads of
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states. There are a myriad of instances throughout the world where elected officials and/or
presidents’ legitimacy has been questioned either by their own people and/or by external actors,
such as foreign aid donors, the great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
and the like—the United Nations, the European Union, and other regional and international
organizations. This worldwide outcry over the legitimacy of a government occurs if parties fail
to obey the rules of the electoral game. The 2007 post-election conflict in Kenya provides a
palpable example of the manipulation of electoral process and vote rigging that was widely
condemned. To legitimate the incoming government,
Although the 1997 post-election peace agreement required that members of the Kenyan
independent Electoral Commission (EC) be proportionally represented by the ruling party and
the political opposition parties, the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki unilaterally replaced 19 of
the 22 members of the EC at the expenses of his political opponents (Brown 2011). Even though
this act might have contributed to triggering the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya, the
international actors failed to denounce the politicization of the EC but rather legitimized it
through their continuing financial support of the commission (Brown 2011). In spite of his
international recognition as the country’s re-elected president, Kibaki’s legitimacy was
questioned by the overwhelming majority of Kenyan population who took the matter to the
streets. To emphasize the record number of Kenyans in disagreement of the re-election of
President Kibaki, Chege (2010) uses the phrase “Forty-One Tribe Against One.” This slogan
simply means that out of the forty-two ethnic groups in Kenya, forty-one ethnic groups were
pitted against Kibaki’s ethnic group, the Kikuyu, by the campaign of the opposition which
accused the latter of obtaining preferential treatments from the government.
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Post-election conflicts may create fear among and within future voters, who can be hesitant
to go to the polls and exercise their civic and fundamental rights to vote. Voter turnout in
subsequent elections may be impacted or experience problems. This state of affairs will no
doubt, have dire consequences on the country’s democratization process. In Cote d’Ivoire for
example, the 2013 municipal and regional elections, despite being relatively peaceful, saw a
record low turnout.
According to Inza Diomande, a spokesman for the Ivorian Independent Electoral
Commission (CEI), only about 30 percent of the 5.7 million eligible voters turned out and cast
their ballots during these local elections (Naharnet 2013). This low turnout not only was a result
of a call for a mass boycott by the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), the political party of the former
Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo (who is now in The Hague for crimes against humanity), but
also it is indicative of a bitter and persistent division between supporters of Gbagbo and the
current Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara. This bitterness between the two rival camps was a
result of the disputed 2010 presidential elections that pushed the country into a civil war.
Analyzing violence through the lens of conflict management, Hoglund (2009) writes
“violence may have a negative impact by polarizing the electorate along conflict lines and in
extreme cases led to new outbursts of violence” (p. 413). An overwhelming majority of Ivoirians
(about 70 percent), because of their bad experiences from previous post-election violence that
occurred in the aftermath of both the 1999 and 2010 presidential elections, may have refrained
from going to the polls in 2013 during the municipal and regional elections. The low turnout in
these local elections can also be seen as “a trial run for the 2015 presidential election” (Naharnet
2013). The report of low turnout in the 2013 Ivorian local elections is consistent with the fact
that in most democracies local and regional elections tend to have much lower turnouts than
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national elections because of less high profile candidates, less media coverage, and less interest
among voters.
The 2013 post-election atmosphere in Cote d’Ivoire clearly shows that the country still faces
significant threats to its current reconciliation talks that are necessary for its long-term stability.
The long-term stability of the country remains a sine qua non condition for both the survival and
consolidation of its “infant” democracy. Cote d’Ivoire is still struggling in its democratic
transition stage.
Other instances exist where post-election conflicts have created a political atmosphere in
which voters not only were psychologically traumatized but also were intimidated by the
protagonists of the conflicts. For example, dissatisfied with the 2005 general elections in which
the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and allied parties won
an overwhelming majority of seats (about 70 percent of total seats) in their parliament,
opposition candidates and their supporters took the matter to the streets. A score of protesters,
mostly the leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), were arrested and jailed.
Many people were wounded and some deaths were registered as a result of the government
response to anti-government demonstrations (Lyons 2006).
According to Lyons, journalists and civil society leaders were also arrested and the Ethiopian
government decided to charge vocal human rights organizations and opposition leaders with
treason. Such a political development or situation created a psychosis within many voters. These
voters massively responded to the call by the political opposition parties to boycott the re-run
elections in electoral districts where there was a disagreement between the coalition government
and its political opponents over elections’ results.
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Post-election conflicts may generate the problem of refugees wherein peaceful citizens for
fear of military repression leave their homes or countries for foreign places. This case existed
after the 2005 presidential election in Togo where thousands of people were displaced and
became refugees in their neighbor Benin to the east, and Ghana to the west. In post-conflict
societies, as is the case in many African and Middle Eastern countries, candidates often withdrew
their candidature if they had reason to believe that conditions for peaceful, free, and fair elections
were not guaranteed by the government in power and that the victory of incumbents was
regarded as a forgone conclusion. Candidates also called for a mass boycott to delegitimize
elections’ outcomes if they believed that participating in such elections would lead to additional
electoral violence. The opposition boycotted elections in many places across the globe.
In Burundi, for example, in the aftermath of the 2010 violent presidential election that took
place on June 28, with the ruling party candidate Pierre Nkrunziza as the only candidate on the
ballot after the resignation of his political opponents, the parliamentary elections of July 23, 2010
were also boycotted by the opposition parties, leaving the country with a record low voter
turnout (Coleman 2012). The country continues to experience post-election political violence
orchestrated by both the former rebel forces known as the Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL)
or National Liberation Forces, and the militia group of the ruling National Council for the
Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). According to
Human Rights Watch (2012),
The political space in 2011 continued to narrow, with the CNDD-FDD still in a position
of near monopoly following the main opposition parties’ boycott of the 2010 elections.
The government continued to harass and intimidate journalists, lawyers, and civil society
actors who exposed abuses, often labeling them opposition supporters.
This description clearly shows the continuing violations of human rights in Burundi. The
presence of harassment and intimidation nullifies any efforts toward the establishment of
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electoral democracy. In a country where there is no guarantee of rights, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of speech, people tend to live under a constant fear. Such a fear may also
have been translated into a low turnout as the Burundian opposition candidates boycotted
elections in 2010.
Other instances where boycotts were used as pressure tactics to delegitimize elections and
election results include, but are not limited to, Zimbabwe (during the second round of the 2008
presidential election); Togo (in the 2002 legislative and 2003 presidential elections); Ethiopia
(repeatedly in 1992, 2000, and 2001) (African Election Database 2012); Afghanistan (during the
second round of the presidential election in 2009); and Sri Lanka (in the 2004 general election)
(see for example, Hoglund 2009); to name just a few. In each of these countries, voters may
have no incentives to go out and vote if their candidates resigned their candidatures. In such
circumstances, voter turnout may be low, and this low turnout may be a hurdle to the
democratization process in these countries. It may also affect the legitimacy of elections.
Political instability due to improprieties in elections may also have a huge impact on public
opinion and public acceptability of elections as a means of transfer of power and democratic
alternations. An in-depth analysis of the 2006 Afrobarometer surveys by Bekoe (2012: 5) reveals
that in countries where elections have been violent, people tend to have “a less favorable opinion
of ‘elections as a means to represent the true voice of the people in government’” than in
countries where elections have been relatively peaceful or with no major incidence. Similarly,
according to Bekoe (2012), people tend to have a more favorable view of democracy if they view
their elections as transparent, free, and fair than if their elections lack transparency and fairness.
Last but not least, post-election conflicts can also weaken governmental institutions and,
therefore, jeopardize the democratic process of the country, and in extreme cases, escalate to
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civil wars. This situation was particularly evident in some post-conflict countries where parties
turned to armed conflict after elections despite having peace agreements in place (Jarstad 2009).
Although all cases cannot be discussed in detail in this thesis, I will mention some of the cases
that most caught the attention of the international community. Examples of these post-conflict
countries include Cambodia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Uganda.
In Cambodia, after the Paris Agreement of 1991, the May 1993 elections did little to bring
about peace. The Cambodian government forces and Khmer Rouge resorted to all out war as a
way to resolve their differences. In the Republic of Congo, the Accord de Cessez-le-Feu (cease
fire) et de Cessation des Hostilités of 1999 failed to prevent the 2002 post-election violence,
which degenerated into a civil war. In the same year, armed conflict occurred in Chad despite the
closeness of the January 2002 Tripoli 2 Agreement and the April 2002 elections. Uganda also
experienced a violent and protracted armed conflict in the aftermath of the 2006 elections despite
the implementation of the Yumbe Peace Agreement that was signed by the government and the
Ugandan National Rescues Front at Yumbe Bona Ground in 2002, four years prior to the
elections.

1.4. Why Contemporary Africa?
Contemporary Africa is referred to here as Africa since 1990, a reference year of the call for
multiparty systems and electoral democracy around the globe. Since then, elections in Africa
have often been marred by conflicts and sometimes with violent conflicts. According to Salehyan
and Linebarger (2013), from 1990 to 2011, most of the 685 conflict events identified by the
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) across the continent were election-related conflicts.
Salehyan and Linebarger (2013) note that:
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Democracy is more likely to survive when there is a well-developed economy, a robust
civic culture, and strong institutions such as an apt judiciary and limits on executive
power that are able to channel social conflict by ensuring that political decision makers
are held accountable. These additional elements help preserve the integrity of elections
and provide assurances to the public that the democratic process will be allowed to take
its course.
Unfortunately, many African countries suffer from weak institutions, the lack of transparency
and accountability in decision-making processes, the lack of separation of powers, and the nonexistent vibrant civil society, and underdeveloped economy. Consequently, elections in these
countries have frequently been accompanied with violent conflicts. The continent was violently
shaken by post-election conflicts for example, in 1992 and 2007 in Kenya, in 1994 in South
Africa, in 1996 in Sierra Leone, in 2000 and 2010/2011 in Cote d’Ivoire, in 2003 and 2007 in
Nigeria, in 2005 in Togo, and in 2006 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Salehyan
and Linebarger 2013, Straus and Taylor 2012).
According to Frazer (2011), Ethiopia, Liberia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda remain the most
vulnerable cases of African countries that have at least once experienced post-election conflict.
Due to the frequency of political instability and violence associated with post-election conflicts,
there has been a negative image of African democracy. The 2012 Freedom House Report reveals
that only 12 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries are totally free or democratic compared to
71 percent in the Americas and 85 percent in Western Europe. Figure 1 below illustrates African
democracy levels in comparison to the rest of the world.
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Figure 1: Africa’s democracy level in comparative perspective

Source: Freedom House 2011

These descriptive statistics show how poorly most countries in Africa are doing when it
comes to embracing democratic culture. Free, transparent, and fair elections; respect for human
rights; protection of the rights of minorities; majority rule; separation of power; and elimination
of systemic corruption constitute major tenets of democracy. In many African countries, basic
human rights are often violated and abused. In most cases, both the economic and political
powers are concentrated in the hands of small groups of corrupt elites who forcefully preside
over the destiny of their countries.
Since the adoption of multiparty systems in the 1990s in some African countries, many
elections have been marred by violence and boycotts by political opponents who continue to
question not only the fairness and the transparency of such elections but also the fairness of the
electoral systems of their countries. The study of general patterns of electoral violence in all the
50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008 by Straus and Taylor (2012) shows
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that, out of the 221 elections, about twenty percent were highly violent with generalized killing,
repressive violence, and assassinations and torture. Thirty eight percent occurred with low levels
of violence including intimidation and harassment. However, the study also finds that about 42
percent of the 221 elections occurred peacefully or with no electoral violence.
The analysis of these data shows that about 58 percent of elections occurred with some kinds
of violence. This fact indicates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the likelihood of the occurrence of
violent elections is greater than the occurrence of peaceful elections. This result is also
significant and should catch the attention of policymakers, peace advocates, and experts in
conflict management to try to find durable solutions that aim not only at ending post-election
conflicts but also more importantly at preventing future election-related violence.
In March 2010 at the Conference on Preventing Electoral Violence in Accra, Ghana, the
participants acknowledged the severity and the frequency of post-election conflict in Africa.
According to Frazer (2011) the participants include “electoral commissioners; parliamentarians;
Ministers of Information, Foreign Affairs, and Security; members of the United Nations and
European Union; US Government officials; and non-governmental business leaders and
academics” (p. 16). A conference of such a caliber does not occur often.
The stated objective of the conference was “to focus on effective prevention and the
mitigation of violence through credible elections and good governance” (Center for International
Policy & Innovation [CIPI], 29 March 2010). To achieve stated objective, the conference laid out
six practical recommendations as an action plan, which includes: (1) dismantling the structures
for violent political mobilization through citizen education and empowerment, (2) promoting
adoption of core principles for conducting elections, (3) harmonizing codes of conduct across
Africa, (4) strengthening the association of African electoral authorities (AAEA) to serve as a
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resource for senior level election professionals, (5) promoting transparency of the electoral
process, and (6) increase and support research agenda on electoral violence (CIPI, 29 March
2010). However, the conference did little to prevent the 2012 electoral violence and military
coup in Guinea-Bisseau, and 2013 election-day violence in which about 15 people in Kenya
were killed.
Between 1990 and 2010, the time period that is the focus of this dissertation, the SCAD
reported an estimated 2,652 deaths in the top ten most violent African elections. These deaths
were recorded during election months alone. Out of these 2,652 deaths, the Kenyan 2007
electoral violence claimed the lion share with 1502 deaths (Salehyan and Linebarger 2013).
These deaths were directly related to elections. Table 1.2 below displays the circumstances,
dates, and places of these top ten most violent elections. The death toll of the horror of the 2010
Ivorian post-election crisis was not included in the SCAD report or these figures would be even
higher.
Table 1.2: Top Ten Violent Elections in Africa, 1990-20105
Country

Election Date

Number of
Deaths
Kenya
December 2007
1502
South Africa
April 1994
239
Nigeria
April 2007
226
Cote d’Ivoire
October 2000
178
Kenya
December 1992
156
Zimbabwe
March 2008
114
Togo
April 2005
110
Nigeria
April 2003
57
DRC
October 2006
42
Sierra Leone
February
28
Total
2652
Source: SCAD. See also Salehyan and Linebarger (2013)
5

The table summarizing the top ten most violent African elections is a collaborative work of Idean Salehyan, an
associate professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas and an associate at the Robert S. Strauss
Center for International Security and Law and Christopher Linebarger, a PhD student in International Relations and
Comparative Politics at the University of North Texas.
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The SCAD report indicates that not only do electoral conflicts occur frequently in Africa,
but also they have devastating effects on the continent’s democratization process. If the
establishment of democracy is the ultimate goal in order to ensure good governance and
sustainable peace and development in Africa, then, as Bekoe (2012) has suggested, electoral
violence should be an explanatory variable regarding conditions of survival and consolidation of
democracy.
Many countries in contemporary Africa have been experiencing post-election conflicts
since 1990. For this reason, this thesis will: (1) examine the relationship between post-election
conflict and electoral systems; (2) examine the impact of a critical intervening variable: electoral
system type on the main types of electoral conflicts (i.e. identity conflict, campaign conflict,
balloting conflict, and results conflict); and (3) provide policy recommendations on how to
reduce or eliminate the frequent occurrence of post-election political unrest. The section below
provides the structure of the thesis and discusses how the study is carried out.

1.5. Overview of the Thesis
The thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, discusses the
importance of studying post-election conflicts, and explains the choice of Africa and some
specific cases as the area of study. Chapter 2 covers two important aspects of the thesis. First, it
presents the review of the existing literature on post-election conflicts, their origins and
consequences. In the literature, the author specifically looks at possible definitions of postelection conflicts and political instability. The author then discusses the correlation between the
two concepts and how they can affect the legitimacy of elections and countries’ democratization
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processes. The author also identifies and conceptualizes the various types of electoral conflicts
including identity conflict, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, and results conflict.
The literature also addresses possible roles of elections in African politics and discusses
the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and elections’ outcomes. After defining a critical
control variable, that is, social cleavages, the author presents and discusses how their presence
might affect the electoral systems designs in Africa and vice versa. Furthermore, the author
argues in this chapter that the presence of ethnic heterogeneity alone normally does not ignite a
conflict, in this context, post-election conflict, but a conflict can erupt if ethnic groups are
manipulated by leaders for their political ambitions. Second, these four key theories—the Social
Cleavages and Party System Theory (SCPST), the Bounded Rationality Theory (BRT), Relative
Deprivation Theory (RDT), and the Democratization Approach (DA)—provide a theoretical
framework for analyzing and explaining the frequency of post-election conflicts and electoral
behavior in Africa.
Chapter 3 discusses the data and methods used in this thesis. In order to get the variables
that are critical for this study so as to thoroughly address the theoretical question being
investigated, that is, “In Contemporary Africa, why do some countries tend to experience postelection conflict while others do not?”, this chapter takes a step back and lays out two testable
hypotheses as follows:
(H1): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than countries that use proportional representative electoral systems;
(H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than countries that use mixed electoral systems.
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In addition, chapter 3 provides a comprehensive definition of the dependent variable, that
is, post-election conflict, and takes appropriate steps to measure both the dependent variable
(DV) and independent variables (IV), including but not limited to, the types of electoral systems,
effectiveness of elections, disproportional index, ethnic fractionalization index, living standard,
level of education, and the level of inequality. This chapter also examines the mixed method
approach adopted in this thesis. Such a method is conducted in two phases.
In phase I, secondary quantitative data are used and issues regarding the reliability of
sources are addressed. Because of the continuous DV, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analysis is run to determine the effect of election systems type on the post-election conflict in all
African nations that hold elections. Matching pattern is used in phase II, as in-depth comparative
case studies of six African states (as described earlier in the section of the statement of the
problem), to determine in detail why countries, despite using similar electoral systems,
experience electoral conflicts at different levels.
Chapter 4 discusses variations in electoral systems in contemporary Africa. It generally
looks at electoral systems in democratizing countries and examines the African models. It also
addresses questions concerning rules that govern elections and electoral processes and how such
rules may hinder or promote democracy in Africa. Chapter 4 also examines the relationship
between elections and party systems.
In an in-depth comparative analysis, chapter 5 sheds light on how the political institutions
function and how these institutions influence people’s voting behavior in each of the six
countries—Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Senegal—selected for this study. It
also investigates whether previous elections in each of these cases are competitive, free and fair,
and/or legitimate. The chapter discusses how elections are sequenced, managed, and monitored.
27

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

The role of civil society and traditional authorities in promoting democracy and conflict
mitigation is also discussed in chapter 5. The chapter also addresses a critically important
question, that is, “What are the consequences of electoral systems and the rules of the game on
democratic alternations?” Such a question, at least in the context of Africa, is not yet widely
studied by either scholars in academe or practitioners in the field of conflict management.
Chapter 6 emphasizes the importance of electoral systems and the role they play in
conflict management and resolution in general and in the prevention of post-election conflicts in
particular. After a critical analysis of the devastating effects of post-election conflicts on Africa’s
development, governance, and democratization, the chapter outlines a series of lessons learned
based on past electoral malpractices across the continent. Furthermore, chapter 6 underlines and
discusses the policy implications of this study. This chapter also sums up the main findings of
the thesis and discusses their significance with regard to the emergence, survival, and
consolidation of democracy as well as the prevention of post-election conflict in contemporary
Africa. It finally discusses the limitations of the study and establishes the ground for further
investigations into post-election conflicts beyond the African continent.
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CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN AFRICA

2.1 Literature Review
Political stability plays a paramount role in the consolidation of democracy. In places where
political instability reigns as a result of frequent electoral violence or other forms of major
conflict, any endeavors toward political liberalization and economic development become
problematic. If establishing democracy requires holding elections, and if African elections often
degenerate into violence, then why are elections necessary instruments of legitimacy? What are
the potential causes of conflict after elections? What are the necessary conditions for holding free
and fair elections that are indispensable for the emergence and survival of democracy in Africa?
The literature review discusses these questions in depth so as to provide a better
understanding of the main purpose of this study and help answer the research question, “In
Africa, why do some countries tend to experience post-election conflict while others do not?”
Preventing electoral conflicts requires a total elimination of biased rules of the electoral game
and an understanding of “unbiased” rules and especially their fair application. Given that all
electoral rules include some biases, it is the fair implementation of such rules that is most critical
in the prevention of electoral conflict. But before exploring the existing literature on electoral
violence, let us first and foremost define the concept of conflict, identify various types of
electoral conflicts, and discuss potential root causes of post-election instability.
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2.1.1. Definition of Conflict and Causes of Post-Election Instability
In this section, I adopt the conceptual definition of the two categories of conflict (violent
and nonviolent conflicts) from the 2006 HIIK Conflict Barometer, operationalize each category,
and discuss potential sources of political instability.
2.1.1.1. Defining Post-Election Conflicts and Political Instability
Conflict is defined here as the result of an incompatibility of goals, objectives, and
interests of parties involved in the struggle for power and/or allocation of scarce resources. The
definition of the term “conflict” is not as simple as it appears. The complexity of conflict
requires researchers and scholars to categorize conflict into two types: non-violent and violent
conflicts. Violent conflicts occur in many forms including crisis, severe crisis, civil war, attacks
on the regime, violent protests, and riots (Franke, Hampel-Milagrosa, and Schure 2007).6 By
contrast, non-violent conflicts are observable conflict behaviors, such as peaceful
demonstrations, boycotts, rallies, and sit-ins that can contribute to potential conflicts if they are
perceived and reacted to. While the classification of conflict into violent and non-violent
conflicts is both creative and interesting, it is not comprehensive enough to empirically help
explain potential causes of electoral conflicts as it fails to discuss conflict within the rules of the
electoral system and outside existing system rules.
In the context of elections, Straus and Taylor (2012) define electoral violence as
“physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or an

6

According to the 15th Annual Conflict Analysis of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
(HIIK), a crisis is “a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents” and a
severe crisis is defined as a crisis in which “violent force is repeatedly used in an organized way.” HIIK also defines
a war as “a type of violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and
systematic way. The conflicting parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of
destruction is massive and of long duration.” An extensive discussion on crisis, severe crisis, and war is available at:
http://www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2006.pdf
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announced electoral result” (p. 19). Such violence also includes the use of threats of physical
harm by at least a stakeholder that has vested interests in elections and electoral outcomes.
Outside existing electoral system rules, it is very important to determine whether violence is
committed by the ruling party and supporters to maintain power or by the opposition parties to
challenge the outcomes of the elections and, therefore, change the status quo (Straus and Taylor
2009). Most importantly, regardless of who uses violence for a political gain, how it is reported
remains a key empirical question when it comes to conducting a comprehensive analysis of
electoral conflict. Straus and Taylor (2009: 21) identify four levels of electoral violence: 1) no
reported violence throughout the entire electoral process, ranging from pre- to post-election; 2)
violent harassment (police or security forces breaking up rallies, party supporters brawling in the
streets, confiscation of opposition newspapers, candidate disqualifications, and limited shortterm arrests of political opponents); 3) violent repression, which includes high-level
assassinations and targeted murder, continuous high-level arrests of party leaders, long-term
violent intimidation and torture; and 4) violent campaign with generalized violence including
widespread physical attacks and massive killings.
Another way to discuss electoral conflict is to look within the rules of the electoral
system and discuss parties’ motives to embrace violent conflict behaviors. According to
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 7-8),
Conflict is universal feature of human society. It takes its economic differentiation, social
change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization –all of
which are inherently conflictual –and becomes overt through the formation of conflict
parties, which come to have, or are perceived to have, mutually incompatible goals.

In the same order of ideas, Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus (2006) contend that “conflict is often
a means of seeking or maintaining the balance of or imbalance of power in relationships” (p.
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120). These two quotations capture well what motivates parties to engage in violent conflicts
during electoral processes. In the context of elections, the ruling party or a coalition government
may want to maintain the status quo by preventing its political opposition parties the access to
power through elections while the opposition parties may seek change or opportunity for change.
How can a ruling party or coalition government maintain the status quo? An answer to such a
question can be found in Cox (1997)’s discussion on what he called “coordination failures and
democratic performance” (p. 223). The author identifies three main ways by which political
opposition parties can be prevented access to power.
First, the ruling party may decide to make the electoral system stronger. According to
Cox (1997), “Increasing the strength of the electoral system will decrease the representativeness
of the polity’s legislative and executive branches but will increase government stability” (p.
225). As the electoral system becomes stronger, smaller parties may not be able to win seats in
parliaments and, therefore, will be excluded from the decision-making processes. Second,
governments can deny their political opponents access to power by “sustaining dominant party
systems” (p. 238). If the electoral system does not allow opposition parties to coordinate at the
electoral stage, these parties may fail to agree on a mutually acceptable compromise that may
help them compete in elections against the dominant party and possibly win seats. Coordination
failures help to perpetuate the dominant party in power (Cox 1997).
Third, the dominant party prevents peaceful and democratic alternations by provoking
“short-lived but very intense disruptions of traditional patterns of voting behavior” (p. 251),
and/or making sure that the main political party is fragmented. In such circumstances, the
dominant party may either provide incentives for voters so that they can switch their partisan
voting habits or dictate to them how to vote and threaten them with retaliation if they vote
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otherwise. The costs of coordination failures are in most cases extremely high. If parties failed to
coordinate, the situation may lead to violent and deadly conflicts, especially where the
legitimacy of the government is put into question. The most recent example of such conflicts in
Africa is the 2010 post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire where thousands of people were killed.
In the section below, I discuss various types of electoral conflicts, including identity,
campaign, balloting, results, and representation conflicts.

2.1.1.2. Types of Electoral Conflicts
Fischer (2002), an election expert of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES), identifies and discusses five possible types of electoral conflicts that may occur during
an election chronology. These interrelated conflicts include identity, campaign, balloting, results,
and representation conflicts. In this thesis, I adopt this typology of electoral conflicts to help
explain why some African countries tend to experience electoral violence while others do not.

a.) Identity Conflict
In the context of elections, identity conflict occurs during the voter registration process
when within a country some citizens are denied their voting rights. They may be treated as
second-class citizens or illegal immigrants. With that status, they may be unable to clearly
establish their national identities or citizenships, and therefore, will not be able to register to
vote.

Denying any citizen or groups of citizens—assuming that these people are actually

legitimate, legal citizens—their basic civic rights does nothing but incite them to resort to
violence.
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Horowitz (2001)’s discussion of ethnic violence as a specific example of identity conflict
identifies pre-emptive strikes, break-outs, and lock-ins as patterns of ethnic violence that occur in
the early phases of elections. These three patterns of ethnic violence are discriminatory in
nature. The main objective of pre-emptive strikes is to enhance one party’s winning chances at
the expenses of the other or others as with new voter ID laws in some U.S. states. In other words,
“pre-emptive strikes are aimed at enhancing a particular community’s chances of electoral
success, for example by driving out, intimidating or otherwise influencing voters whose vote is
assumed to go to a different political party” (Wolff 2006: 13). In electoral contests, pre-emptive
strikes are often used by politicians to eliminate their political opponents and their supporters.
For example, in Cote d’Ivoire, the current Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, because of his
parents’ status as immigrants, was repeatedly excluded from contesting presidential elections
after the death of President Houphouet Boigny.
However, when there is a need to broaden their political base, politicians sometimes use
break-outs that consist of making refugees and other non-citizens (for example) members of their
political parties and providing them with party identification cards and voter registration cards to
allow them to cast the ballots in their favor. Wolff (2006) writes, “Break-outs often happen in the
form of attempts to broaden the base of an existing political party to expand beyond its
traditional core ethnic constituency,” (p. 13) (quoted in Horowitz 2001, pp. 295-308). This
break-outs strategy surfaces in the 2012 elections in Ghana when the main opposition party, the
New Patriotic Party (NPP), accused the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) of inflating
the list of registered voters with non-Ghanaians.
According to Horowitz (2001), both pre-emptive strikes and break-outs threaten not only
the prospect of other political parties but also their mere existence. Because no political party
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leaders would want the survival of their parties threatened by their counterparts, the likelihood to
engage in violence as a way to deal with such threats increases even before the election takes
place. As Fischer (2002) notes, it is too simplistic to say that identity conflict in the electoral
contests occurs in the registration process. Wolff (2006), who discusses what Horowitz (2001),
calls “lock-ins” as a type of ethnic violence in particular and identity conflict in general, argues
that identity conflict occurs even beyond the voter registration process given that it is often one
of the main sources of post-election conflict. Lock-ins happen when “elections confirm the
continuation of dominant, demographic majorities” (Wolff 2006: 20) through the use of
illegitimate methods, including the gerrymandering technique, whereby boundaries of electoral
districts are drawn to unfairly increase the dominant party’s winning chances. If the electorate
were expecting a change, or more specifically, a democratic alternation, but an election
confirmed the status quo (through breakouts or ins), post-election violence would be a more
likely result.

b.) Campaign Conflict
During any election season, campaigns are organized to persuade registered voters to
elect one candidate or party over others running for the same public offices. To appeal to voters,
candidates have to know voters’ needs, concerns, and interests, and be able to convey their
message that addresses such needs and interests. Any successful campaign requires all kinds of
resources including, but not limited to, human, material, and financial resources. Conflict often
occurs because of the scarcity of such resources. Political parties and their candidates fight over
those resources. For example, how is access to the media distributed among parties or candidates
to the elections? During presidential elections, are candidates free to campaign throughout the
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country? In legislative contests, do all candidates have equal access to voters in their
constituencies regardless of their ethnic and/or religious backgrounds?
Once candidates and their supporters realize that these scare resources are not equitably
distributed, the occurrence of violence is more likely during election campaigns. In the 2009
UNDP Elections and Conflict Prevention Guide, campaign conflict is defined as “efforts to
intimidate or influence voters and candidates, and efforts to affect participation (usually to limit
it through creating insecurity)” (p. 21). Campaigns are often disrupted, and voters and candidates
are intimidated. As an immediate consequence, participation in voting may be negatively
impacted (Fischer 2002).
Similarly, Bratton (2008) argues that “threats of violence lead to an especially sharp
reduction in voter turnout” (p. 2). In Mali for example, due to internal strife and voter
intimidation, voter turnout has been consistently low (below 40 percent) since 1992. In Malian
parliamentary elections, voter turnout was 21.09 percent in 1992, 21.58 percent in 1997, 26.00
percent in 2002, and 32.19 percent in 2007. In presidential contests in Mali, although voter
turnout seems to have a slight increase compared to that of Malian parliamentary elections, it has
been below 40 percent. In 1992, 1997 and 2007, the voter turnouts in the country presidential
elections were 20.9 percent, 28.41 percent, and 36.24 percent, respectively. The highest voter
turnout in Malian presidential elections was 38.57 percent. It occurred in 2002 (International
IDEA 2011).
Many African election campaigns are marred by violent clashes between supporters of
different rival groups. According to Teshome (2009), countries like Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, and Zimbabwe, to name just a few, have been experiencing
violent election campaigns since 1991. Even Ghana, which is known recently for holding
36

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

peaceful and democratic elections in Africa, experienced pre-election violence that killed “three
people and injured many others in northern Ghana” (IRIN News 2008). During election
campaigns in Ghana, not only are anti-government demonstrations dispersed by the security
forces loyal to the ruling party, but also peaceful campaign rallies are often attacked or restricted
(IRIN News 2008).
Teshome (2009) pinpoints the daunting problems facing East African countries when it
comes to establishing democracy in the region. He argues that the main handicap of Africa’s
democracy is with no doubt the frequency of political and electoral violence. Teshome (2009)
then notes, “The most common types of political and electoral violence in East Africa include
abduction and kidnapping, assault, violent disruption of political meetings and rallies, murder
attempts, murder, hooliganism, torture, arson, death threats and threats to violence” (p. 464). In
general, how election campaigns were conducted by political actors gives a preview of how the
polling day will look. There is a high likelihood that violent election campaigns lead to a high
level of violence at the polling stations. However, despite pre-election tensions in Lesotho and
post-Arab Spring Egypt and Libya, peaceful elections were held (The Nordic Africa Institute
2012/3).

c.) Balloting Conflict
Balloting conflict happens on election days at the polling stations (Fischer 2002, Bratton
2008, and UNDP 2009). Bratton (2008: 2) conducted a critical analysis of the 2007 Nigerian
elections and noted,
Voting for President and National Assembly failed to take place in certain polling
stations in a half dozen states in the southeast and northeast due to the non-delivery of
electoral materials. In numerous other locations across the country, ballot papers were
misprinted or arrived late. In the southern Niger Delta zone, armed militias brazenly stole
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ballot boxes or substituted pre-stuffed containers of their own. Despite guarantees from
the Inspector General of Police that public security would be assured, opposition
candidates were harassed or arrested, voters were turned away from polling places by
gangs of young thugs, ballot secrecy was violated by party workers and police, and some
300 persons were killed in election related violence.

The quote cited above shows how violence, corruption and misuse of political power are still
dominating Nigerian politics. Achebe (1967) demonstrates how the Honorable Chief Nanga used
greedy and violent means, including trying to bribe and proceed with the arrest of his opponents
(Max and Odili) and supporters, killing Max, and stuffing ballot boxes in order to win elections
against his main challenger, Odili. Practically, in Nigerian politics there is no change from when
Achebe wrote his A Man of the People. The Nigerian case is just an example among others in
Africa. Besides electoral improprieties such as ballot rigging and stuffing, intimidations,
harassments, and arrests of political opponents and their supporters, it is not a surprise to learn
that both sides (the ruling party and its political opposition) may engage in reciprocal accusations
of fraud on Election Day (Teshome 2009, IciLomé.com 1 August 2013). Palpable examples of
African elections where accusations and counter accusations between rival camps escalated into
post-election mayhem include, but are not limited to, the 2005 parliamentary elections in
Ethiopia; the presidential elections in Togo (2005 and 2010), in Kenya (2007 and 2012), and in
Cote d’Ivoire (2010); and the legislative and presidential elections in Zimbabwe (2008 and
2013).
Allegations of fraud on Election Day make all stakeholders, including election observers,
aware of the possible unfairness of the elections so that they can find a remedy to the situation.
As the Democratic Governance Group and Bureau for Development Policy (2009) note, if
parties’ concerns about electoral fraud are not seriously addressed by election management
commissions or elections’ administrators, then election materials, such as ballot boxes can be
38

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

stolen or physically attacked, voters may be intimidated and decide not to turn out to vote, and/or
Election Day may turn bloody as rebel forces or government forces for that matter—if fearing a
loss—may use firearms and seize power as a way to stall political log-jam.

d.) Results Conflict
If the registration stage of elections and election campaigns are crucial in setting the tone
of whether such elections will be fair and transparent or not, the period between voting and the
proclamation of election results are also crucial in determining the fate of parties and their
candidates. In many countries, electoral commissions play an important role in the credibility of
both the electoral process and elections results. The electoral commissions are responsible for
handling a series of duties, such as voter registration, ensuring that only legal citizens and
eligible voters were those on the voters’ registry and that no voter registered twice. In addition,
the electoral commissions manage campaigns for various electoral contests, such as local,
legislative or parliamentary and presidential elections (Sabastiano 2006). The electoral
commissioners assume the responsibility for the delivery of electoral kits or materials to polling
stations as well as dispatching members of polling stations and polling officers to ensure not only
the security of voters, but also the security of the ballot boxes and the serenity of Election Days.
The electoral commissions are also in charge of recruiting international election
observers, who according to Sabastiano (2006: 2), are able to: (i) demonstrate a track record of
credibility; (ii) demonstrate neutrality in elections; (iii) illustrate that governance is a key aspect
of their activities; (iv) submit timely written observation reports; (v) meet their upkeep expenses;
and (vi) comply with guidelines to be issued by the electoral commissions. Vote counting and the
proclamation of election results are also key responsibilities of the electoral commissions. “The
39

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

people who cast the votes don’t decide an election, the people who count the votes do,” said
Joseph Stalin (quoted in Popovic, Milivojevic, and Djinovic 2006, p. 16). The credibility of
elections results depends on both the credibility of the electoral commissions and the
trustworthiness of these commissions and accredited international observers.
When parties have reasons to strongly believe that elections were fraudulent, that the
electoral commissions and international observers failed to demonstrate their neutrality and
impartiality during the electoral process, and that they have no chances of winning and that there
are no independent legal institutions or election dispute mechanisms to correct elections’
improprieties, violence becomes a potential ultimate option to them. Similar to balloting conflict,
results conflict may be characterized by (1) armed clashes among political parties, (2) violent
clashes among groups of rival supporters, (3) vandalism and physical attacks on property of
opponents, and (4) targeted attacks against specific candidates or political parties (Democratic
Governance Group and Bureau for Development Policy 2009: 21), or peaceful demonstrations
which may be repressed by security forces loyal to the regime as was the case in Egypt where
over two hundred civilians were killed and about two thousand people injured (Mohyeldin,
Engel, and Arkin 2013, Hendawi and Michael 2013).

e.) Representation Conflict
Fischer (2002) writes, “Representation conflict can occur when elections are organized as
‘zero sum’ and where ‘losers’ are left out of participation in governance” (p. 10). It seems that
Fischer is only alluding to post-election period when he talks of “governance.” After a critical
analysis of the chronology of the discussion on the types of electoral conflict, I argue that
representation conflict can also be discussed even before identity conflict. The issue of
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representation emerges even before election date is decided. For example, during the process of
redistributing electoral districts, the dominant party may use gerrymandering practices with a
hope to establish a political advantage over its opponents and secure its majority in subsequent
parliamentary elections. The electoral map of Cameroon provides a good example of
gerrymandering or what Ochieng’ Opalo (2012) called “strategic legislative malapportionment”
(p. 81). According to Ochieng’ Opalo (2012), Cameroonian president, Paul Biya’s “home region
of South Province, for instance, has five MPs representing 121,000 inhabitants while North West
Province, and opposition bastion, also have five MPs—but they represent 313,000 people” (p.
88). Electoral malpractices of this kind have helped Biya and his Cameroon People’s Democratic
Movement (CPDM) to enjoy landslide victories election after election since 1992.
Political actors talk of representation during discussions about the composition of
election management commissions (EMC) that must be in charge of the organization and
administration of elections. Which party must be a member of EMC and which one should be
excluded? What quota of representation can each party get? What will the threshold of
representation be? What role can each participant play in the commission and how? and
international observers participate and what role will they play? Representation conflict erupts as
tension increases around the debate about who gets “what, when, and how” in the EMC.
Other kinds of representation conflict surface in the post-election era when losers are not
included in the administration of their country’s economic, cultural, and socio-political affairs.
Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2008) discuss in-depth the concept of “representation” in terms of
geography, ideology, political party, and social fabric (gender, age, class, ethnicity, religion, etc.)
of the country. First, since in much of Africa ethnicity and geography coincide, does each region
have representative(s) in the legislature? If so, are all regions equally or proportionally
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represented? Second, are all political ideologies within the country represented in the legislature?
Finally, as Reynolds, et al. (2008) point out, “the legislature should be to some degree a ‘mirror
of the nation’ which should look, feel, think and act in a way which reflects the people as whole”
(p. 9). Countries may experience a representation conflict if the legitimacy of their legislatures is
in doubt. For instance, during the apartheid era (1948-1990), elections in South Africa were
“white-only’ elections (African Election Database 2011).
Indeed, when the Afrikaner National Party (NP), a party of white minority in South
Africa, “won” a general election in 1948, the apartheid policy was established to protect the
political and socio-economic interests of the minority white population. Because of its monopoly
of the House of Assembly, the NP was able to enact discriminatory laws and policies that
prevented the majority black population from sharing South Africa’s scarce resources. This
minority population of about 5 million of whites at the time controlled 87 percent of land and
other economic assets at the expense of 33 million of blacks and colored people, including the
Indians (Ottaway 1993). Because the majority black population suffered discrimination as a
result of lack of representation in the House of Assembly, they engaged in the struggle against
the apartheid or racial discrimination via legitimate revolutions that paved the way for South
Africa’s democratic transition in 1994.
In all, conflict is inherent in human nature. As long as human beings continue to interact
among themselves, conflict is unavoidable. However, violent conflicts are destructive and,
therefore, must be avoided. Van der Stoel (1994) argues that violent conflicts can be prevented
and/or avoided if their origins or sources are carefully identified and addressed in the early stages
assuming there is no core value conflict. The section below turns to a discussion of the potential
causes of electoral conflicts.
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2.1.1.3. Potential Causes of Post-Election Instability
Numerous scholars of African studies (such as Williams 2011, Akokpari 2008, Mazrui
2008, Zeleza 2008, and Alao 2007) have been writing on issues such as military coups, natural
resource conflicts, and identity-based conflicts and how to deal with them. However, despite the
multiplicity of studies on current conflicts in Africa, little effort has been made to isolate and
study post-election conflicts in Africa and how to prevent such conflicts from arising. This study
attempts to fill this gap in the existing literature.
Fischer (2002) combines the two concepts—conflict and violence—and argues that, to
some extent, conflict and violence impact electoral processes the same way. However, he argues
that their nuances remain in what he calls “the magnitude of the victimization” (p. 9). According
to Fischer (2002), “electoral conflict and violence can be defined as any random or organized act
that seeks to determine, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal
intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced ‘protection,’ blackmail,
destruction of property, or assassination” (p. 8). These terms are used in my analysis of types of
post-election violence. Fischer (2002) also identifies five potential types of conflicts that often
occur during an election process. These types include identity conflict during the voter
registration stage, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, results conflict, and representation
conflict (as discussed earlier).
By definition, political violence takes several forms, including armed revolution, civil
strife, institutionalized military repression, intimidation and periodic arrest, and assassination of
political leaders and their supporters. Ong’ayo (2008) discusses the association between political
violence and political instability. The author argues that during the 1990s the leadership in most
African countries have had difficulty accepting the multi-party system as one of the
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preconditions for the emergence of democracy. These African political leaders “did not fully
embrace the changes that accompanied the transition” (p. 6). The reluctance of these leaders to
cope with these new changes has been one of the root causes of political instability in many
African countries.
Most literature on political violence and civil war has focused on economic indicators
that are more likely to signal countries’ vulnerability to civil war (Gleditsch and Ruggery 2010).
Such indicators include, but are not limited to, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the size
of country’s population, employment and wages, productivity, inequality, consumer price index
(CPI), food shortage, financial meltdown, economic depression (Abrahamian 2009: 162), and
social exclusion (Gurr 1968).
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also show a linkage between GDP per capita and conflict.
They argue that the higher the GDP per capita, the lower the potential for conflict. Although
focusing mainly on economic grievances as potential root causes of instability has been useful, it
has failed to show the big picture when it comes to identifying and understanding the overall
determinants of political instability. For example, in studying a causal model of civil strife, Gurr
(1968) finds that “a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for
civil strife of some kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among
members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form” (p. 1104).
To Gurr, the concept of relative deprivation is defined as the perceived discrepancy that exists
among members of a society about what they have and what they feel that they ought to have.
Theoretically, if a group of people within a society perceives that it is relatively deprived
compared to other groups within the same society, it is more likely that the deprived group will
expresses frustration and aggression toward the authority and or the privileged groups (Brush
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1996, Gurr 1968). Many current conflicts in Africa can be explained through the lens of relative
deprivation. Examples of such conflicts include, but are not limited to, the current Malian crisis
in which the Touaregs feel that they have been excluded from sharing their country’s resources
(land, political power, etc.), and the Ivorian civil war after the late President Felix Houphouet
Boigny. Social exclusion in these countries has been going on for decades. The impact of relative
deprivation is moderated in many ways by intervening variables such as “coercive potential,
institutionalization, and social facilitation” (Gurr 1968: 1104). Defining the following variables
has a significant importance for clarification purposes. The first variable is coercive potential.
The term coercive potential refers to the degree to which people are affected by deprivation. It
also denotes the intensity of deprivation and multidimensional deprivation (Whelan and Maître
2005). The second intervening variable that moderates the relative deprivation is
institutionalization.
According to Collins English Dictionary, institutionalization is “the act or process of
establishing something as a custom or common practice”. In his discussion of relative
deprivation, Gurr (1968) defines the term institutionalization as “the extent to which societal
structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or
personnel, and are stable and persisting” (p. 1105). Theoretically, the existence of such structures
minimizes the occurrence of civil strife and political instability (Huntington 1965, Kornhauser
1959). The third variable is social facilitation. By definition, social facilitation denotes the
existence of conditions that facilitate mass mobilization and uprisings. As Gurr (1968) notes it,
“populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs
justifying violent response to deprivation” (p. 1106). The magnitude of strife is, therefore,
proportional to the level of social facilitation. The long term relative deprivation remains thus the
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main cause of civil strife and political instability in many divided societies in transition to
democracy.
Schnytzer (1994) and Gurr (1970), argue that major explanatory factors of democratic
deficit—lack of civil liberties, lack of political rights and lack of opportunities for political
participation—may also create room for violent anti-government uprisings (quoted in Gleditsch
and Ruggery 2010: 301). These factors of democratic deficit have produced relative deprivation
in many regions and countries, such as Middle East and North Africa, where there are ongoing
anti-government uprisings or Arab Spring (Baroi 2012, Fahmy 2012, Byman 2011), and South
Africa under the apartheid regime (Lodge 2009, Ottaway 1993).
With the exception of Nazi Germany and contemporary China, countries that have strong
political institutions are less likely to experience political violence than countries that do not
(Sander, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983). For instance, in 2005 in Togo, after the abrupt death of the
longtime dictator, President Eyadéma Gnassingbé, the country experienced a bloody political
transition as a result of non-compliance with the Togolese Constitution by the ruling party. Faure
Gnassingbé, a son of the late president became first, an interim president by a constitutional coup
and second, the country’s president through the 2005 electoral holdup (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s
Transformation [BIT] 2012). This constitutional coup was possible in Togo not only because of
the state’s monopoly of the military and security forces as a means of regime maintenance, but
also most importantly because of a lack of strong institutions, including the constitution.
In Guinea, a military coup led by Captain Dadis Camara followed the announcement of
the death of President Lassana Conté in 2009. However, when a similar scenario occurred in
2012 in Ghana, the political transition following the death of the Ghanaian president Atta Mills
went smoothly without violence. The country’s Vice President became the Interim President and
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finished the four remaining months of the mandate of his predecessor. He then prepared and held
multiparty democratic elections in December 2012 and won the presidency for another four
years.
Given that Togo and Guinea are not yet full democracies while Ghana is (Freedom House
2012, African Election Database 2011), these cases illustrate how democracies with strong
institutions and leaders that are imbibed in democratic values rely heavily on such institutions to
mitigate their political crises. In addition, according to Afrobarometer Round 5, an online survey
analysis conducted between 2010 and 2012 in twenty-two African countries, an overwhelming
majority of people in those countries have a favorable view about democracy.7 For instance, in
Togo, 77 percent of the 1200 respondents affirm that democracy is preferable to any other kinds
of government (Afrobarometer 2012). This popular support for democracy in that state does not,
however, influence their country’s political leaders to establish strong institutions that can help
prevent potential political violence.
In a country, political stability and its breakdown depend not only on the strength or
weakness of political institutions, but also on its political leaders’ understanding of power and
how to access power. Gleditsch and Ruggery (2010) measure political stability by looking at
how leaders come to power. By definition, political stability is a multidimensional concept,
which denotes “system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness” (Lijphart 1977:
4) (quoted in Eckstein 1973). In their discussion on political stability, Gleditsch and Ruggery
(2010) link “the security with which leaders hold office to the risk of civil war” (p. 302). From
that association, one should expect that leaders who come to power through violent coup d’état

7

Benin (72 %), Botswana (82%), Burkina Faso (72%), Burundi (74%), Cape Verde (81%), Ghana (82%), Kenya
(73%), Lesotho (55%), Liberia (81%), Malawi (76%), Mali (62%), Mauritius (85%), Mozambique (63%), Namibia
(64%), Nigeria (69%), Sierra Leone (76%), South Africa (72%), Togo (77%), Uganda (79%), Tanzania (84%),
Zambia (90%), and Zimbabwe (79%).
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are more likely to experience political instability and even be removed via violent coups. This
situation is the case in Guinea (2009), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997 and 2001), and
Central African Republic (2003 and 2012 – present).
Kenya is a good example of how leaders use violence to reach their political objectives.
In Kenya, both President Mwai Kibaki and the Kenyan opposition leader, Raila Odinga, have
resorted to violence to achieve their political gains (Otieno 2009, Chege 2008). The death toll in
the 2007 electoral violence was estimated at 1,200 (Voice of America, 2013). While Kibaki
managed to hold on to power after the bloody 2007 presidential elections, his challenger,
Odinga, became the country’s Prime Minister after a political peace agreement between the
former rivals. Odinga led the Kenyan coalition government and prepared the 2013 presidential
elections in which he took part as one of the leading candidates (France 24, 28 January 2013).
Zimbabwe is another interesting case that fits this model of reliance on violence.
As Bratton and Masunungure (2010) note, in Zimbabwe, “The political elite take as
articles of faith the assumptions that violence was effective in delivering independence and that
repression is the party’s most effective weapon for countering real and imagined threats” (p.
347). Thus, in 1976, Robert Mugabe proclaimed that “our votes must go together with our guns;
after all any vote…shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which provides the votes,
should remain its security officer, its guarantor” (p. 12) (see for example, Bratton and
Masunungure 2010, p. 347). Throughout the history of Zimbabwe, the ruling party (the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF]), which has been in power since
independence in 1980, relies on the use of force to consolidate its power around its leader
President Mugabe. Mugabe considers the repression of his political opponents and their
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supporters as the sole and effective means to maintain the status quo in Zimbabwe and hold on to
power for life (Kriger 2005).
Mugabe’s 2008 presidential runoff strategy against his challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai,
was termed “electoral cleansing” (Bratton and Masunungure 2010: 348). This strategy of
“electoral cleansing” was not only directed at intimidating supporters of the opposition
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but also it aimed at assassinating the political
opponents of the dictatorial regime. Mugabe still uses a violent language even after the 2013
presidential elections held on July 31 that he won with 61 percent of the vote against his
traditional opposition leader, Tsvangirai (Aljazeera 22 August 2013). In his inaugural speech in
Harare (the capital of Zimbabwe), Mugabe told his critics, including Tsvangirai and Western
powers who accused him of electoral holdup, to “go hang” (Chinaka and Dzirutwe 2013).
Studying potential causes of political instability in Africa, Ong’ayo (2008) contends that
“the African elites, who are bent on hanging to power at all cost and for the purpose of primitive
accumulation, have perfected the art of political expediency even when these acts threaten the
stability of their countries” (p. 7). The author concludes that although a new type of leadership
within Africa is both required and needed so as to find immediate solutions to political
instabilities on the continent, external actors, especially in the Western countries, have to change
their attitudes and behaviors toward these African countries. The author, then, argues that lasting
solutions to Africa’s instability issues require new leaderships in both sides: African countries
and Western countries. These new leaders should really commit themselves to an agenda that
promotes democracy — which no doubt will minimize the frequency of post-election conflicts
— rather than worrying about their self-interests.
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Although Ong’ayo (2008) discusses how the type of leadership may promote political
instability, he overlooks the role of political institutions, such as electoral systems, electoral
management commissions, and election monitoring instruments. This thesis tries to fill the gap
by providing a comprehensive understanding of and approach to post-election conflict and
prevention in Africa. Such an approach not only looks at the socio-economic root causes of preand post-election conflicts, but also it provides a detailed overview of the political causes of
African electoral conflicts.
Another critical way to delve into the root causes of electoral conflict is to look at the
nature of political parties and their relationships with social cleavages.
In their article “Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions,” Creevey,
Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005) identify two important common features in emerging democracies
in Africa with regard to elections. These features include the “rapid proliferation of political
parties” (p. 473), and “ethno-regional cleavages” (p. 474). As far as the proliferation of political
parties is concerned, they argue that, because of severe censorship of associational movements
during the authoritarian rule in these countries, many political leaders seized the opportunity of
multi-party system offered by the wave of democratization to get heard through the creation of
political parties.
Although the multiplicity of political parties is a necessary step for a multiparty system, it
does not, as Adejumobi, Hambok, Nordlund, Rukambe, and Dowetin (2007) note, “necessarily
guarantee competitive party politics” (p. 26). By definition, competitive party politics is a
system which precludes a strict monopoly of the electoral space by one dominant party. In such a
system, competitions for political offices, including the presidency and the legislatures, is open
to all legitimate political parties (parties that accept the rules of the game and the legitimacy of
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the electoral process). In many African countries, a competitive party system is almost
nonexistent. In addition, African political parties have their own problems. Creevey et al. (2005)
contend that these political parties have no experience on how to galvanize popular support for
their ideologies. Therefore, political parties, they argue, rely heavily on ethnic and regional
cleavages not only as sources of information but also as tools to win elections. These cleavages,
if exploited, instead of overcoming the violence, provide a fertile ground for conflicts.

2.1.2. Necessity of Elections and Neo-Patrimonialism
Shedler (2002a), in her study on non-democratic regimes, reveals the two consequences
that elections may have for these kinds of regimes. She argues that elections may sustain regimes
or may contribute to regimes’ instability. But Cox (2007) contends that rulers in autocratic
regimes are motivated by either maintaining the status quo and holding on to power as long as
possible or by preventing removal from office through violent means by preemptively trying to
get rid of their opponents via any means including imprisonments. Mozaffar and Vengroff
(2002) use the case of Senegal where the late President Leopold Sedar Senghor voluntarily
transferred power to his Prime Minister Abdou Diouf in 1981 to allow the Socialist Party (PS) to
consolidate its power and maintain Diouf in power until 2000.
Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) note that incumbents often design electoral rules to
achieve three main goals: “(1) enable the opposition to secure enough representation to
encourage them to stay in the game; but (2) mitigate the prospects of a potential opposition
majority in the national legislature and, in particular; (3) discourage opposition coordination
behind a single challenger for the presidency” (p. 603). In spite of some probable costs and risks
associated with elections, non-democratic regimes still hold elections for three fundamental
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reasons: first, to gain legitimacy through non transparent elections, elections in which results are
known beforehand (Linz 2000; Schedler 2002b); second, to reinforce the cohesion among
members of the ruling party and at the same time facilitate the division among the opposition
parties by manipulating individual opposition leaders and discouraging strategic coordination
among the opposition; and third, just to receive foreign aid from the international community.
Other researchers and scholars such as Abbink (2006), Nawaz (2008), and Lindberg
(2003) use the neo-patrimonial theory to show how most regimes in Africa favor a small
segment of their populations, especially their supporters, at the expense of the larger
populations.8 Indeed, Abbink (2006) uses the neo-patrimonial theory in his investigation of “why
the Ethiopian political system is moving away from a transitional democracy to
authoritarianism.” He asserts that “re-institutionalization” of the neo-patrimonialist regime
hinders the democratization process in Ethiopia. Abbink, however, recognizes that the neopatrimonial approach alone cannot explain Ethiopian politics. By comparing Ethiopian politics
to that of other African countries, he argues that many factors, such as the “force of ideology,”
the “inherited tradition of state capacity,” the “existence of professionalism in the bureaucracy
and the civil service,” and foreign donors’ pressures, have played a significant role in
undermining its small democratic gains during the transitional period.
In the same line of ideas, Nawaz (2008) argues that neo-patrimonialism leads to a “hybrid
state where real decision-making power about state functions, such as resource distribution, lies
outside of the formal institutions”(p. 2). Cammack (2007) also affirms that rulers in a number of
8

The term neo-patrimonialism was first used by German sociologist Max Weber. It denotes patron-agent
relationship whereby a patron rewards his/her clients or followers with gifts, grants, employment, etc. to obtain,
maintain, and strengthen their loyalty. Neo-patrimonialism is characterized by two main concepts: loyalty to
political leaders and/or chief executives, and material incentives to followers. According to Bratton (2011), “The
term neo-patrimonialism refers to a hybrid mode of rule in which political ties and exchanges suffuse the
management of a state.” Accessed 19 September 2013, from
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/intlpoliticalscience/n386.xml
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Sub-Saharan African countries and their personal connections are the real decision-makers when
it comes to their countries’ resource allocation. Using a survey report on the election campaigns
of members of parliament (MPs) in Ghana and data collected from 34 interviews with MPs,
Lindberg (2003) finds that “MPs are involved in patron-client relationships to a significant
degree to reproduce their political power” (p. 121). He further argues that “this persistent pattern
of patronage politics threatens the very heart of democratic consolidation” (p. 121). However,
this argument is a “cop-out” and often used to delegitimize governance systems in Africa
because it deviates from the western practice of supposed “meritocracy.” Looked at a different
way, we could argue that this “shadow state” is the way “things are” rather than the way they
“ought to be” and should be more seriously understood. For example, in the Ghanaian case, one
could argue that one of the reasons we tend to see less election-related violence is the effective
incorporation of the “shadow state” (traditional institutions and clientelism) into the operation of
the post-colonial Westphalian state, especially in the 2012 presidential elections.

2.1.3. Consequences of Social Cleavages on Electoral Systems
2.1.3.1. Defining Social Cleavages
Commonly used in sociology and political science, the concept of social cleavage denotes
the existence of different groups of people living within the same society. Criteria for
distinguishing such groups from one another are identified as follows: (i) cultural traits such as
religion, ethnicity, language and race; (ii) class or economic status; (iii) age; and (iv) geographic
location or region. These differences must be salient and enter into the consciousness of the
people either historically or as promoted by political elites. Eckstein (1966) equates social
cleavages to segmental cleavages and writes, “This exists where political divisions follow very
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closely, and especially those salient in a society” (p. 34) (see for example, Lijphart 1977: 3).
Social cleavages mean more than social differences. According to Bornschier (2009), social
cleavages are “durable patterns of political behavior linking social groups to political
organizations” (p. 3). In the same order of ideas, Neto and Cox (1997) define the term social
cleavage as “enduring social differences that might become politicized, or might not: differences
of ethnicity, religion, language, or occupation, for example” (p. 152). How long such differences
seem to appear among social groups remains the key to understanding the concept of social
cleavage.
Yet other scholars, such as Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220) assert that the term social
cleavage goes beyond both socially-defined differences and the persistence of such differences
and argue that it must be characterized by three key elements: (i) division of society into groups
along demographic or socioeconomic lines, (ii) collective identity and shared attitudes of such
groups, and (iii) distinct organizational bases or forms of collective action of such groups (also
cited by Chiavacci 2010: 49). In divided societies, each individual group has its own identity,
and members of such a group may want to protect their group’s identity and ensure its survival.
In the context of elections, not only may politicians want to play identity cards to build
support and gather votes, but voters themselves may also want to cast the ballots for candidates
from their own ethnic groups in the name of securing the accumulation of scarce resources for
their groups and then distributing such resources to in-group members. Even though some voters
may not plan to initially vote along ethnic lines, they will end up doing it for fear that their
counterparts will do so (Horowitz 1985). In ethnically divided societies, voters often face a
dilemma. The dilemma here is that one group of voters does not know what the other groups will
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do, how other voters will actually vote.9 In case ethnic voting occurs, ethnic conflict is a likely
result as other underprivileged groups will not allow the privileged group(s) to indefinitely
control scarce resources.
It is quite interesting, but not surprising, to hear the debate on ethnic cleavages and
African politics (Posner 2007). In Africa, Posner (2007) affirms, “Ethnic cleavages have become
politically salient” (p. 1304). Why have African social cleavages become so politicized? The
answer to the question leads Posner (2007: 1304-1305) to identify and discuss three main claims
with regard to the nature of African politics. To Posner (2005 and 2007) and his predecessors,
such as Barkan (1979) and Kanyinga (1994), African politics is about maximization of state
resources. To achieve such a goal, many African leaders resorted to the elimination of their
political opponents and created one-party systems, defined by a state party and a government, in
the name of “unity” or “oneness” in the newly independent African states (Zolberg 1966).
However, there had been a clear “dominance of the party over government” (Zolberg 1966: 106).
The dominance of the state party over the government is well painted by Cowan (1961) in his
discussion of the Guinean politics in the early moments of the country’s postcolonial era.
According to Cowan, “the source of political power is expressly kept outside the
provisions of the constitution and the subordination of all organs of government to the party
organization render meaningless the constitutional relationships of these organs to one another”
(p. 208) (see for example, Zolberg 1966, p. 106). There is no significant change in African
politics since Zolberg wrote his Creating Political Order. For instance, in Cameroon, the ruling
party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) consistently modified the
9

While providing a feedback on this thesis, Professor Richard Vengroff, the Chair of my dissertation committee,
confirms the attitude and voting behavior of voters in Burkina Faso, an ethnically divided African country. He
writes: “While working in Burkina Faso rural voters told me they weren’t sure who they would vote for because
their ‘patron’ hadn’t yet told them.”
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constitution to allow Paul Biya to retain power for life (Ochieng’ Opalo 2012). This situation is
also true in many African states, such as Togo and Zimbabwe, where the constitutions do not set
any cap to the number of terms a president can serve in office.
African politics is also about throwing electoral support behind candidates from one’s
own ethnic group to guarantee resources’ redistribution to coethnic group members (Posner
2007); and most importantly, according to van de Walle (2003), African politics is essentially
dominated by “strong presidentialism” wherein decision-making powers (executive, legislative,
and judiciary) are concentrated in the hands of the Head of State and Governement or the
president. Because the president is empowered to control both the political and state scarce
resources, including public goods (schools, roads, just to name a few), and because of lack of
checks and balances to ensure accountability, he/she is free to wield power as he/she pleases.
The predominance of social cleavages in African countries has affected electoral systems in
Africa.
2.1.3.2. Consequences of Social Cleavages
Postner (2007) explores a pertinent question regarding whether the shift from one-party
system to multiparty system has caused “ethnic conflict to be carried out in the name of different
kinds of identities” (p. 1302). The author uses evidence of pre-transitions to democracy and
multi-party elections in Zambia and Kenya to illustrate his point and finds that voters in both
countries made the “strategic choice of local-scale identities over national-scale identities in oneparty elections, and of national-scale identities over local ones in multiparty contests, that
accounts for the effects of regime change on the salience of different kinds of ethnic cleavages”
(Posner 2007: 1322). This observation highlights that ethnic cleavages are not static. In a
country, people may see themselves as members of a particular ethnic group during one-party
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systems, whereas in multiparty systems voters tend to identify themselves as citizens of that
country over an ethnic group. However, it is also important to note that this is not always the
case. For instance, in multiparty systems where political parties are formed along ethnic lines,
many voters are more likely to identify themselves with their ethnic groups than they do with
their country.
The study of social cleavages may be of a help to the study of elections and electoral
behavior. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (2009) assert that “The reason why political scientists
study social cleavages is not because of any interest in these cleavages per se, but because they
can shed light on voting behaviour” (p. 5). The question here is that: How can such a study help
explain voting behavior? This question is interesting especially in the context of Africa, where
many countries are ethnically divided with preexisting social conflicts.
These social conflicts were often promoted and exploited by former colonial powers. For
instance, Zeleza (2008) asserts that “there is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa
that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history and even in the late nineteenth century”
(p. 1). These social conflicts occurred in Rwanda (Shah 2006), Uganda (Shaw and Mbabazi
2008, Van Acker 2004, Nhema 2004, Crook 2001, Osaghae 2001), Nigeria (Newsom 2011,
Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco 2011) and others places across the African continent. The
assumption worth highlighting is that countries that experienced social conflicts in the past are
more likely to experience electoral conflicts in the future if underlying issues of such conflicts
are not seriously addressed.
Zielinsky (2002) raises two concerns regarding the “translation of social cleavages into
political oppositions—a kernel of contemporary theorizing about political parties and party
systems” (p. 184). The first concern is that what if emerging democracies have a history of
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multiple issues conflict? The author suggests that it is up to politicians to determine “which
cleavages to depoliticize and which to establish as the permanent axes of political competition”
(P. 185). Is it possible to privilege ethnic issues over religious ones or vice versa? Politicians
often make political calculations that can help them win strong support from voters. However, in
his study of party systems in Eastern Europe’s new democracies, Zielinsky (2002: 201) argues
that:
In new democracies the early rounds of electoral competition determine not only who
wins or loses a particular election but also, and perhaps more importantly, which social
cleavages will be depoliticized and which will be established as permanent bases of
political conflict.

The second concern is about the emergence of new social cleavages after the
consolidation of new party systems (Zielinsky 2002). In this case, there are only two options:
either allow parties to form coalitions or not. The choice of electoral system, therefore, dictates
whether the alliance or coalition formation strategy is the appropriate course of action. Some
electoral systems work well in countries with a small number of political parties while other
systems give incentives to a large number of political parties. But, what determines the number
of political parties that can actually compete in elections?
As stated by Neto and Cox (1997), “the effective number of parties in a polity should be a
multiplicative rather than an additive function of the permissiveness of the electoral system and
the heterogeneity of the society” (p. 149). The number of parties is determined either by: (i)
whether the electoral laws contain a reward mechanism for forming political coalitions or not, or
(ii) the importance of preexisting social cleavages (Neto and Cox 1997). If a particular electoral
system has high coalitional incentives, there is a high likelihood to have a reduced number of
political parties in that country because parties will be better off competing as a coalition than
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individually. This argument is in line with what Cox (1997: 271) calls “M+1” rule, with M
denoting the district magnitude (number of seat per electoral district). According to this rule, in
single member elections held under a majoritarian system, where M equals one—one seat per
constituency—there should be no more than two viable candidates to compete in case of runoff
elections. Similarly, in multimember elections, where M is greater than one, the rule states that
there should be no more than two viable party lists. Also, the importance of social cleavages
determines which cleavages to depoliticize and which ones to allow as bases of electoral conflict
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Doing so may help reduce the number of political parties that must
compete in political contests.
As discussed earlier in the introduction to this dissertation, the majoritarian electoral
system favors the two-party system, whereas the proportional representative system favors the
multi-party (more than two) system. This pattern is consistent with Duverger’s Law that states
that “The simple-majority single-ballot system [i.e., simple plurality rule in single-member
districts] favors [a] two-party system” (Duverger 1954: 217) (see for example, Neto and Cox
1997, pp. 149-150).

Regardless of the type of electoral systems, the existence of social

cleavages and how electoral rules are enacted play a paramount role in determining which party
or parties to include or exclude in political competitions. As different electoral systems provide
different incentives to both strong and weak or minority political parties, political elites also
respond differently to different types of electoral systems. Because proportional representation
systems do not discriminate against minority parties as much as majoritarian electoral systems do
(Farrell 2011), political elites have more incentives in translating social cleavages into new
political parties under proportional representation systems than they do under majoritarian
systems.
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2.1.4. Ethnic Manipulation
Several studies show that there is a direct relationship among ethnic fractionalization and
civil war onset and indirect effect of the probability of civil war onset (Tembo 2012, Tangera and
Lagerlof 2009). The 2007 Kenyan electoral crisis, in which over forty ethnic groups were pitted
against the perceived-to-be-most-privileged Kikuyu ethnic group (Chege 2008, Collier 2009,
Kiai 2010); and the recent violent post-election conflicts between the rebel forces and supporters
of Ouattara (who is not only a Muslim from the north of Cote d’Ivoire but also a descendent of
Mossi speaking parents who migrated from Burkina Faso) and the supporters of Gbagbo (who
belongs to the Bété ethnic group and is also a Christian from the south) (Akokpari 2008) are just
a few examples that illustrate the importance of discussing ethnic manipulation in this thesis.
Consistent with Easterly and Levine (1997) and Olson (1982), Englebert (2000) asserts
that, due to ethnic diversity in Africa, “African countries have weak institutions and adopt poor
policies” (p. 9). Their main argument is that ethnic diversity has brought about what Englebert
(2000) terms “social polarization” (p. 9) in African countries. This social polarization, they
argue, may not only hinder economic growth but may also be a source of political instability in
the region. If social cleavages remain the driving forces of political instability, how do we
explain sustainable democracy and growing economy in countries like the United States that is
politically polarized, and India that is the world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s most
culturally and religiously diverse societies? Social cleavages contribute to instability in societies
that lack strong institutions and accountability. They are often used as an ingredient by
politicians in many African countries to ignite political violence for power’s sake. For example,
Kagwanja (2005), in investigating youth identity and generational politics in Kenya, draws on
Lonsdale’s moral ethnicity theory, which puts emphasis on the creation of communities from
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within. Moral ethnicity theory suggests that the creation of such communities accommodates
disagreement over social values. The author argues that Kenyan political leaders use Kenyan
youths as tools to either come to or hold onto power during the post-election era in Kenya.
Yet another important point is that the existence of social cleavages within a polity can
affect the country’s party system. Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003) explain how “electoral
institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems as sources of information that
structure the mutual expectations of voters and candidates about winning and losing, thus
facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and seats” (p. 380). In elections, while
candidates may want to win seats, voters on the hand may want to vote for candidates who are
likely to win seats so that in return they can get some benefits for voting for such candidates
(Cox 1997). Such a calculation by both the candidates and voters is called “strategic
coordination” (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003: 380) (see for example, Cox 1997, Liphart
1994, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Theoretically, strategic coordination is moderated by
ethnopolitical cleavages.
In ethnically fragmented and politicized societies as is the case in many African
countries, the number of ethnopolitical cleavages should be proportional to the number of
parties. On the one hand, if a society is highly ethnically fragmented, there is a high likelihood
that votes will be also highly dispersed among larger numbers of small parties or ethnic groups,
reducing the number legislative parties. On the other hand, if such ethnic groups are localized
within a region, they can form a coalition in order to avoid votes’ dispersion and possibly win
seats and increase the number of legislative parties (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).
Both among academics and practitioners of conflict resolution and management, little
attention has been paid to the prevention of post-election conflicts in Africa. For example, in his
61

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

article “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention,” Fischer (2002)
writes “the connections between elections and conflict have not been studied in a systematic
fashion using a generally accepted framework of analysis” (p. 30). However, Fischer (2002) does
not derive the framework of analysis he is alluding to. Rather, he leaves us with a series of
unanswered questions, including
a) What trends can be tracked on a country or regional basis as indicators of the motives,
victim, and perpetrators of electoral conflict?
b) How does election sequencing and scheduling impact potential conflict and violence?
c) Do the number and nature of political parties impact the prospects for a peaceful
election?
d) What is the evidence on the impact of the system of representation on the potential for
conflict?
e) Does the presence of international observers prevent violence or simply delay it until the
observers depart?
f) How does the choice of a third party mediator influence the resolution and management
of electoral conflict?
g) How can we then prevent post-election conflicts?

2.1.5. Exploring the Gap
Extensive research has been conducted to determine the causes of electoral conflicts. Posner
(2007) did an in-depth analysis on the effect of ethnic cleavages on regime change in Africa.
Zielinski (2002), Lijphart (1990 and 1977), Duverger (1994) studied how electoral laws help
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create incentives for political actors to reduce the number of parties. While Zielinski (2002),
Neto and Cox (1997) investigated the relationship between social cleavages and party systems,
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) studied party systems and voter alignments. Lindberg 2003,
Wantchekon 2003, van de Wall (2001) also showed the relationship between elections and redistribution of scarce resources. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (2009), Wantchekon (2003),
Young and Turner (1985), Horowitz (1985) demonstrated how clientelism affects voting
behavior in ethnically divided societies. Furthermore, Cox (1996), Duverger (1954) studied
electoral systems and effective number of parties. In addition, Mozaffar and Vengroff (2001)
demonstrated conditions under which it is in the interest of leaders to expand the number of
parties, fragment the opposition, and retain control of the key office, the presidency.
In all, despite a panoply of research on political violence and post-election political unrest,
little has been done on the prevention of electoral conflicts in Africa. In addition, with the
exception of few scholars, such as Straus and Taylor (2012), Bratton (2010), and Lindberg
(2006), who used quantitative approaches in their studies of Africa’s democracy and its
challenges, many studies on democratization, elections, and electoral conflicts in Africa are short
of strong empirical evidence (Smith 2012, Oduro 2012, Diamond and Plattner 2010). Also,
studies on the effects of Africa’s electoral systems as possible sources of electoral conflicts are
very limited (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002, Lindberg 2005).
Using a mixed methodology approach consisting of an ordinary least square (OLS)
regression analysis and an in-depth comparative case studies, this study is a departure from that
practice. In this regard, this thesis not only contributes to the existing literature on post-election
political unrest, but it also raises awareness about one of the critical challenges facing Africa in
this 21st century. It also argues that ethnic heterogeneity and other causes discussed in the
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literature are not enough to ignite electoral conflicts. But inadequacies in the distribution of
power or decision-making mechanisms and the “breakdown in the electoral process” (Fischer,
2002) are likely to ignite conflicts. It finally will hopefully propose ways to prevent post-election
conflicts from occurring in Africa.

2.2. Explaining Post-Election Violence: Theoretical Framework for Analysis
Based on the premises of the hypotheses and the literature review, I use the following
theories: the social cleavages and party system theory (SCPST) (Cox 1997, Taagepera and
Grofman 1985); the bounded rationality theory (BRT) (Simon 1999, Jones 1999); the
democratization approach (DA) (Baroi 2012, Potter 1997); and the relative deprivation theory
(RDT) to undergird my study of post-electoral conflict in contemporary Africa.

2.2.1. The Social Cleavages and Party System Theory (SCPST)
This theory states that in a society with a greater social fragmentation, political parties are
formed alongside social cleavages (such as class, race, ethnicity, and religion). In other words,
Taagepera and Grofman (1985) note that “the more axes of cleavages there are within a society,
the greater will be the number of political parties” (p. 343) (see for example, Cox 1997: 19).
Consequently, besides issues that are the main sources of political polarization, social
fragmentation/polarization may lead to political polarization as is the case in many African
countries (Englebert 2000). What impact (if any) does the social structure have on electoral
systems? These social cleavages not only affect a country’s party system, but also they predict
the type of electoral system a country should adopt. Nohlen (1993: 27) notes that
The greater the social fragmentation, the more probable is the adoption of a proportional
[electoral] system and also the rise of a multiparty system. The greater the social
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homogeneity the more probable is the adoption of a single plurality system; but, also, the
more probable the rise of a two-party system … or of a limited party pluralism (also
quoted in Cox 1997: 19).
Similarly, Cox (1997), while discussing the endogeneity of electoral structure, argues that
“the party system (and the calculations of partisan benefit rattling around within it) may affect
the electoral system” (p. 17). This thesis will discuss potential consequences of both the
proportional and majoritarian electoral systems on the democratization process in Africa.
Inspired by Cox’s argument based on Duverger law that states that the number of parties should
tend toward the number of societal cleavages plus one, I argue in this thesis that an appropriate
electoral system chosen for a right social structure can help prevent and mitigate post-election
conflicts in Africa.
2.2.2. The Bounded Rationality Theory (BRT)
BRT is based on “rationality” which describes the human behavior of acting rationally and in
a calculated manner. This theory is based on a satisficing decision-making strategy. By
definition, the term satisficing is a decision-making strategy that helps, for instance, parties to a
conflict to reach settlements (that meets their minimum requirements) or solutions that are
mutually acceptable. BRT asserts that human beings make satisficing decisions rather than
decisions that optimize their utility, which comes from their self-interests based on limited time,
information and knowledge (Simon 1995). According to Jones (1999: 299),
Bounded rationality is a school of thought about decision making that developed from
dissatisfaction with the “comprehensively rational” economic and decision theory models
of choice. Those models assume that preferences are defined over outcomes, that those
outcomes are known and fixed, and that decision makers maximize their net benefits, or
utilities, by choosing the alternative that yields the highest level of benefits (discounted
by costs).
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Decision makers may encounter a situation in which the costs and the benefits of their choice are
equal. Such a situation is referred to as the equilibrium position. However, in most cases, choices
are made on deficient calculation of costs and benefits. According to the theory, protesters and
any political actors who use marches, mass demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts among others
means, to bring about a change in the status quo engage in some sort of costs and benefits
analysis, in which the ultimate outcome is benefit maximization. In the context of post-election
conflicts, voters may make rational decisions to participate in protests if they feel that they were
cheated or their votes were wasted. Therefore, participating in anti-government uprisings after
elections will be their best alternative, especially when they do not trust political institutions in
their country. The possible outcomes that these protesters can expect to achieve include raising
public awareness and changing public opinion on issues and gathering both internal and
international supports for their cause of political change.
Speaking of trust in political institutions, Cook and Gronke (2005) note that “low trust in
government and low confidence in institutions reflects skepticism, an unwillingness to presume
that political authorities should be given the benefit of doubt” (p. 787). In the context of this
study, political authorities include incumbent governments and a number of institutions—
election management commissions, election monitoring organizations, etc.—in charge of
organizing, administering elections and proclaiming elections’ results. In advanced democracies,
such institutions are independent from national governments. In addition, there are separations of
powers among the three branches of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
branches. Such separations of powers are made possible by the principle of checks and balances.
Many countries in Africa suffer separation of powers and checks and balances’ deficit. Because
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of that deficit, elections management commissions are more likely to be co-opted and play the
game in favor of incumbent governments.

2.2.3. Democratization Approach (DA)
The democratization approach is an approach used to transform a corrupt government to a
more accountable one. In other words, it aims at eliminating systemic corruption. In addition,
DA aims at guaranteeing both political rights (for example, free and fair competitive elections,
rights to vote, participatory political culture, etc.,) and civil liberties (such as freedom of speech
and expression, freedom of assembly or associational autonomy, and freedom of religion) to a
population within a polity. This approach has been used by a number of renowned scholars,
including David Potter (1997), as a framework for analysis when explaining the concept of
‘democratization’ in Potter et al. (1997)’s Democratization, David Held (1996) in Models of
Democracy, Larry Diamond (1992) in “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,”
Robert Dahl (1989) in Democracy and Its Critics, and Harold S. Baroi (2012) to explain recent
Arab uprisings or the “Arab Spring.”
DA is the sum total of three interrelated approaches, including the modernization approach,
the transition approach, and the structural approach (Potter 1997). Potter (1997) notes that “the
modernization approach emphasizes a number of social and economic requisites either
associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful democratization” (p. 10).
Liberal democracy is defined as a type of political regime in which an accountable/uncorrupt
government (or representatives) that is elected through free, fair and transparent elections makes
binding policies that affect the entire country. The modernization theory links economic
development to the emergence and consolidation of democracy. For Lipset (1960), a country’s
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level of modernization or socio-economic development determines its level of democracy. The
assumption here is that countries with a higher socio-economic development are less likely to
experience political instability. The transition approach focuses on political process and
institutional choices made by transitional governments so as to establish liberal democracies. The
structural approach focuses on how to allocate power among the three branches of government—
executive, legislative, and judiciary—to ensure checks and balances. In all, according to Baroi
(2012), DA addresses issues of “economic development, social divisions, state and political
institutions, civil society, political culture and ideas, etc.” (p. 110). These factors served in this
thesis as secondary data collected mainly from the World Bank, Political Institution Database,
and Afrobarometer Online Analysis.

2.2.4. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT)
In discussing the RDT, Hegre, Østby and Raleigh (2009) argue that “the population of
locations that are relatively poor and are marginalized by the central government should be more
likely to support and join a rebel group that works to topple the government” (p. 600). These
scholars also argue that deprivation and inequality are among the main factors in intrastate
conflicts. Despite a myriad of research on the negative association between the level of socioeconomic development and political violence (Hardy 1979, Weede 1981, Gurr 1994), Auvinen
(1997) posits that “people are more satisfied with a higher level of economic development and
consequently are less prone to rebellious action” (p. 179). In ethnically divided countries, how
people or groups of people feel about their socio-economic status compared to others determines
their decision to participate in protests. In elections, candidates and their supporters are more
likely to participate in protests if they feel that they are less advantaged than their counterparts.
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Thus, there is a positive relationship between relative deprivation and parties’ decision to
participate in protests: as the intensity of relative deprivation increases, parties’ decision to
protest also increases.
In the context of elections and electoral behavior in divided societies that knew nothing but
protracted authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships, many voters and political opponents
may lack sufficient information necessary for strategic and informed decisions that can help
them achieve democratic alternations. To put it in the words of Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002),
“in the aftermath of extended authoritarian rule with limited or no electoral history, political
actors usually suffer from an information deficit about the extent of their electoral support” (p.
603). In many democratizing countries in Africa, not only are political opposition parties often
denied freedom of movement and assembly, but they are also often denied access to resources
such as media and campaign financing. In chapter 3, I discuss the methodological approaches,
data and sources as well as data collection procedures used in this thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODS

In this section, I will explain the research design, measure key variables, test my
hypotheses, and discuss the results of the regression analysis.
3.0. Research Design
Research question: In Africa, why do some countries tend to experience post-election conflicts
while others do not?
Research purpose:
This research investigates the reasons why many countries in contemporary Africa have been
experiencing post-election conflicts since 1990 and seeks ways to manage such conflicts without
resorting to violence or use of force. In addition, the intent of the proposed research is to provide
recommendations on how to reduce or eliminate the frequent occurrence of post-election
political unrest.
Hypotheses
H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems;
H2: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems;
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H3: In Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems are more likely to experience postelection conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems.

3.1. Operationalization of Key Concepts
To test these hypotheses, I identify the variable “post-election conflict” as the dependent
variable and the independent variables include electoral systems (majoritarian, proportional, and
mixed); and the disproportionality index, including least squares index, which determines the
disproportionality between the distributions of votes and of seats; the effective number of parties;
the effective number of seats, and the total number of seats; the level of inequality;
unemployment by level of education; ethnic fractionalization; and the level of democracy.

3.1.1. Electoral Systems
In this thesis, I regrouped countries based on their electoral systems and proceeded with the
most similar and the most different analysis so as to test my hypotheses. In my analysis, African
countries are classified into three groups based on their electoral systems as presented in Table
3.1 below.
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Table 3.1 Electoral Systems in Africa
Majoritarian Electoral System
(MA)

Mixed System (Mixed)

Botswana, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of
Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Cameroon (MMM)10,
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) (MMM), Djibouti
(MMP), Arab Republic of
Egypt (MMM), Guinea
(MMM), Lesotho (MMP),
Libya (MMM), Niger11
(MMM), Senegal (MMM),
Seychelles (MMM), Sudan
(MMM)

Proportional Representative
System (PR)
Algeria, Angola, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape
Verde, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, Sao Tome, South
Africa, Tunisia,

Note: Data on Eritrea, Madagascar, and Somalia are unavailable.
Sources: African Election Database 2011, IFES Election Guide 2012, Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) 2012, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) 2011

3.1.2. Elections
As it is done in liberal democracies, an election is a formal decision-making mechanism by
which people choose their fellow citizens for public offices. In line with the definition of an
election, Fisher (2002) argues that an electoral process is a means for achieving governance. As
such, elections (municipal, legislative and presidential, to name just a few) are viewed as
instruments or tools of democracy (Powell, 2000). For the purpose of this thesis, I measured the
effectiveness of elections between 1990 and 2010 by measuring their qualities: political
participation, competition, and legitimacy (Lindberg 2006).

10

MMM stands for the mixed-member majoritarian system also known as mixed independent, and MMP stands for
the mixed-member proportional system or mixed dependent.
11
Niger switched from Mixed to PR in 2010.
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Political participation is defined as “all voluntary activities that aim to influence political
decisions at all levels of the political system. These activities include conformist participatory
activities like party membership or electoral campaigning and non-conformist activities, such as
strikes and demonstrations” (GSDRC, 2012)12. In order to measure the variable “political
participation,” the following key questions are carefully looked at. Do the people have the right
to vote or are there any legal guarantees of universal suffrage in the country? Do the people have
the right to form and belong to political parties? Do opposition political parties have the right to
co-exist with the ruling party? Do all political parties have equal access to resources to actually
compete against the incumbent party or government coalition in elections? How well do people
turnout to cast their votes? Is the military still involved in politics? Above all, how vibrant and
independent is the civil society? Briefly, as Cingranelli and Richards (2010) note it, political
participation is the extent to which “citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right
and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair
elections.”13
By definition, competition requires the existence of more than one choice. Do electoral laws
in African countries allow choices? If so, are those laws implemented correctly to allow voters to
actually have choices when they go to the polls? I argue in this thesis that within a democratic
political system, the effectiveness of elections depends on the creation of a political atmosphere
that allows individuals and/or political parties to compete without fear. According to Lindberg
(2006: 31-32),

12

GSDRC stands for Government and social Development Resource Centre. Retrieved May 17, 2012, from
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-systems/participation
13
CIRI Human Rights Data Project. (22 November 2010). CIRI Variable Definitions. Retrieved November 9, 2013,
from http://www.humanrightsdata.org/myciri/my_ciri_variable_definition.asp#9
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Individuals or groups aspiring to represent the people and assume the function of
government—or legislature—must be subjected to competition. Thus, the fundamental
value of self-government as individual and collective freedom translates not only into
equality of political participation but also into free political competition allowing the
people to exercise its sovereign discretion to rule.

Lindberg’s (2006) concept of free political competition implies the importance of a multiparty
system that guarantees the equality of political participation for all candidates seeking political
offices through elections. It can also be argued that within one-party system, competition is also
possible because the party may present several candidates to compete for only one office as was
the case for example in several African countries (such as Tanzania) prior to the “Third wave of
democratization.” This practice, however, consolidated authoritarian regimes in Africa and
undermined any prospect of democracy in the continent.
Another indispensable measure of political competition involves the number of seats won
by political parties that contested the legislative elections: what is the make-up of the legislative
body and how competitive is it? The response to this question will indicate not only how strong
or weak the opposition parties are but may also be indirectly related to how permissive the
electoral system is. Finally, the legitimacy of elections is measured by whether the elections took
place with major irregularities, such as vote rigging, ballot stuffing, and/or elections marred by
violence as both parties claimed victory and wanted to defend their victory at all costs. This
thesis analyzes the parliamentary or legislative elections held in six African countries between
1990 and 2010 as summarized in Table 3.1 (see chapter 1) or Table 3.14 (see the method on
comparative case studies section at the end of this chapter).
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3.1.3. Level of Electoral Conflicts
This thesis adopted Straus and Taylor (2009)’s four levels of electoral violence. The
level of electoral violence is measured by whether there is a no report of election-related
violence, or violent harassment, or violent repression, and/or large-scale violence during the
electoral process.14 In my study I adopted Straus and Taylor’s African model of electoral
violence with a little modification. Specifically, I disagree with their classification of South
Africa in the category of countries that usually experience high electoral violence. It does not
appear to be an accurate characterization because the country experienced large-scale violence
only on two occasions: the first-two post-apartheid parliamentary elections of 1994 and 1999.
Subsequent elections held in 2004 and 2009 in the country were relatively peaceful. Therefore, I
classified South Africa in the category of countries with occasional high electoral violence (see
Table 3.2 below).
Another problem with the Straus and Taylor (2009)’s model of frequency of high
electoral violence is that, within the time frame of 1990-2010, some African states such as The
Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire had not regularly had elections to be classified
in the category of countries that usually experienced high electoral violence. To avoid the
overgeneralization associated with Straus and Taylor’s model, I used their SCAD dataset in
which countries are classified based on the four levels of electoral violence listed above (Straus

14

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, violent harassment includes police or security forces breaking up rallies,
party supporters brawling in the streets, confiscation of opposition newspapers, candidate disqualifications, and
limited short-term arrests of political opponents; violent repression, includes high-level assassinations and targeted
murder, continuous high-level arrests of party leaders, long-term violent intimidation and torture; and violent
campaign with generalized violence or large-scale violence includes widespread physical attacks and massive
killings (see Straus and Taylor 2009: 21).
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and Taylor 2009: 25)15, and extended it to 2010 and included North African countries (Algeria,
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). However, this thesis differs significantly from Straus and Taylor’s
scholarly work in two ways. First, while these scholars used descriptive statistics to explain when
electoral violence mostly occurred during the electoral process and what actually happened
during an electoral violence, this thesis is interested in how a type of electoral system may
influence the occurrence of electoral violence in Africa. In addition, this thesis looks at why a
type of electoral system may be more or less prone to electoral violence than the others.

Table 3.2: Frequency of High Levels of Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan African
Countries

Never High Electoral
Violence
Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Chad,
Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau*,
Liberia, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé
& Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Swaziland, Zambia

Occasionally High Electoral
Violence
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic,
Comoros, Guinea, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Niger, Republic
of Congo, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda

Usually High Electoral
Violence
Cote d’Ivoire, DRC,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo,
Zimbabwe

Note: Data on North African countries are not available, * Data are collected before 2012
elections.
Sources: Straus, S. & Taylor, C. (2012). In Bekoe, D. A. (2012) (Ed.). Voting in Fear: Electoral
Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press.

15

For the full SCAD dataset, see Hendrix, C. S. & Salehyan. (2013). Social Conflict in Africa Database
(SCAD). www.scaddata.org, accessed on 2 December 2013.
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3.1.4. Disproportionality Index
The disproportionality index is measured by the least squares index (LSq), which is also
known as Gallagher’s index. It compares the percentage of votes won by political parties to the
percentage of legislative seats actually won by parties. As Gallagher (2008) puts it, LSq is “the
measure of disproportionality between the distributions of votes and of seats.” LSq is calculated
by the formula LSq = √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2), where “Si” represents the percentage of seats won by
a party and “Vi” represents the percentage of votes it received. Although I used Gallagher’s data
in the compilation of Table 6 (see Appendix A), I also double-checked every single result by
calculating the disproportionality index in African countries where the number of votes and the
number of seats are available independently of Gallagher.
Because of the unavailability of data within the time frame of this study (1990-2010), the
dataset used for this thesis lacks the value of LSq of the following African states: Algeria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire,
The Republic of Congo, DRC (former Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. I am convinced that the variable LSq may play a
critical role in predicting electoral conflict; therefore, I will use it in my in-depth comparative
analysis that will cover the six African states (Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Senegal,
and Togo). In the section below, I presented ethnic fractionalization as one of the control
variables to right any possible shortcomings as a result of the inaccessibility of the
disproportionality index in countries listed above.
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3.1.5. Ethnic Fractionalization Index
The variable “ethnic fractionalization” is moderated by ethnic heterogeneity and/or social
cleavages. Studies have shown that ethnic heterogeneity disrupts not only the emergence but also
the survival of democracy. For the purpose of this thesis, I used the index of ethnic
fractionalization constructed Daniel N. Posner. Posner called this index the “PREG index.” The
PREG index is the newest index of ethnic fractionalization that is rigorously constructed by
consulting between five and twenty reliable books and academic sources that discussed
ethnopolitical cleavages for each country in Africa (Posner 2004). Posner used it to study the
impact of ethnic diversity on long-term growth and macroeconomic policies.
Posner (2004) was “particularly interested in sources that described the dynamics of
competition over resources and policies, especially if the sources provided accounts of the
coalition-building efforts that were part of this competition” (p. 854). Most importantly, because
this PREG index was built with data on “party-building, electoral campaigns and voting
patterns,” and above all, “interethnic alliances and rivalries” (Posner 2004: 854), I used it as an
intervening variable in my study of post-election conflict in contemporary Africa and simply
labeled it EFI. Because Posner’s PREG index does not include North African countries such as
Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, I fill in that gap with Fearon (2003)’s ethnic
fractionalization data.
3.1.6. Living Standard
The gross domestic product in terms of purchasing power parity, commonly referred to as
yPPP, measures the living standard of people within a polity. yPPP shows the big picture of how
well a country is doing in terms of economic development. The term economic development is
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used in this thesis to include not only economic growth but also people’s quality of life. As a
country’s yPPP increases, literacy rate16 also increase, and people tend to have a long life
expectancy, and infant mortality within that country tends to decrease.
3.1.7. Unemployment Rate
According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate is the proportion of the adult
population aged 15 and over that is not working. It is measured as a percentage of the total labor
force. Voters tend to be dissatisfied with the government and governmental institutions if their
country’s unemployment rate increases or remains relatively high (Harper 2000). Other studies,
including Evans, and Ivaldi (2008), have linked voters’ decision-making in elections to
unemployment.

3.1.8. Level of Inequality
I used the World Bank’s Gini index also known as Gini coefficient as a measure of the
level income inequality within a country. It determines income inequality among the entire
population of a country. The lower the value of Gini coefficient, the lower the income inequality
is. A lower income inequality indicates that the wealth is being distributed relatively equitably
within the population. On the other side, the gap between the haves and the have-nots increases
as the value of the Gini coefficient increases.

16

By definition, the term literacy rate is referred to as the proportion of people aged 15 and over who read and write. “A
person is literate who can with understanding both read and write a short simple statement on his everyday life...A person is
functionally literate who can engage in all those activities in which literacy is required for effective functioning of his group
and community...” (UNESCO, 1978) (also quoted in Wagner 2005: pp. 25-26).
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3.1.9. District Magnitude
The district magnitude is the size of the electoral district or constituency. It is measured
by the number of members of parliament or MPs. In this thesis, I used the average or mean
district magnitudes of the lower houses (MDMH) or National Assemblies/Parliaments (Keefer
2012). If a country uses a majoritarian electoral system, the value of the MDMH is one.
Otherwise, the MDMH is greater than one. As Farrell (2011) puts it, the overall proportionality
of a PR system depends on the MDMH. The electoral system becomes more proportional as the
MDMH increases (Farrell 2012, Reynolds, et al. 2008).
The sources of the data used in this thesis and the procedures followed are discussed in
the methods section below.

3.2. Methodological Approach
The study used a mixed method approach consisting of quantitative methods and
comparable case studies. In this study, I used the quantitative research method to test the three
hypotheses that are H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more
likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral
systems; H2: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems; and H3: In
Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems (MMM especially) are more likely to
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems.
Since my main investigation is concerned with what is going on with a sample of types of
electoral systems in Africa and not what individual countries have done, the quantitative method
is the most appropriate method. In addition, the results of this study were also reported in terms
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of type of electoral system used countries in contemporary Africa. This method is in line with
Robson (2002) who conceptualizes quantitative designs as fixed methods and posits that “the
advantage of fixed designs lies in their ability to transcend individual differences and identify
patterns and processes which can be linked to social structures and groups or organizational
features” (p. 98). Above all, the use of quantitative methods in combination with in-depth case
analysis helped identify the main causes of post-election conflicts in the continent.

3.2.1. Data Collection and Sources
I conducted a very rigorous quantitative analysis while using secondary data collected
from different credible sources, including Afrobarometer Database, African Election Database,
Database of Political Institutions, Freedom House, The Carter Center, Systemic Peace, Amnesty
International, Transparency International, and World Development Index from the World Bank.
The types of data that I collected for that matter include, but are not limited to, types of
electoral systems used; election results; polity score (Polity II, for example) indicating countries’
democratic status; corruption perception index (CPI); countries' data on human rights; data on
level of inequality and literacy; data on disproportionality (calculated) such as the least squares
index (LSq), which is used to measure the disproportionality between the distributions of votes
and of seats; the effective number of votes (Eff_Nv); the effective number of seats (Eff_Ns); and
the total number of seats (N seats) (Gallagher 1991). The main limitation is that these secondary
sources may not have updated information. Therefore, it is possible that these standard sources
may lack some pieces of information that are indispensable for the generalization of findings of
my study.
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To fill such a gap, I checked the websites of the individual country electoral commissions
or ministry of the interior for updated on election-related information. In addition, I reviewed
newspapers and watched interviews at various reputable news channels (both local and
international) such as Africa No 1, BBC Africa, IRIN News (a humanitarian news and analysis
program), and Al Jazeera. I also browsed relevant online journals, such as The Economist and
Jeune Africa and blogs. Moreover, I browsed respected websites (local, regional, and
international) including but not limited to AllAfrica.com, Koaci.com, and CNN.com. Not only
did using multiple sources for data gathering help fill informational gaps, but also such practice
helped minimize possible biases embedded in sources (Bernard 2006, Robson 2002). This design
is basically a secondary data analysis on all the countries that held elections among 50 African
countries from 1990 to 2010. Figure 3.1 is the map of Africa, the continent being studied in this
thesis.

3.2.2. Reliability of the Sources
Sources of the quantitative data are described as follows:
African Election Database: It supplies the main source of data on Sub-Saharan African
elections since 1960. It provides an overview of the political system, the type of electoral system,
and the democratic status of each country in Africa. The election results published by the African
Election Database are the official results provided by every individual country’s electoral
management commission. Data collected via this source were cross-checked by using other
independent and reputable international election monitoring organizations, such as The Carter
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Center and Adam Carr’s Election Archives, and renowned academic sources, including InterParliamentary Union (IPU) and IFES.
Database on Political Institutions: This database is provided by the Norwegian Social
Science Data Services (NSD), which a world renowned “resource centre, which assists
researchers with regard to data gathering, data analysis, and issues of methodology, privacy and
research ethics” (NDS, 2012). The MacroDAtaGuide (an International Social Science Resource)
of NSD provides credible information on political institutions of countries across the globe.
Transparency International: The corruption perception index (CPI) is gathered from
Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption. Scholars such as Emma
Henriksson from International Peace Bureau Disarmament for Development and Tobias Bock, a
Project Officer with Transparency International’s Defense and Security Program have written on
corruption in the arms trade, and the arms trade treaty and the impact of corruption, respectively.
Freedom House: Since 1972, Freedom House has been providing annually two sets of
ratings for every country in the world on their political rights and civil liberties. These two sets –
political freedom and civil liberties –are used here as measures of democracy. Freedom House
continues to provide these sets as a way to help policymakers, media, and human rights
advocates, among others, to track trends on countries’ democratic status. Countries are rated on
the scale of 1 to 7, with lower values indicating more freedom and higher values, less freedom
(Freedom House, 2012 Website). In this study, I combined each country’s political rights and
civil liberties’ annual scores and calculate the mean value of these scores. In the empirical
analysis, a country is considered free if it gets a score that is equal or less than 5. A country is
partially free if its score is between 5 and 10, and a country with a score above 10 is considered
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not free. Many other reliable sources such as Afrobarometer Database (an African-led series of
national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance), Systemic Peace, Amnesty
International, and the World Development Index, which were used in a number of studies
dealing with democracy, development, elections, conflicts, and human rights, are also used in
this study. For most indicators of human rights, I used the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Dataset.

3.2.3. Data and Coding
The dependent variable (electoral conflict) noted in this thesis as “ELEC_CONF” is
coded 0 if there is no report of electoral violence during an electoral process in a country. It is
coded 1, 2, and 3 if a country experienced violent harassment, violent repression, and large-scale
electoral violence, respectively. Electoral system is the independent variable. At the
parliamentary or the legislative level, electoral system is used as “LEGIS_TYPE.”
LEGIS_TYPE is coded by 1 if a country used a majoritarian electoral system (MA), by 2 if a
country used a proportional representation electoral system (PR), and by 3 if a country used a
mixed system (MI).
At the presidential level, electoral system is used as “PRES_TYPE.” PRES_TYPE is
coded by 1 if a country used a plurality system, where a candidate with the most votes wins a
presidential election; by 2 if a country used an absolute majority system, where a presidential
candidate needs 50 percent plus one to win an election; and by 3 if a qualified majority system (a
system that requires more absolute majority of votes) was used by a country during a presidential
election.
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As identified in CIRI Human Rights dataset, other critically intervening variables
include, but are not limited to, freedom of speech, electoral self-determination (also known as
political participation or indicator of free and fair elections), freedom of assembly and
association, freedom of religion, and independence of judiciary. These factors also influence
elections and voting behavior (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). Their coding for these
intervening variables has been adopted in this thesis. For example, freedom of speech is coded
SPEECH and receives a score of 0 if it was censored by a government in a given period of time.
SPEECH receives i) a score of 1 if freedom of speech was moderately restricted by a
government, and ii) a score of 2 if freedom of speech was fully allowed in a country.
Similarly, freedom of assembly and association (ASSN), electoral self-determination
(ELECSD), freedom of religion NEW_RELFREE), and independence of judiciary (INJUD)
receives each as a score of i) 0 if people were completely denied each of these freedoms and that
the judicial branch was not independent from the other branches of government (namely the
executive and the legislative branches); ii) 1 if these rights were not completely denied to people
and that the judiciary was partially independent; and iii) 2 if these rights were not restricted and
that the judicial branch was totally independent from the branches of the government in a given
year (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). In all, in a country where all of these rights are fully
guaranteed by the constitution and respected by the government in power, people are less likely
to resort to violence as a means of electoral conflict resolution tool.
It is very important to point out that Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan were
dropped from the study because Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia did not hold any elections while
South Sudan was not even a sovereign state during that time frame. Table 3.3 (see Appendix A)
provides a summary of election data used for the purpose of this study.
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In the next section, I used Gretl computer software as the main instrument to analyze the
data and proceeded with normality, and multicollinearity tests as well as multivariate regression
analysis.

3.2.4. Data Transformation and Regression Analysis
3.2.4.1. Normality Test
I conducted a normality test to see whether my variables were normally distributed. Data
that were not normally distributed were transformed by taking the log to improve their normality.
As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the test statistic for normality with a Chi-square of 6.967 and a
p-value of 0.03 reveals that the data may not have originated from a normal distribution. The
improved normality is shown in Figure 3. 3. The test statistic for normality shows a p-value of
about 0.15.
Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution of Electoral Conflict
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Figure 3.3: Normal Distribution of Electoral Conflict After Transformation

Similar to the dependent variable (ELEC_CONF), which becomes lnELEC_CONF after
the transformation, the independent variables yPPP, GINI, UNEMP, VPA_TURN, VPR_TURN,
MA, PR, MI, LSq, Eff_Nv, Eff_Ns, mdmh, EFI, ELECSD, PRES_TYPE, LEGIS_TYPE,
ELECRULE, ELEC_FORM, SEATS, LITERAC, UNEMP, EFI, ASSN, FORMOV, SPEECH,
NEW_RELFRE, and INJUD become lnYCAP, lnGINI, lnUNEMP, lnVPATURN, lnVPRTURN,
lnMA, lnPR, lnMI, lnLSq, lnEff_Nv,ln Eff_Ns, lnmdmh, lnEFI, lnELECSD, lnPRES_TYPE,
lnLEGIS_TYPE,

lnELECRULE,

lnELEC_FORM,

lnSEATS,

lnLITERAC,

lnASSN,

lnFORMOV, lnSPEECH, lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnINJUD. Because the transformation of the
variable POLITY2 does not provide a better result than the non-transformed POLITY2, I
therefore kept POLITY2 as it is.
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3.2.4.2. Multicollinearity Test
I conducted a multicollinearity test to check whether the independent variables used in
this study explain each other. I made a judgment call regarding whether or not to drop some
variables if the independent variables were highly correlated at 0.7 and above (Field 2009). This
information helped me to determine whether one variable accounted for half or more of the
variation in the other.
An analysis of Table 3.4 below shows that the variable lnLEGIS_TYPE is highly
correlated with the dummy variables MA and MI with correlation coefficients of -0.947 and
0.739, respectively. While MA and PR are also highly correlated with correlation coefficient of 0647, MA and MI moderately correlated with correlation coefficient of -0.483. Because of the
exact collinearity, one of the dummies will automatically be dropped while running the OLS
regression. Another important observation worth noting is that there is correlation between the
variables lnPRES_TYPE and lnLEGIS_TYPE. This means that the type of electoral systems
(MA, PR, and MI) chosen by a country to allocate electoral votes into seats has no effect on the
electoral systems (plurality or first past the post, absolute majority, and qualified majority) used
for its presidential elections

Table 3.4: Correlation matrix with electoral systems
lnPRES_TYPE lnLEGIS_TYPE
1.000
0.215
1.000

lnMA
-0.266
-0.947
1.000

lnPR
0.276
0.367
-0.647
1.000

lnMI
0.013
0.739
-0.483
-0.355
1.000

lnPRES_TYPE
lnLEGIS_TYPE
lnMA
lnPR
lnMI
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Table 3.5 presents the relationships among electoral rules, electoral formula, types of electoral
systems, and number of seats directly elected by voters. An analysis of Table 3.5 reveals that the
variables lnELECRULE and lnELEC_FORM are highly correlated (with correlation coefficient
of 0.958). It also shows that lnELECRULE is highly correlated with lnMA, lnPR, and lnMI, and
lnELEC_FORM is highly correlated with lnMA and lnPR, but not with lnMI. Surprisingly, both
the electoral rules and electoral formulas are not highly correlated with the number of seats, but
have minimal issues of multicollinearity with it.
Table 3.5: Correlation matrix with electoral rules, formula, and types of electoral system
lnMA lnPR
1.000 -0.647
1.000

lnMI
-0.483
-0.355
1.000

lnELECRULE
-0.953
0.556
0.530
1.000

lnELEC_FORM lnSEATS
0.054
lnMA
-0.898
-0.071 lnPR
0.739
0.295
0.005
lnMI
-0.119 lnELECRULE
0.958
1.000
-0.152 lnELEC_FORM
1.000
lnSEATS
In Table 3.6, the correlation coefficient of 0.52 shows that the variables lnELECSD and lnASSN
are highly correlated, and the correlation of 0.42 reveals that lnELECSD is moderately correlated
with lnSPEECH. These observations indicate that for an African country to have an electoral
self-determination, it must not only guarantee freedom of speech, but also it must allow all of its
citizens the freedom of assembly and association.
Table 3.6 Correlation matrix with opportunity of political participation and judicial independence
lnELECSD lnASSN lnFORMOV lnSPEECH lnNEW_RELFRE lnINJUD
1.0000
0.2539
0.4238
0.2647
0.3366 lnELECSD
0.5206
1.0000
0.1789
0.4045
0.3604
0.3246 lnASSN
1.0000
0.2133
0.1971
0.3576 lnFORMOV
1.0000
0.2398
0.3978 lnSPEECH
1.0000
0.2195 lnNEW_RELFRE
1.0000 lnINJUD
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An analysis of the correlation, Table 3.7 below, reveals a high correlation between the variables
the POLITY2 and lnELECSD with correlation coefficient of 0.607. This observation is
consistent with the premise that the emergence and survival of democracy depend on countries’
commitments to an electoral self-determination principle, which means holding free and fair
elections.
Table 3.7: Correlation matrix with level of democracy and electoral self-determination
POLITY2
1.000

lnELECSD
0.607
1.000

lnMA
-0.020
-0.043
1.000

lnPR
0.093
0.101
-0.647
1.000

lnMI
-0.080
-0.062
-0.483
-0.355
1.000

POLITY2
lnELECSD
lnMA
lnPR
lnMI

An analysis of Table 3.8 shows a fairly high correlation between lnLSq and
lnELEC_FORM with a correlation coefficient of -0.507, and a very high correlation between
lnEff_Nv and lnEff_Ns with a correlation coefficient of 0.856. These observations indicate that
in African countries, any disproportionality between the percentage of votes and the actual
percentage of seats won in a parliamentary or legislative election may be negatively linked to the
electoral formula used in translating such votes to electoral seats; there is also an indication that
as the effective number of elective parties (votes) increases, so does the effective number of
legislative parties (seats) increases. Another important point worth noting here is the negative
relationship between the variables lnLSq and lnmdmh. Although these variables are not highly
correlated, their correlation coefficient of -0.332 tells us that increasing values of one of the
variables (lnLSq and lnmdmh) is associated with decreasing values of the other variable.
Therefore, as the district magnitude increases, the disproportionality index decreases.
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In Table 3.9, the issue of multicollinearity is observed between the variables lnUNEMP
and lnLITERAC. The correction coefficient of 0.530 indicates that the two variables
(unemployment rate and literacy rate) are highly correlated. This observation suggests that in
African countries, as the literacy rate increases, unemployment rate also tends to increase, and
vice versa. The literacy rate is, therefore, related to the overall level of unemployment.

Table 3.8: Correlation matrix with disproportionality indexes
lnSEATS
1.000

lnLSq
-0.274
1.000

lnEff_Nv
0.031
0.244
1.000

lnEff_Ns
0.076
-0.172
0.856
1.000

Lnmdmh
0.159
-0.332
-0.122
0.106
1.000

lnSEATS
lnLSq
lnEff_Nv
lnEff_Ns
lnmdmh

Table 3.9: Correlation matrix with unemployment and literacy rates
POLITY2 lnGINI
1.000
0.271
1.000

lnyPPP
-0.134
-0.263
1.000

lnLITERAC
0.050
0.250
0.053
1.000

lnUNEMP
-0.030
0.036
0.193
0.530
1.000

lnEFI
-0.057
-0.016
0.181
0.121
-0.051
1.000

POLITY2
lnGINI
lnyPPP
lnLITERAC
lnUNEMP
lnEFI

3.2.4.3. Regression Analysis
I ran an ordinary least squares regression analysis through Gretl computer software to see
how much of the dependent variable was explained by the independent variable and conducted
both the hypothesis, significance, and causality tests.
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Finally, I ran a multivariate regression analysis between my dependent variable and all
the independent variables so as to identify the variables that were the main explanatory factors of
the dependent variable (electoral conflicts) being investigated in this study and the overall
significance of the model. The decisions to enter the predictors or independent variables were
based on four main reasons:
(i) past research (literature) that used sound methodology;
(ii) by avoiding multicollinerity between explanatory variables;
(iii) in order of importance or statistical significance of each of the predictors;
and (iv) other alternative models can also be tested.
In all, these reasons help to lay out a fully specified model.
Again, the hypotheses to be tested in order to identify the causes of post-election conflict
in contemporary Africa are
H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems.
H2: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience
post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems.
H3: In Africa, countries that use PR systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts
than are countries that use mixed systems (MMM especially).
The regression analysis tables provide the results of the OLS regression analysis. In these
tables, the regression coefficient estimates are the first numbers reported and underneath them
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are the standard errors reported in parentheses. The tables also include p-values showing the
statistical significances, the number of observations (N), the Adjusted R-Squared, showing the
goodness of best fit or how well each model actually reflects the data used, and F-statistics,
indicating the overall significance of the model. A p-value below 0.01 indicates statistical
significance at the 1 percent level.
In contemporary Africa, post-election conflicts are likely to occur in presidential
elections as well as in legislative elections. Two main reasons inform my decisions to include the
regression analysis at the presidential level in this project. First and foremost, except Lesotho and
South Africa, all African countries that are trying to embrace democracy as a form of
government have opted for presidential systems. Many of these democratizing countries,
including Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zambia have held their presidential
elections simultaneously with legislative elections. In their Puzzle of African Party Systems,
Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005) show the significance of African presidential elections.
According to these authors, in Africa, “the presidency is the top prize in the political
game” and that “African presidents possess substantial resources for patronage” (p. 415). In most
cases, many presidential candidates from weaker parties entered the electoral competitions with
the hope to form a strategic coalition, which would secure them a power-sharing deal with the
winning parties or candidates after the presidential elections. Such a power-sharing accord would
offer weak presidential candidates and their parties an opportunity to have some access to their
countries’ resources. At the end such a strategic coalition would be beneficial to all parties of the
coalition including the winning party as it would broaden the electoral support and base for the
latter.
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Secondly, people respond to the electoral system as a whole. For that reason, it is
indispensable to evaluate the performance of such a system at both the legislative and the
presidential levels. Although the proportional representative formulas are not used to elect a
president of a country, African presidents, because of their “unrestricted” powers, influence the
makeup of their respective states’ legislatures regardless of whether their countries use PR or
mixed systems for allocating legislative seats. As Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002)’s “whole
system” approach emphasizes, “Success at one level depends on the performance at all levels”
(p. 601). This suggests that for an electoral system (MA or PR or MI) to perform as expected will
depend on how far a president is willing to accommodate or to provide opportunities for his/her
political opponents to participate in the decision-making process. It is regrettable to learn that in
many African countries, the outcomes of presidential elections dictate the nature and the
composition of national assemblies or parliaments. Because of this strong relationship between
the presidency and the legislatures, I tried to identify through a regression analysis the main
explanatory factors of electoral violence in the aftermath of presidential elections in
contemporary Africa before testing my three hypotheses that are exclusively associated with
legislative elections.

3.2.4.3.1: Potential Determinants of Electoral Conflict at the Presidential Level
Table 3.10 presents eight OLS regression analysis models that investigate the potential
determinants of electoral conflicts in 153 presidential elections in contemporary Africa.
Obviously, the unit of analysis is presidential elections, and the eight indicators used in the
analysis include the type of presidential election (lnPRES_TYPE), ethnic fractionalization index
(lnEFI), electoral self-determination (lnELECSD), freedom of assembly and association
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(lnASSN), freedom of religion (lnNEW_RELFRE), freedom of speech (lnSPEECH),
independent judiciary (lnINJUD), and freedom of movement (lnFORMOV).
A bivariate regression coefficient of 0.053 between the independent variable
(lnPRES_TYPE) and the dependent variable (lnELEC_CONF) shows that a one percent increase
of lnPRES_TYPE increases the lnELEC_CONF by 0.053 percent. However, because the
estimated coefficient (0.053) is not statistically significant as revealed in Model I, this increase
indicates that a type of rules or formula used in a presidential election is not in itself the main
predictor of post-election conflict.
In Model II, when controlled for lnEFI, the estimated coefficient of lnPRES_TYPE
becomes statistically significant at 10 percent while the estimated coefficient of lnEFI is
statistically significant at 1 percent but such significance disappear in Models III, IV, V, VI, VII,
and VIII. This observation indicates that ethnic fractionalization is not a strong and consistent
explanatory variable of post-presidential election conflict in Africa. With other critically
intervening variables such as lnASSN, and lnELECSD, the results are consistent and statistically
significant. While the regression coefficients of lnASSN maintain their significances at 1 percent
from Model III to Model VIII, the estimated coefficients of lnELECSD maintain their statiscally
significances at 5 percent in Models IV and V, and such significances reduce to 10 percent in
Models VI, VII, and VIII.
In addition, the negative estimated coefficients of lnASSN and of lnELECSD reveal that
in countries where freedom of assembly and association is not respected by government, and that
presidential elections are not free and fair, there is a high likelihood of the occurrence of postelection conflicts. However, the lack of statistically significance of the estimated coefficients of
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the control variables (lnNEW_RELFRE, lnSPEECH, lnINJUD, and lnFORMOV) is not
consistent with prior expectations. In other words, this study helps us to safely say that the lack
of respect of these rights or freedoms is unrelated to the occurrence of post-presidential election
conflicts in contemporary Africa.
Overall, Table 3.10 below shows that conflicts occur in the aftermath of presidential
elections in Africa as a result of the lack of freedom of assembly and association, and the lack of
free and fair elections. In addition, the adjusted R-Squared of 0.302 in Model VIII suggests that
about 30 percent of the post-presidential conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2010 in
African are explained by the indicators discussed above.
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Table 3.10: Ordinary least squares regression results at the presidential level
DV=
lnELEC_CON
F

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

Model VII Model
VIII

Intercept

0.728
(0.099)**
*

0.397
(0.133)**
*

0.995
(0.157)**
*

1.119
(0.164)**
*

1.229
(0.183)**
*

1.222
(0.183)**
*

1.243
(0.185)**
*

1.242
(0.188)**
*

lnPRES_TYPE 0.053
(0.153)

0.234
(0.139)*

0.168
(0.127)

0.176
(0.124)

0.155
(0.125)

0.178
(0.126)

0.156
(0.129)

0.156
(0.134)

lnEFI

0.886
(0.255)**
*

0.322
(0.251)

0.242
(0.249)

0.193
(0.251)

0.226
(0.252)

0.238
(0.253)

0.239
(0.256)

-0.566
(0.097)**
*

-0.466
(0.105)**
*

-0.437
(0.107)**
*

-0.404
(0.111)**
*

-0.383
(0.114)**
*

-0.383
(0.115)**
*

-0.251
(0.110)**

-0.240
(0.110)**

-0.204
(0.114)*

-0.194
(0.115)*

-0.195
(0.116)*

-0.128
(0.098)

-0.118
(0.098)

-0.116
(0.098)

-0.117
(0.099)

-0.135
(0.117)

-0.116
(0.120)

-0.116
(0.120)

-0.084
(0.109)

-0.085
(0.113)

lnASSN

lnELECSD

lnNEW_RELF
RE
lnSPEECH

lnINJUD

lnFORMOV

Adjusted

0.002
(0.094)
0.007

0.087

0.278

0.304

0.309

0.311

0.308

0.302

F-Stat %

11.882

666.943

1562.113

1345.638

1118.316

957.0016

825.549

715.610

N

133

121

115

115

115

115

115

115

R-Squared

Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at
10%
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3.2.4.3.2 Potential Determinants of Electoral Conflict at the Legislative Level
To test the three hypotheses formulated for the purpose of this study, I ran three different
sets of multivariate regression analysis. Each set uses a type of electoral system (MA, PR, and
MI) as the main independent variable against electoral conflict (ELEC_CONF) as the dependent
variable. The results of the estimated coefficients are compared against each other in order to
determine which electoral system may be more prone to post-election conflicts than the other.
However, to determine whether a result is statistically significant, the estimated regression
coefficients are compared to at least two times their standard errors. This justification is in line
with Treiman (2009)’s note: “The convention is to interpret coefficients at least twice the size of
their standard errors as statistically significant” (p. 107). To obtain accurate comparisons, the
following

seven

indicators

(lnSEATS,

lnASSN,

lnEFI,

lnELECRULE,

lnELECSD,

lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnMDMH) are used in each of the three sets of multivariate regression
analysis.
In Table 3.11, Model 1, which is a bivariate regression analysis between lnMA and
lnELEC_CONF, reveals a positive estimated regression coefficient of 0.185. This observation
indicates that in a country, a one percent increase of the use of a majoritarian electoral system
increases the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.185 percent. In addition, the Model 1
shows no statistically significant result and the adjusted R-Squared of 0.009 demonstrates that
only 0.9 percent of post-election conflict is explained by the use of majoritarian electoral
systems. This first test suggests that MA is not a significant explanatory factor of post-election
conflict.
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Although the estimated coefficients of lnMA are not statistically significant across the
Models 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7a, Model 8a shows a weak statistically significant result at 10
percent when I controlled for the average district magnitude (lnMDMH). Such an observation
contradicts the test in Model 1a. Not only does the control variable lnMDMH exert a weak
significant (at 10 percent) effect on the majoritarian system, but also it has a weak statistically
significant effect on the electoral rules (Model 8a) used in legislative or parliamentary elections.
Overall, while the critically intervening variables such as the number of elected seats, and
freedom of assembly and association exert significant effects on the occurrence of post-election
conflicts as revealed by Models 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a, Table 3.11 demonstrates that the
control variables lnEFI, lnNEW_RELFRE and lnELECSD have no statistically significant effect
on post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. Although ethnic fractionalization does not
exert any statistically significant effect on the occurrence of post-election conflicts, its positive
estimated coefficients observed in Models 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a indicate that if a country with a
higher ethnic fractionalization index uses a majoritarian electoral system, the likelihood that it
experiences post-election conflict increases.
Similarly, the positive estimated regression coefficients of lnSEATS observed in Models
in 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a show that as the number of elected seats increases so does the
level of post-election conflicts given that in many countries in contemporary Africa, dominant
parties usually get an absolute majority of seats that enable them to enact all rules and policies at
the parliament at the expenses of the opposition parties. On the other hand, the consistent
negative estimated coefficients of lnELECRULE (Models 6a, 7a, and 8a) and lnNEW_RELFRE
(Models 7a and 8a) indicate that a decrease in the legislative electoral rules leads to an increase
of post-election conflicts and the more the freedom of religion is restricted within a country, the
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more likely that country will experience post-election conflicts. Finally, the adjusted R-Squared
of 0.397 of the multivariate model indicates that about 40 percent of post-election conflicts is
explained by both the independent (MA) and the critically intervening variables, including but
not limited to the number of elected seats and freedom of assembly and association.

100

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

Table 3.11: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level Using MA
DV=
lnELEC_CONF

Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 3a

Model 4a

Model 5a

Model 6a

Model 7a

Model 8a

Intercept

0.613
(0.058)**
*

-1.316
(0.232)**
*

-0.717
(0.301)**

-0.773
(0.318)**

-0.339
(0.439)

-0.362
(0.443)

-0.257
(0.471)

-0.118
(0.518)

lnMA

0.185
(0.119)

0.104
(0.101)

0.155
(0.102)

0.091
(0.110)

-0.354
(0.330)

-0.361
(0.332)

-0.379
(0.334)

-0.572
(0.343)*

0.405
(0.048)**
*

0.327
(0.055)**
*

0.316
(0.057)**
*

0.301
(0.058)**
*

0.303
(0.058)**
*

0.293
(0.060)**
*

0.285
(0.068)**
*

-0.363
(0.095)**
*

-0.311
(0.101)**
*

-0.303
(0.101)**
*

-0.332
(0.117)**
*

-0.307
(0.123)**

-0.323
(0.132)**

0.319
(0.243)

0.294
(0.242)

0.297
(0.243)

0.296
(0.244)

0.441
(0.269)

-0.153
(0.108)

-0.158
(0.108)

-0.164
(0.109)

-0.229
(0.116)*

0.058
(0.116)

0.075
(0.120)

0.157
(0.130)

-0.081
(0.123)

-0.163
(0.145)

lnSEATS

lnASSN

lnEFI

lnELECRULE

lnELECSD

lnNEW_RELF
RE
lnMDMH

Adjusted

0.0150
(0.043)
0.009

0.318

0.361

0.335

0.340

0.336

0.333

0.397

F-Stat %

243.265

3758.958

2722.781

1797.522

1489.946

1238.570

1063.350

940.555

N

163

158

140

136

136

136

136

103

R-Squared

Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at
10%
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Table 3.12 tests how the use of proportional representation electoral systems may
influence the occurrence of post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. The estimated
regression coefficient of -0,111 in Model 1b indicates that one percent increase in the use of PR
decreases the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.111 percent. Also, the adjusted RSquared of 0.005 observed in Model 1b shows that only about 0.5 percent of post-election
conflicts that occurred in contemporary Africa can be explained by the use of PR systems alone.
This negligible result confirms the lack of statistically significant estimated coefficient in Model
1b, indicating that PR systems have negligible effect on post-election conflicts.
After controlling for lnSEATS and lnASSN, the result suggests strong statistically
significant estimated coefficients across all the last seven models (2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, and 8b)
for lnSEATS, and across the last six models (3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, and 8b) for lnASSN. These
observations suggest that the critically intervening variables “number of elected seats” and
“freedom of assembly and association” are the significant predictors of post-election conflicts.
However, when one turns to the control variables lnEFI and lnELECRULE, Table 3.12 shows
mixed results. The estimated regression coefficients remain statistically significant at 10 percent
for lnELECRULE in Models 5b, 6b, and 7b, but such a weak significance pales in Model 8b. On
the other hand, the estimated regression coefficient of lnEFI appears statistically significant at 10
percent only in Model 4b. Again, with this analysis, one can carefully say that both electoral
rules and ethnic fractionalization are weak explanatory factors of post-election conflicts when a
country uses a proportional representation system in contemporary Africa. In addition, while
Table 3.12 shows that none of the estimated coefficients of lnELECSD, lnNEW_RELFRE, and
lnMDMH are statistically significant, the adjusted R-Squared of 0.388 of the multivariate
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analysis demonstrates that about 39 percent of post-election conflicts are explained by
combination of the independent variables used in Table 3.12.
Finally, Table 3.13 tests the effect of the use of mixed electoral systems (MI) on postelection conflicts in contemporary Africa. Model 1c uses lnMI as an independent variable. The
estimated coefficient of -0.038 indicates that a one percent increase in the use of MI decreases
the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.038 percent. The regression coefficient of lnMI
remains statistically insignificant even after controlling for lnSEATS. As noticed in Table 3.12,
the critically intervening variables “number of elected seats” and “freedom of assembly and
association” remain statistically significant at 1 percent across the last seven models for
lnSEATS and across the last six models for lnASSN in Table 3.13. These observations, once
again, confirm the conclusion reached with the analysis in Table 3.11 and 3.12 that the variables
“number of elected seats” and “freedom of assembly and association” are the strong explanatory
factors of post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa.
Another important observation worth discussing here is that the independent variable
lnMI reveals a statistically significant estimated regression coefficient at 10 percent in Model 3c
after controlling for lnASSN. This observation suggests that the occurrence of post-election
conflicts increase if freedom of assembly and association is severely restricted to all citizens. In
addition, analysis of Table 3.13 shows that none of the estimated regression coefficients for the
lnEFI, lnELECRULE, lnELECSD, lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnMDMH are statistically significant
in the overall multivariate regression analysis. These observations suggest that in a contemporary
Africa, none of the variables: the level of ethnic fractionalization, the electoral rules used, the
electoral self-determination, the level of religious freedom, and the average of district magnitude,
have significant effect on the occurrence of post-election conflict if a country uses a mixed
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electoral system. Finally, the overall adjusted R-Squared of 0.381 indicates that about 38 percent
of post-election conflicts in African countries that use MI is explained by the independent
variables.
In summary, three conclusions emerge from this quantitative study. First, the findings
from Table 3.11 and 3.12 support the Hypothesis 1 or (H1) that states that “In Africa, countries
that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than
are countries that use proportional electoral systems.” Such a comparison is based on the fact that
there is a likelihood that the occurrence post-election conflict will increase by 0.185 percent if a
country in Africa uses a majoritarian electoral system and decrease by 0.111 percent if it uses a
proportional representation system. Second, the findings from Tables 3.11 and 3.13 support the
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems. Because of
a likelihood that the occurrence post-election conflict will increase by 0.185 percent if a country
in Africa uses a majoritarian electoral system and decrease by 0.038 percent if it uses a mixed
electoral system as revealed by Table 3.11 and 3.13, one can carefully assert that in Africa,
countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election
conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems. Finally, the findings from Tables
3.12 and 3.13 demonstrate that while the occurrence of post-election conflict decreases by 0.111
percent if an African country uses proportional representation system, it will decrease only by
0.038 percent that country uses a mixed electoral system. Therefore, the findings from Tables
3.12 and 3.13 supports the Hypothesis 3 or (H3) that posits that “In Africa, countries that use PR
systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed
systems (MMM, especially).
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In all, the procedure used in this thesis only allowed me to find a relationship among the
variables (both the dependent and the independent variables). The data collection process and
procedures lasted about six to nine months and were performed mainly in libraries. While this
study is encouraging, more research is needed not only to confirm the conclusions reached by
this thesis, but also to show the causation or causal effects among the variables.

Table 3.12: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level Using PR
DV=
lnELEC_CON
F
Intercept

lnPR

Model 1b

Model 2b

Model 3b

Model 4b

Model 5b

Model 6b

Model 7b

Model 8b

0.718
(0.049)**
*
-0.111
(0.082)

-1.251
(0.240)**
*
-0.050
(0.070)
0.402
(0.048)**
*

-0.688
(0.305)**

-0.799
(0.321)**

-0.629
(0.332)*

-0.656
(0.338)*

-0.574
(0.365)

-0.594
(0.417)

-0.007
(0.073)
0.331
(0.055)**
*
-0.347
(0.096)**
*

0.041
(0.077)
0.318
(0.057)**
*
-0.296
(0.099)**
*

0.128
(0.090)
0.311
(0.057)**
*
-0.338
(0.101)**
*

0.128
(0.090)
0.313
(0.057)**
*
-0.364
(0.117)**
*

0.129
(0.090)
0.304
(0.059)**
*
-0.342
(0.123)**
*

0.113
(0.102)
0.305
(0.067)**
*
-0.367

0.405
(0.236)*

0.294
(0.242)
-0.076
(0.042)*

0.297
(0.242)
-0.079
(0.042)*
0.052
(0.116)

0.296
(0.243)
-0.079
(0.042)*
0.066
(0.119)
-0.073
(0.122)

0.333

0.344

0.340

0.337

lnSEATS

lnASSN

lnEFI
lnELECRULE
lnELECSD
lnNEW_RELFR
E
lnMDMH
Adjusted
R-Squared
F-Stat %
N

0.005

0.310

0.351

(0.132)**
*
0.379
(0.272)
-0.080
(0.058)
0.137
(0.131)
-0.142
(0.145)
0.009
(0.044)
0.388

186.713 3600.364
2601.867
1782.554
1517.940
1260.436
1080.164
906.756
162
157
140
136
136
136
136
103
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at
10%
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Table 3.13: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level using MI
DV=
lnELEC_CONF
Intercept

lnMI

Model 1c

Model 2c

Model 3c

Model 4c

Model 5c

Model 6c

Model 7c

Model c

0.692
(0.046)**
*
-0.038
(0.074)

-1.280
(0.235)**
*
-0.031
(0.062)
0.407
(0.048)**
*

-0.629
(0.301)**

-0.698
(0.319)**

-0.663
(0.332)**

-0.688
(0.339)**

-0.612
(0.367)*

-0.640
(0.417)

-0.125
(0.067)*
0.332
(0.054)**
*
-0.394
(0.098)**
*

-0.112
(0.068)
0.319
(0.057)**
*
-0.342
(0.103)**
*
0.313
(0.233)

-0.094
(0.083)
0.316
(0.057)**
*
-0.342
(0.103)**
*
0.290
(0.242)
-0.016
(0.044)

-0.093
(0.084)
0.318
(0.058)**
*
-0.367
(0.119)**
*
0.292
(0.243)
-0.019
(0.044)
0.048
(0.116)

-0.092
(0.084)
0.310
(0.060)**
*
-0.347
(0.125)**
*
0.290
(0.244)
-0.019
(0.044)
0.063
(0.119)
-0.068
(0.122)

0.005

0.309

0.367

0.345

0.341

0.336

0.333

-0.037
(0.095)
0.310
(0.068)**
*
--0.362
(0.134)**
*
0.389
(0.275)
-0.044
(0.063)
0.135
(0.132)
-0.131
(0.146)
0.014
(0.044)
0.381

lnSEATS

lnASSN

lnEFI
lnELECRULE
lnELECSD
lnNEW_RELF
RE
lnMDMH
Adjusted
R-Squared
F-Stat %
N

25.947
3580.483
2786.865
1875.887
1493.671
1239.675
1061.245
883.1589
162
157
140
136
136
136
136
103
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at
10%
3.2.5. In-depth Comparative Analysis – Pattern Matching
To narrow down the focus of the study, investigate in detail the main research question,
and obtain robust results for greater replication, the author intends to do in-depth comparative
case studies on three pairs of African countries {(Ghana, Togo); (Benin, Guinea-Bissau);
(Senegal, Guinea)} using a different electoral systems design for each (see Table 1 in chapter 1).
These pairs are selected from the 54 African countries that hold elections (see Appendix A,
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Table 3.8). These six countries provide some degrees of variation of the consequences of
electoral systems on Africa’s democratization process and its conflict prevention mechanisms.
All elections held at national levels (presidential, legislative or parliamentary) between 1990 and
2010 will be studied with a particular attention to political participation, competition, and
legitimacy (Lindberg 2006). In all, a total of 25 parliamentary or legislative elections will be
analyzed. Table 3.14 below provides an account of the legislative/parliamentary elections being
investigated in this research. This method focuses also on contemporary events in the six
countries selected for the study.

Table 3.14: An account of elections to be studied
Countries
Benin
Ghana

Legislative elections
1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008

Guinea

1995, 2002

2

Guinea-Bissau

1994, 1999, 2004, 2008

5

Senegal

1993, 1998, 2001, 2007

4

Togo

1994, 1999, 2002, 2007

4

Total

Total number of elections
5
5

25

This comparative study used both qualitative and quantitative data as an analytic strategy.
The quantitative data helped cover elections and electoral behavior that is the embedded unit of
analysis that this study purports to explain. The qualitative data, however, helped explain the key
questions of the study that are (1) “Why are some electoral systems more prone to conflict than
others?” and (2) “How can post-election conflicts be prevented in contemporary Africa?” Pattern
matching was used as analytic technique. Yin (2009) notes that the pattern matching “compares
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an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)” (Yin
2009: 136) (see for example, Trochim 1989). This analytic technique helps improve the internal
validity of the case study. The two important questions raised in this section will be thoroughly
answered in chapter 5 after the discussion of variations of African electoral systems in chapter 4.
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Appendix A
Table 3.3: Elections in Africa from 1990 to 2010
Countries
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde

Legislative/
Parliamentary Elections
2007
1992, 2008
1991, 1995, 1999, 2003,
2007
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1993, 2005, 2010
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1991, 1995, 2001, 2005?,
2006
1992, 1993, 1998, 2005
1990, 1997, 2002
1992, 1993, 1996, 2004,
2007?, 2009
1992, 1993, 2002, 2007
2006
1992, 1997, 2003, 2008
2005, 2010
1993, 1999, 2004, 2008
N/A
1994, 1995, 2000, 2005,
2008, 2010,
1990, 1996, 2001, 2006

Presidential Elections
2009
1992
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006
(President elected by
House)
1991, 1998, 2005, 2010
1993, 2005, 2010
1992, 1997, 2004,
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006

Guinea
Guinea-Bissau

1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004,
2008
1995, 2002
1994, 1999, 2004, 2008

Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho

1990, 1995, 2000
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1993, 1998, 2002, 2007

Liberia
Libya
Madagascar

1997, 2005

1992, 1993, 1999, 2005
1996, 2001, 2006
1990, 1996, 2002,
2006, 2008, 2010
1992, 2002, 2009, 2006
2006
1999, 2005
2005
1996, 2002, 2009
N/A
President elected by the
House)
1993, 1998, 2005, 2009
(b/c death)
1992, 1996, 2001, 2006
1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008
1993, 1998, 2003, 2010
1994, 1999, 2005, 2009
(b/c of the assassination
of the president)
1990, 1995, 2000, 2010
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
Kingdom (PM elected
by the House)
1997, 2005

1993, 1998, 2002, 2007

1992, 1996, 2001, 2006

Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana

Total Number of
Elections
2
3
9
4
8
6
7
8
8
6
11
8
2
6
3
7
N/A
6
8
8
10
6
8

7
8
4
4
8
109

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

Table 6 (continued)
Countries
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania

Legislative/
Parliamentary Elections
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006

Mauritius

1991, 1995, 2005, 2010

Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger

2007
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1993, 1995, 1996, 1999,
2004, 2009
1992, 1998, 1999, 2003,
2007
2003, 2008
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002,
2008, 2010
1993, 1998, 2001, 2007
1993, 1998, 2002, 2007
1996, 2002, 2007

Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Somaliland
South Africa

2005
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009

South Sudan
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo

2010
2000, 2010
Non partisan
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
1994, 1999, 2002, 2007

Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia

2009
2006
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006

Presidential Elections
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007
1992, 1997, 2003,
2007, 2009
President elected by the
National Assembly

Total Number
of Elections
8
8
9
4

1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
1993, 1996, 1999, 2004

1
8
8
10

1993, 1999, 2003, 2007

9

2003, 2010
1991, 1996, 2001,
2006
1993, 2000, 2007
1993, 1998, 2001, 2006
1996, 2002, 2007

4
10

2003, 2010
Pres. elected by the
House
2010
2000, 2005, 2010
Traditional monarchy
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
1993, 1998, 2003,
2005, 2010
2009
2006,
1991, 1996, 2001,
2006, 2008(b/c death),
2005, 2010
1990, 1992, 2002, 2008

7
8
6
NA
3
4
2
5
NA
8
9
2
2
9

2005, 2010
4
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005,
9
2008
N=324 elections (i.e. 153 presidential elections and 171 legislative/parliamentary elections)
Sources: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA):2005-2010 and African
Election Database 2011
Zanzibar
Zimbabwe
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Figure 3.1: Map of Democracy Rating in Contemporary Africa

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; Mo Ibrahim Foundation; The Economist 2012, at
http://www.economist.com/node/21551494
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CHAPTER FOUR
VARIATIONS IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
The electoral system, or how the votes cast are actually translated into seats, has a
huge impact not just on inclusion and exclusion but also on the tone of the entire political
system. The system will also craft the space for corruption and vote rigging—it will not
eliminate the space for malfeasance, but it can limit it. For these reasons, the crafting of
appropriate electoral systems is one of the key factors shaping democratization and
political conflict on the continent.
______ Andrew Reynolds, 2009

The choice of electoral system determines how the entire electoral process will be run. It
can affect not only the size of electoral districts and the ballot structures but also who can vote
and how their votes can be counted (Reynolds 2009, Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2008). Conflicts
are more likely to arise if an electoral system is perceived as a system of “pick and choose.” As
Chapter 3 of this thesis suggested, some electoral systems may be less prone to post-election
conflicts than others; and to some extent such electoral systems may also be more helpful in
promoting democracy than others. In addition, studies have shown that many African countries
that hold elections inherited their political systems from their former European colonial powers
(Reynolds 2009, Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001, Young 1986). Such systems are less likely to
work on African terrains. Therefore, designing an electoral system that can help minimize
frequent occurrences of political conflict requires not only an in-depth knowledge of party
systems in Africa but also a deep understanding of electoral rules of the game. This chapter
covers two interrelated topics: African models of electoral systems with a particular emphasis on
electoral rules and democracy promotion, and elections and party systems.
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4.1. Electoral Systems in Democratizing Countries: Examining African Models
In this section, I discuss the main electoral rules and formulas used in allocating elected
seats in African countries. I also identify and discuss potential effects of electoral systems:
plurality/majority, block vote, list proportional representation, and mixed-member majoritarian
and mixed-member proportional systems.
4.1.1. Electoral Rules and Democracy Promotion
An electoral rule determines how many representatives or members of parliament (MPs)
are elected from one electoral district or constituency. If only one MP is elected to a parliament
from a district, that district will be called a single-member district. However, if more than one
MP is elected to a parliament from a district, the district will be referred to as a multi-member
district.17 The plurality/majority systems use single-member districts. These systems are the
plurality single-member district or the First Past The Post (FPTP), the majority single-member
district or the Two-Round System (TRS), and Block Vote (BV). The multi-member districts are
used by both the proportional representation systems (LIST-PR) and mixed systems (MMP and
MMM). In Africa, the variations in electoral systems indicate that there are also variations in
electoral rules that are used to translate votes into elected seats and, therefore, into policy
preferences. Table 4.1 summarizes the variation in electoral rules used in contemporary Africa.

17

For a detailed discussion on single-member district and multi-member district, see Reynolds et al. (2008), Farrell
(2011).
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Table 4.1: Variation in Electoral Rules in Contemporary African States
FPTP

TRS

BV

List-PR

MMP

MMM

Botswana, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Gabon (19962010), Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Madagascar*,
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe

Central African
Republic,
Comoros,
Congo
Republic,
Egypt, Gabon
(1990), Mali,
Mauritania, and
Togo

Mauritius

Algeria, Angola, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape
Verde, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Magadagascar
(1993), Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger
(2010), Rwanda, Sao Tome
Principe, South Africa,
Tunisia,

Djibouti,
Lesotho

Cameroon, Chad, DRC,
Egypt, Guinea,
Madagascar (1998 and
2002), Niger*, Senegal,
Seychelles, and Sudan

Sources: IDEA, African Elections Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)

An analysis of Table 4.1 reveals that fifteen African states, including Botswana, Ethiopia,
The Gambia, Gabon (1996 – 2010), Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe use FPTP and that most of these
countries were once colonized by the United Kingdom, the founding country of FPTP systems
(Reynolds et al. 2008).

While only one African state (Mauritius) uses BV systems, eight

countries including Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Republic, Egypt, Gabon (1990),
Mali, Mauritania, and Togo use TRS. Contrary to FPTP systems, which are mostly used by
former British colonies, TRS systems have been adopted by overwhelming majority of former
French colonies in Africa.
Table 4.1 also suggests that apart from Niger, which recently switched from MMM
systems in 2010 to List-PR, and Madagascar, which used List-PR in 1993 before switching to
MMM in 1998 and 2002 and to FPTP in subsequent legislative elections, fifteen other African
states such as Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principe, South Africa,
Tunisia, used List-PR systems between 1990 and 2010. Among the ten African countries that
steadily use mixed electoral systems, eight of them—Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of
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Congo (DRC), Egypt, Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, and Sudan—use MMM systems, and only
two of them (Djibouti and Lesotho) use MMP systems.
Another important point to note is that between 1990 and 2010, while Liberia switched
from FPTP to List-PR in 1997 and back to FPTP since 2005, other African countries switched to
a “more proportional system” as a result of post-conflict agreements (Reynolds 2009). For
instance, Lesotho switched from FPTP to MMP in 2002, Rwanda from FPTP to List-PR after the
1994 Rwandan genocide, and South Africa and Sierra Leone from FPTP to List-PR in 1994 and
1996, respectively (African Elections Database 2012, Reynolds 2009). As it is discussed in
Chapter 2, MMP systems tend to be more proportional than MMM systems. In general, each
electoral rule has its advantages and disadvantages.

4.1.2. Effects of Electoral Systems in Contemporary Africa
4.1.2.1. Effects of Plurality/Majority Systems
According to Reynolds et al. 2008), “First Past The Post is the simplest form of
plurality/majority electoral system. The winning candidate is the one who gains more votes than
any other candidates, even if this is not an absolute majority of valid votes” (p. 35). Because
FPTP is simple and easy to understand by political actors in general and voters in particular, it is
often recommended to less developed countries where, in most cases, illiteracy rate remains
high. Such a recommendation fails to take into account the existence of multiple sociopolitical
cleavages in these developing countries given that FPTP favors only strong parties or minority
groups that are located in a concentrated geographical area.
In a country where FPTP method or other single-member district systems are used,
candidates are the focus of voters, who cast their ballots for them instead of voting for political
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parties. The FPTP system is often believed to strengthen the relationship that must exist between
representatives and their constituents. Because these representatives are directly elected by
voters, the latter can hold them accountable for any decisions they made by either re-electing
them or voting them out in future elections. This is what Strom (2000) refers to as
“accountability for candidates.” This accountability can be discussed at two levels. First, under
single-member district systems, MPs are required to maintain permanent communication or
contact with people they represent.
Second, because of the existence of strong party discipline under FPTP and other singlemember district systems, MPs must demonstrate strong support for their parties’ policies and
platforms to earn re-nomination in subsequent elections. But under multi-member district
systems, such as List-PR, MMM and MMP, voters cannot hold candidates accountable. Instead,
political parties are often punished for their actions.
Specific to TRS is that a legislative/parliamentary election is run in two rounds if no
candidate wins the majority of vote (i.e. over 50 percent) in the first round. Generally, only two
candidates with the highest vote in the first round are allowed to compete in the second round. In
that case, the system is called “majority run-off TRS” (Reynolds et al. 2008: 52). The majority
run-off TRS is commonly used in many states that use majoritarian electoral systems in
contemporary Africa. As illustrated by Table 4.2, these countries include Central African
Republic, Comoros, Congo Republic, and Mali.
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Table 4.2: Variations in Electoral Formula in Contemporary African States
Single-Member District
Plurality
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia,
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Two- Round
PluralityMajority
Gabon,
Swaziland,
Togo

Two-Round Majority
Runoff

Party Block Vote

Hare Quota

Central African Republic,
Comoros, Congo Republic,
Mali

Cameroon, Chad,
Djibouti, Senegal,
Tunisia

Madagascar (2007)

Table 4.2 (Continued)
Hare Quota (HQ) with Largest
Remainders or HQ with
Highest Average
Algeria, Benin (1991), Burkina
Faso, Egypt, Madagascar (1993)

Remainders

Block Vote

Droop Largest
Remainders

D’Hondt

Madagascar (1998,
2002), Niger (2004,
2009),
Benin 1995, 1996, 2003,
2007, Madagascar
(1998, 2002)

Mauritius

South Africa

Angola, Burundi,
Cape Verde,
Mozambique, Sao
Tome Principe

Sources: African Elections Database, IDEA, and IPU

However, it is also important to point out a variation in TRS method as it is used in
France and other places around the globe (Reynolds et al. 2008). While the United Kingdom is
known for creating FPTP method, France is always referenced when it comes to the use of TRS
method. Rather than using a majority run-off TRS method, France sets a magic number of 12.5
percent of the vote as a minimum quota that any candidates must win in the first round of a
legislative in order to contest the second round if no one wins a majority of vote in the first round
(Reynolds, et al. 2008). In doing so, the system allows more than two candidates in the second
round of a legislative election. Such a system is simply called “majority-plurality TRS”
(Reynolds, et al. 2008: 52). In contemporary Africa, this system is used by countries such as
Gabon, Swaziland, and Togo.
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Without distinguishing the type of TRS, the TRS method is often praised not only for
allowing voters a second chance to select their representatives, but also for minimizing votesplitting by allowing coalition formation among candidates who have similar policy agendas but
are in the competition to win over the same electorate. However, there is a high likelihood for
party systems to be more fragmented in countries where TRS has been used than in countries
where other single-member district systems are used.
Talking of party systems, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) note “Party system stability and
competitiveness are positively associated with democracy in Africa” (p. 242) (see also Kuenzi
and Lambright 2005). For example, since 1992, Ghana, which has been using the FPTP method
to translate votes into elected seats, is currently cited as a model of Africa’s democracy.
Compared to its neighboring state, Togo, which not only uses TRS is also classified as a country
with restricted democratic practices by Freedom House, Ghana’s democratic status can be
credited to the stability of its party system as a result of its reliance on FPTP system for votes
allocation of the country’s parliamentary elections.

4.1.2.2. Effects of Block Vote Systems
Party fragmentation and vote-buying are usually associated with the use of BV systems in
legislative elections (Nabki 2012, UNAMI 2008, Reynolds, et al. 2008). By definition,
Block vote is a plurality/majority system used in multi-member districts. Electors have as
many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote
totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in most
systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish (IDEA 27 November
2013).

Because voters can cast as many votes as there are seats to be directly elected, in countries where
BV systems are used, candidates of the same political party are allowed to compete against one
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another (Reynolds, et al 2008). In addition, as Reynolds, et al (2008) note it, the system allows
voters to vote in many parties within their electoral district. This situation may result not only in
massive corruption but also in internal party fragmentation and/or the fragmentation of the entire
political system of countries where BV systems are used.
As identified by IDEA (2012), in the world, there are ten countries that use BV systems
for the legislative/parliamentary elections. These countries include Cayman Islands with fifteen
elected seats in the national assembly, Falkland Islands or Malvinas (8 seats), Guernsey (45
seats), Kuwait (50 seats), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (132 seats), Lebanon (128 seats),
Mauritius (62 seats), Montserrat (9 seats), Syrian Arab Republic (250 seats), and Tuvalu (15
seats) (IDEA 2012). Apart from Syrian Arab Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and
Lebanon, an analysis of the total number of seats directly elected to the legislatures in these
countries shows that BV systems are usually adopted in countries that choose to have a small
number of seats.
Because the BV systems are basically plurality/majority systems in multi-member
constituencies, an absolute majority of seats is more likely to be won by bigger parties at the
expense of smaller parties and minority groups. For instance, since 1990 in Mauritius, the only
country in contemporary Africa that uses the Block Vote system for translating votes into seats,
despite its reliance on what Reynolds, et al. call “best loser” seats18, suffered a problem of
representation of minorities and smaller parties in the legislature.
According to African Elections Database (2012), in the 1991 Legislative Assembly
elections, the ruling coalition called the Mauritian Militant Movement-Mauritian Socialist
Movement (MMM-MSM) won 59 seats against 3 seats for its political opposition coalition, the
18

The best loser seats, according to Reynolds, et al. (2008), are seats that are guaranteed for the candidates who
were front-runners in the exit poll but failed to gather enough vote to win seats in the actual legislative election.
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Mauritian Labor Party-Mauritian Social-Democratic Party (MLP-PMSD), which was
compensated with 4 best loser seats. The BV system allowed the ruling coalition to continue
winning an absolute majority of seats (60 seats) in the 1995 National Assembly elections versus
2 seats for the opposition; and in the 2000 legislative elections, it won 54 seats against 8 seats for
the coalition of the opposition parties. Although the number of the best loser seats was increased
from 4 to 8 in the country’s subsequent legislative elections, it did not help smaller parties, such
as the Organization of the People of Rodrigues (OPR) and the Rodrigues Movement (RM) to
play any significant role in the country’s National Assembly since the Third Wave of
Democratization.
In spite of their inefficacy in ensuring that smaller political parties and minority groups
are fairly represented in parliaments, voter turnouts seem to very high in countries where the BV
systems are used with the exception of Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic (IDEA 2011). Table
4.3 shows voter turnouts in legislative/parliamentary elections in BV countries in the world
during the last two decades. It also highlights whether voting is compulsory in each of these
countries. A critical analysis of Table 4.3 reveals that compulsory voting has no effect on voters’
decisions to turn out to vote. Political instability may have contributed to the low voter turnout in
Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic. As discussed in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, a higher voter
turnout indicates a high degree of political participation. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the lack
of opportunity to participate in the political process has significant effects in the occurrences of
post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. According to African Elections Database,
Mauritius is one of the rare democratic countries in Africa with a political rights score of 1 and a
civil liberties score of 2. These democratic scores indicate that Mauritius is less prone to sociopolitical conflicts in general and electoral conflict in particular.
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Table 4.3 Voter Turnouts and Compulsory Voting in BV Countries in the World
Cayman Islands
Year
Voter turnouts
Compulsory voting
2005
80.25%
No
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
2006
99.69%
No
2002
99.90%
No
1997
99.37%
No
1992
99.26%
No
Lebanon
2009
53.98%
Yes
2005
46.47%
Yes
2000
44.97%
Yes
1996
43.14%
Yes
1992
30.35%
Yes
Mauritius
2010
77.82%
No
2005
81.25%
No
1995
79.69%
No
1991
84.08%
No
Montserrat
2009
66.75%
No
2006
74.63%
No
2001
77.48%
No
Syrian Arab Republic
2007
56.00%
No
2003
63.45%
No
1998
82.22%
No
1994
61.17%
No
Tuvalu
2002
79.99
No
Source: http://www.idea.int/esd/type.cfm?electoralSystem=BV

4.1.2.3. Effects of List Proportional Representation (List-PR)
In a proportional representation system, “all groups influence a decision in proportion to
their numerical strength” (Steiner 1971: 63) (also quoted in Lijphart 1977: 39). This system is
just a complete opposite of the majority/plurality electoral system where only stronger parties
dictate their decisions to smaller parties. To allow parties to be represented in the legislature,
countries can choose between closed List-PR systems and open List-PR systems (Reynold, et al.
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2008). Under a closed List-PR system, voters have no choice than to vote for candidates at the
top of their parties’ lists or simply vote for the parties. In contrast, under an open List-PR system,
“voters can influence the order of the candidates by making individual preferences (Reynolds, et
al. 2008: 60). In contemporary Africa, countries that have used PR systems adopted closed ListPR (African Elections Database 2011, IDEA 2012, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013).
Table 4.1 provides a comprehensive list of African countries that have used closed ListPR systems. In many of these countries, voters have not been given any incentives to select their
representatives. They only vote political parties. In South Africa, for example, the PR system has
opposite effect of what it is initially aimed for. Because of its vivid memories of apartheid, the
majority black population has been mandating the African National Congress (ANC) to rule the
country since 1994. This situation has resulted in one-party domination of the South Africa’s
Parliament. As an illustration, the ANC alone won 252 seats out of 400 seats in 1994, 266 seats
in 1999, 279 seats in 2004, and 264 seats in 2009. This observation shows that PR systems may
not always eliminate the winner-take-all or the majority rule over the minority groups. Despite
an anomaly observed with the use of a PR system in South Africa, the system generally reduces
disproportionality between percentages of votes and the actual percentages of seats won by
parties.
As members of minority groups, women are often denied opportunities to fully
participate in politics in many countries in the world. According to the United Nations,
Politics has traditionally been a male domain that many women have found unwelcoming
or even hostile. Societies in which traditional or patriarchal values remain strong may
frown on women entering politics. In addition to dealing with unfavorable cultural
predilections, women are often more likely than men to face practical barriers to entering
politics, including a paucity of financial resources, lower levels of education, less access
to information, greater family responsibilities, and a deprivation of rights that has left
them with fewer opportunities to acquire political experience. With the exception of the
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close relatives of male politicians, women generally lack the political networks necessary
for electoral success.

In many African countries, the use of closed List-PR systems has helped women to break down
some of these barriers that have prevented them from entering politics. Therefore, the closed
List-PR system has been praised for allowing a high degree of representation of women in the
National Assemblies or Parliaments if female candidates are placed at the top on the winning
party lists (Reynolds, et al. 2008). For instance, South Africa has 42.25 percent of women
serving as MPs since 2009 (IPU 20 January 2014). In the recent legislative elections in Rwanda,
63.75 percent (that is 51 out of 80 seats won by women) of women were elected to the Chambre
des Députés or Chamber of Deputies (IPU 9 January 2014).
The next section presents and discusses Africa’s mixed-member electoral systems and
how the use of such systems affects voters and other political actors.

4.1.2.4. Effects of Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) and Mixed-Member
Proportional (MMP) Systems

By definition a mixed-member electoral system is a mixture of a single-member plurality
(SMP) system and a PR system. Consequently, if a country uses a mixed-member electoral
system, it has to provide two types of elections: SMP and PR elections (Farrell 2011). These
elections can be either dependent (MMP) or independent (MMM). Because of their linkage in
MMP elections, the List-PR seats help to reduce the disproportionality of the SMP seats.
Because of the results MMP elections produce, Massicotte and Blais (1999) call MMP systems
the “corrective” systems while Farrell (2011) describes them as the systems that “provided the
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ideal compromise between the proportional virtues of the list electoral system and the districtorientation of SMP” (p. 117) (also quoted in Kostadinova 2002). According to Massicotte and
Blais (1999), the MMP systems are called differently in different countries. For example, in
Japan they are referred to as “superposition,” “correction” in Germany, “coexistence” or “fusion”
in France, and “conditional” in Italy (p. 341).
Between 1990 and 2010, in Djibouti, where an MMP system had been used in legislative
elections, no opposition candidates had been elected to serve in the National Assembly despite
the fact that the country embraced a multi-party system since 1992 (African Elections Database
2011, IPU 2013). The 1992 Constitutional Referendum in Djibouti limited the number of
political parties to four, including the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and National
Democratic Party (PND), the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), and the
People’s Rally for Progress (PRP), the sole political party legally recognized by the state since
the country’s independence from France in 1977 (African Elections Database 2011, CIA World
Factbook 2014).
The Union for a Democratic Alternative (UDA) is a coalition of two opposition political
parties [Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and National Democratic Party (PND)]. Because of
the UDA, which won no seat in the 2003 legislative elections and boycotted the legislative
elections in 2008, the Union for a Presidential Majority (UPM), which is a coalition of the ruling
PRP and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), had maintained its
monopoly of the country’s national Assembly by winning all the 65 elected seats. The question
one has to ask is that if the MMP system is praised for offering the best of both the SMP and PR
systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001), why had Djibouti’s political system been monopolized
by a single party over the last two decades? As it becomes a routine for the opposition to boycott
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the elections in Djibouti, it will be extremely difficult for scholars and researchers in the field of
comparative study of electoral systems to really evaluate the impact of the MMP system on the
allocation of votes and seats in the country’s National Assembly. One can simply argue that the
use of the MMP system in Djibouti has produced unintended consequences given that the
country’s legislative elections held since 1992 produced results that would be similar to election
results under the winner-take-all systems or majority/plurality systems.
Unlike Djibouti, where political parties and their candidates not only fight for legislative
seats but also to win over the presidency, Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy, where only
members of the National Assembly are elected by voters. Therefore, the focus of each political
party has always been on how to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly and thereby
nominate the leader of the party as the country’s Prime Minister. Following the military coup in
1986, a military regime was established in Lesotho from 1986 to 1993. In the first democratic
legislative elections held in March 1993, the ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), with only
74.78 percent of the vote, won 100 percent of seats or 65 seats against none for more than ten
political opposition parties and independents. In May 1998, the ruling party—at this time under
the umbrella of Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)—won 79 out of 80 seats with 60.72
percent of the vote. Its immediate challenger, the Basotho National Party (BNP), won only one
seat with 24.47 percent of the vote (African Elections Database 2012).
Both the 1993 and 1998 National Assembly elections were held under the FPTP system.
The frustration of opposition parties, especially the BNP, for not being represented in the
parliament after the 1993 elections, carried over the 1998 National Assembly election results that
they qualified as fraudulent. Elklit (2008: 92) writes
A discrepancy of this kind should not come as a surprise—it had happened before—but it
was followed by the losing parties, especially the main opposition party, the Basotho
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National Party (BNP), crying ‘Foul’. This was also nothing new, but it was a sad surprise
that the accusations about the overall correctness of the 1998 election results (which were
never seriously challenged) sometime after they were published, incensed the public to
such a degree that they started rioting in the streets of the capital, Maseru, setting fire to
and demolishing public as well as private buildings.

The turmoil created in the aftermath of the publication of the 1998 election results was met with
the intervention of the South African troops in Lesotho in the name of maintaining regional
peace and security, protecting the interests of South Africa (Neethling 1999), and “[creating] a
safe environment in which Lesotho’s problems could be negotiated” (Sutton-Pryce, Baudin, and
Allie 1998: 26) (also quoted in Neethling 2000, p. 5; Neethling 1999). According to Kent and
Malan (2003), “on 22 September 1998, a 600-strong South African military task force entered
Lesotho to assist the government in restoring law and order following election-related unrest” (p.
3). The decision to adopt an MMP system in Lesotho was not something that came in a vacuum.
It was a fruit of a series of negotiations between the opposition parties and the government under
the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Elklit 2008, Santho
2000).
The outcome of SADC’s mediation of good offices between the protagonists of the 1998
Lesotho’s post-election conflict was the creation of an Interim Political Authority (IPA) (Elklit
2008, UN Peacemaker 1999, EISA n. d.). The IPA, whose main duties and responsibilities were
“to review the constitution, the IEC, the Lesotho electoral system and the Electoral Code of
Conduct and to make appropriate recommendations to the relevant public institutions on its
structures and functions with a view to making it more democratic and representative of the
people of Lesotho” (EISA n. d.), was composed of twelve political parties that equally
represented with two representative each (UN Peacemaker 1999).
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The IPA was able to reach a political compromise with the government, which accepted
an MMP electoral system with 80 SMP seats and 40 PR seats. This MMP system helped ease the
political tension that prevailed in the aftermath of the 1998 National Assembly elections in
Lesotho. Although the LCD was able to win 77 SMP seats in the May 2002 elections with 54.89
percent of the votes and the two vacant seats in the October 2002 elections, the opposition parties
came out stronger than ever before by taking not only all the 40 PR seats but also the one
remaining SMP seat, thanks to the MMP system used to translate votes into elected seats in the
2002 National Assembly elections in Lesotho (African Election Database 2012).
The degree of representativeness of the opposition parties increased in both the 2007 and
2012 National Assembly elections when these opposition parties tried to close the
disproportionality gap with the LCD by winning 58 seats in 2007, and took over the National
Assembly with 94 out of 120 seats. With this extraordinary change in the political landscape in
Lesotho, one can argue that the adoption of an MMP system helped facilitate the democratization
process in the country. Therefore, since 2002, Lesotho has been propelled to the democratic
status with a Freedom House political rights score of 3, and civil liberties score of 3 (African
Elections Database 2012).
Unlike the MMP systems, where the SMP election and PR elections are linked, under the
MMM electoral systems, SMP and PR elections are independently held. The independence of
these SMP and PR elections means that under the MMM systems, there are no compensatory
seats. Because of the lack of connection between the two systems (SMP and PR) in MMM
systems, MMM systems tend to be less proportional than MMP systems. In contemporary
Africa, countries that have consistently used the MMM systems include Cameroon, Chad, DRC,
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Egypt, Guinea, Senegal, and Seychelles (see Table 4.1). The ways in which MMM systems are
used in Guinea and Senegal will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

4.2. Elections and Party Systems
The literature on party systems in Africa not only started late (Erdmann and Basedau
2008, Manning 2005, Erdmann 2004, 1999) but also is still at its early stages (Van de Walle
2003, Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). However, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) argue that “While
systematic research on political parties as organizations is still lacking, there has been increasing
focus on the new emerging party systems and their relation to democratic consolidation” (p.
241). As successful and repetitive free and fair elections may give rise to democratic
consolidation (Powell 2000), party systems also remain one of the drivers of democratic survival
and sustainability.
By sustainable democracy, I mean a democratic polity that it is able not only to address
the needs and concerns of its current populations, but also to address such needs without
compromising the needs of future generations. So far in contemporary Africa, countries such as
Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauitius, Namibia, Sao Tomé Principe, and South Africa
can be cited as African states that are moving in the direction of sustainable democracy because
of their continuous efforts to strengthen their democratic institutions.
By contrast, Mali is a palpable example of what a sustainable democracy may not look
like. Indeed, between 1992 and 2012, Mali was hailed as a model of Africa’s democracy for its
relatively peaceful elections that established two different democratic regimes (one under
President Alpha Oumar Conaré, and the other one under President Amadou Toumani Touré)
(African Elections Database 2012). However, the country was not able to address many
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underlying grievances including, but not limited to, “poor governance, the corrosive impact of
drug trafficking and other illicit commerce, military fragmentation and collapse, limited
implementation of previous peace accords with Tuareg rebel groups” (Arieff 2013: 6). The
failure by the Malian government to seriously tackle those issues may have contributed to the
public support for the military coup that ousted President Touré and led to a near collapse of the
state of Mali in 2012.
How do party systems help sustain Africa’s democratic regimes? A simple answer,
according to Lindberg (2007), is that democratic sustainability requires both “stability and
fluidity among legislative parties in Africa’s democracies” (p. 215). When a political party is
able to ensure its continuity not only by increasing its membership with vibrant members, but
also by providing policy options that respond to the needs and interests of its constituents, such a
party can be referred to as a stable and fluid party (Lindberg 2007). In addition, Lindberg (2007)
joins his predecessors Sartori (1976), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) when he stresses the
importance of institutionalization of political parties as a prerequisite of democratic
consolidation.19
Indeed, to find out whether institutionalization of party systems occurs in Africa,
Lindberg (2007) conducts an interesting study on 21 African countries that he refers to at the
time as either electoral democracies or emerging electoral democracies based on their Freedom
House score of political rights and civil liberties of (4, 4) or below after “at least two successful

19

According to Lindberg, “stability” and “interaction” are key elements of institutionalization of party systems. The
author identifies eight indicators of institutionalization as follows: the number of parties in the legislature, the
number of new parties in the legislature, the share of new parties in the legislature, the number of parties voted out
of the legislature, the share of parties voted out as compared to the total number of parties that compete in the
election, the share of seats in the legislature held by the largest party, and the share of seats held by the runner-up.
The higher the number on these indicators over time, the more fluid the party systems. The party systems become
stable if parties that contest elections and winning seats are almost the same during every election. One talks of destabilized party systems if the dominant parties lost power. See Lindberg (2007: 222-226) for a detailed discussion
of measuring institutionalization of party systems.
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elections” (p. 228). These countries include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Sao Tomé Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. As
expected, he finds that in these countries, party systems had not been institutionalized. Rather,
they were either fluid (Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tomé Principe, Seychelles,
and Zambia) or de-stabilized (Kenya and Senegal) or stable (Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti,
Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania)
(Lindberg 2007: 231-233).
Equally important, the period of Lindberg’s study covered only fourteen years that stretch
“from 1989 to June 2003” (p. 230), and was published in 2007. Erdmann and Basedau (2008)
use a stricter criterion than Lindberg by including in their analysis of African party systems
countries that held “at least three consecutive elections” (p. 244). The rationale behind the “three
consecutive elections” criterion is to determine how consistent interactions among legislative
parties in these countries are. Like Lindberg (2007), these authors are not only inspired by
Sartori’s (1976) work on the classification of party systems in terms of “‘dominant’ and
‘predominant’ party” (Erdmann and Basedau 2008: 242), but they also build on the work of
scholars, such as Hartmann (2007), Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005), Lindberg (2005), Bogaards
(2004), Mozaffar, Scaritt and Galaich (2003), Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999), Scarritt
and Mozaffar (1999), Van de Walle and Buttler (1999), who have tremendous expertise in the
study of African party systems.
In their investigation, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) find that countries such as
Botswana, Burkina Faso (1992-1997 and 2002), Cameroon, Chad (1997 and 2002), Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho (1993-1998, and 2002),
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Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone (2002), South Africa,
Tanzania, and Togo have dominant party systems; Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal have
two-party systems; Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Sao Tomé Principe, Sierra Leone (1996), and
Zambia have moderate pluralism party systems; and Benin (1991, 1995-2003) and Republic of
Congo have extreme pluralism party systems (p. 248).
With regard to the relationship between electoral systems and party systems in Africa,
Erdmann and Basedau (2008) find that 50 percent of one-party dominance can be found in
countries (i.e. Djibouti and Mauritius) that use plurality systems in multi-member constituencies
(MMCs); 58 percent in countries [Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho (1993-1998), Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe] where plurality
systems in single-member constituencies (SMCs) have been used; 56 percent in countries
[Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad (1997), Comoros, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, and
Togo] where absolute majority in SMC or MMC have been used; 57 percent in MMM and MMP
countries [Chad (2002), Guinea, Lesotho (2002), Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles]; 25
percent in PR countries [Benin (1995-2003), Burkina Faso (1992-1997), Cape Verde and
Guinea-Bissau with small MMC; 80 percent in PR countries [Benin (1991), Burkina Faso
(2002), Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone (2002)] with medium and large
MMC; and 67 percent of one-party dominance in pure PR countries [Namibia, Sierra Leone
(1996) and South Africa] (p. 248). An analysis of these findings demonstrates that despite the
existence of highly fractionalized ethnic cleavages in many African states (Mozaffar and
Vengroff 2002; Vengroff 1994, 1993), and in spite of the variations in African electoral systems,
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the continent is still experiencing the preponderance of dominant party systems (Erdmann and
Basedau 2008).
Building on previous literature on African party systems and Erdmann and Basedau’s
(2008) theoretical contributions to the study of electoral systems and party systems, this thesis
looks beyond 2003, expands the discussion on elections and party systems in Africa, and
provides a comprehensive overview of how such party systems affect the promotion of
democracy across the continent during the time span of 1990 and 2010. The effects of the
variations of party systems coupled with the impact of the variations of electoral systems on the
democratization process in contemporary Africa are summarized in Table 4.4 (see Appendix).
The next chapter will provide a detailed account on the roles of the political institutions,
the civil society, and the traditional authorities in shaping the democratization processes in these
six African states: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo, in comparative
perspective. Above all, chapter 5 will discuss the consequences of electoral systems and the role
of the game on peaceful democratic alternations in each of these countries.
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APPENDIX
Table 4.4 African Models of Electoral Systems and Party Systems
Countries

Years of
Legislative
Elections

Electoral
Systems

Algeria

1997
2002
2007

PR
PR
PR

Angola

1992
2008

Benin

Botswana

Burkina
Faso

Burundi

Cameroon

Cape
Verde

# of Parties
in the
Legislature

Names of
Party with
Most or
Coalition

# of
Majority
Seats

Party
Systems

Democratic
/
Freedom
Status

10 & 11
indpts
9 & 30
indpts
23

RND
FLN
FLN

156/380
199/381
136

12
6

MPLA
MPLA

129/220
191/220

1991
1995
1999
2003
2007

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

14
18
16
12
12

12
18
16
12
12

UTRD
PRB
RB
MP*
FCBE

12/64
21/83
27/83
52/83
35/83

1994
1999
2004
2009
1992
1997
2002
2007
1993
2005
2010

MA
MA
MA
MA
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

5 & others
5 & indpts
7 & indpts
7 & indpts
10
4 & others
13
13
7
7
4

2
3
3
5
10
4
13
13
2
5
3

BDP
BDP
BDP
BDP
ODP-MT
CDP
CDP
CDP
FRODEBU
CNDDFDD

27/40
33/40
44/57
45/57
78/107
101/111
57/111
73/111
65/81
59/100
80/100

Domina
nt
(Dom.)
Moderat
e (M)
Pluralis
m (pl.)
Domina
nt.
Domina
nt
Extreme
pluralis
m (E,
pl.)
E. pl.
E. pl.
E. pl.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free

PR
PR

# of
Parties/
Coalitions
at the
Polls
10 progovernme
nt parties
& indpts
9 & indpts
24 &
indpts
18
14

Free
Free
Free
Free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free

1992
1997
2002
2007
1991
1995

MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
PR
PR

4
8
5
5
2
5

4
8
5
5
2
3

RDPC
RDPC
RDPC
RDPC
MpD
MpD

88/180
109/180
149/180
153/180
56/79
50/72

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Twoparty

Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Free
Free
133

Not Free
Not free

Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

2001
2006
1993
1998
2005

PR
PR
MA/TRS
MA/TRS
MA/TRS

5
5
13
13
9

3
3
13
13
9

MpD
MpD
MLPC
UFAP
KNK

40/72
41/72
34/85
55/109
42/105

1997
2002
1992
1993
1996
2004
2009

MMM
MMM
MA/TRS
MA/TRS
MA/TRS
MA/TRS
MA/TRS

10
15
6 & others
9
2 & indpts
2
3

10
15
7
9
2 & indpts
2
3

Congo
Rep.

1992
1993
2002
2007

TRS
TRS
TRS
TRS

19 & indpts
14& 1 indpt
6
18

Cote
d’Ivoire

1990
1995
2000

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

3 & indpts
3
6 & indpts

Democrati
c Rep. of
Congo
Djibouti

2006

MMM

19 &
indpts
14& 1
indpt
6
18 &
indpts
3 & others
& indpts
3
6 & indpts
Over 80 &
indpts

MPS
MPS
UDD
RDR
RND
CdIA
Baobab
Movement
UPADS
UPADS
PCT
PCT

1992
1997
2002

MMP
MMP
MMP

2
3
2

1993
1999
2004
2008
1994
1995
2000
2005
2010

PR
PR
PR
PR
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

1990
1996
2001

TRS
FPTP
FPTP

Central
African
Rep.
Chad
Comoros

Egypt
Equatorial
Guinea

Ethiopia

Gabon

Free
Free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free

65/125
113/155
7/42
28/42
36/43
12/18
17/24

M. pl.
*Twoparty
E. pl.
Dom.
Dom.
E. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free

39/125
47/125
53/137
46/137

E. pl.
M. pl.
M.pl.
E. pl

P. free
P. free
Not free
Not free

PDCI-RDA
PDCI-RDA
FPI

163/175
148/175
96/225

M. pl
M. pl.
M. pl.

Not free
Not free
Not free

Over 80 &
indpts

PPRD

111/500

M. pl.

Not free

1
2
1

RPP
RPP
UMP

65/65
54/65
65/65

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Partly free

PDGE
PDGE
PDGE
PDGE
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF
EPRDF

68/80
75/80
68/100
89/10
484/547
483/548
481/547
327/547
499/547

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Partly free

PDG
PDG
PDG

63/120
85/120
86/120

M. Pl.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Not free

8
4
3 & others
3
3 & others
3
3
3
1 & others 1 & others
1, others
1, others &
& indpts
indpts
6, others
6, others &
& indpts
indpts
11 & 1
11 & 1 indpt
indpt
8
8
12 &
12 & indpts
indpts
10 & indpts
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13 & indpts

PDG

82/120

Dom.

Partly free

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

10 &
indpts
13 &
indpts
5 & indpts
4 & indpts
3
3 & indpts
3 & indpts
4
6 & others
4 & indpts
4 & indpts

3 & indpts
4 & indpts
3
3 & 1 indpt
3 & indpts
4
6 & others
4 & indpts
4 & indpts

PPP
APRC
APRC
APRC
NDC
NDC
NPP
NPP
NDC

25/36
33/45
45/48
42/48
189/200
133/200
99/200
128/230
114/230

Free
Not free
Not free
Partly free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

1995
2002
1994
1999
2004
2008
1992
1997
2002
2007

MMM
MMM
PR
PR
PR
PR
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

9
9
8
8
15
21
7
10
10
23

9
6
6
8
5
5
7
10
10
23

41/76
47/76
62/100
38/100
45/100
67/100
100/188
107/210
125/210

Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Not free
Partly free
Not free
Not free
Partly free
Not free

Lesotho

1993
1998
2002
2007

FPTP
FPTP
MMP
MMP

1
2
2
3

65/65
78/80
79/80
62/80

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Partly free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free

Liberia

1997
2005

FPTP
FPTP

6
11

NPP
CDC

49/64
15

Dom.
M.pl.

Partly free
Partly free

Madagasc
ar

1993
1998
2002
2007

PR
MMM
MMM
FPTP

12 &
indpts
4 & others
15
12
13
21 &
indpts
14 &
others
9 & others
2 & others

PUP
PUP
PAIGC
PRS
PAIGC
PAIGC
KANU
KANU
NARC
ODM &
Allies
BCP
LCD
LCP
LCP

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Twoparty
Twoparty
Twoparty
Dom.
Dom.
M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.
Twoparty

CFV
AREMA
TIM
TIM

47/138
63/150
103/160
105/127

M. pl.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.

Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free

Malawi

1994
1999
2004
2009

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

UDF
UDF
MCP
DPP

84/177
93/193
57/193
113/193

M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
Ml. Pl.

Free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free

Mali

1992
1997

TRS
TRS

14 & others
9 & others
5, others &
indpts
2 & others
3
3 & indpts
9, others &
indpts
6 & 33
indpts
10
8

ADEMA
ADEMA

76/116
128/147

M. pl.
Dom.

Free
Free

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea
GuineaBissau

Kenya

2006

FPTP

1992
1997
2002
2007
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Edoh Agbehonou

8 & indpts
10 &
indpts
9, others
& indpts
6 & indpts
10
8
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Mauritani
a
Mauritius

Morocco
Mozambiq
ue

Namibia

Niger

Nigeria

Rwanda

2002
2007

TRS
TRS

1992
1996
2001
2006

TRS
TRS
TRS
TRS

1991
1995
2000
2005

Edoh Agbehonou

9 & indpts
16 &
indpts
3 & indpts
3 & indpts
7
15 &
indpts

9 & indpts
16 & 15
indpts
3& 10
indpts
3 & 7 indpts
7
15 & 41
indpts

Espoir
2002*
ADP*
PRDS
PRDS
PRDS
RFD

66
115/147
67/79
70/79
64/81
15/95

Twoparty
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
E. pl.

BV
BV
BV
BV

5
6
4
4

5
3
3
3

1994
1999
2004
2009
1994
1999
2004
2009
1993
1995
1996
1999
2004
2009

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM

14
12
21
19
8
8
9
14
9
9
9
5
10 &
others
7 & indpts

3
2
2
3
5
5
7
9
9
9
9
5
10
7 & 10
indpts

1992
1998
1999
2003
2007
2003
2008

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
PR
PR

2
5
3
7 & others
6
8 & indpts
9 & indpts

2
5
3
7
5
7
8

1991

PR

4 & others

3

Free
Free
Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free

MMMMSM*
MMMMSM
MMMMSM
AS

59/62
60/62
54/62
38/62

M.pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.

Free
Free
Free
Free

FRELIMO
FRELIMO
FRELIMO
FRELIMO
SWAPO
SWAPO
SWAPO
SWAPO
AFC*
MNSDNassara
UNIRD
MNSDNassara
MNSDNassara
MNSDNassara
SDP
UNCP
PDP
PDP
PDP
FPR-led
coalition
FPR-led
coalition
PCD-GR

129/250
133/250
160/250
191/250
53/72
55/72
55/72
54/72
50/83
29/83
56/83
38/83
47/83
76/113

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
M. pl.
M. pl
Dom.
M. pl.
M. pl.
Dom.

Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Partly free
Partly free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free

314/593
229/282
206/360
223/360
263/360
40/50
42/53

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Not free
Not free
Not free

33/55

M. pl.

Free
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1994
1998
2002
2006
2010

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

6
4 & others
5
10
10

3
3
3
4
4

Senegal

1993
1998
2001
2007

MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM

6
18
10 &
others
14

6
11
10
13

Seychelles

1993
1998
2002
2007

MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM

2
2
2
2

Sierra
Leone

1996
2002
2007
1994
1999
2004
2009
2000
2010

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
MMM
MMM

1993-2010

N/A

3
3&1
indpt
4 & indpts
2
13
7
7 & indpts
19
16
21
26
1 & indpts
8, others
& indpts
N/A

6
3
3
7
13
12
13
1& 5 indpts
8, others &
3indpts
N/A

1995
2000
2005
2010
1994
1999
2002

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
TRS
TRS
TRS

13
13
18
6 & others
5
1 & indpts
5 & indpts

5
6
5
6
5
1 & 2 indpts
5 & 1 indpt

CCM
CCM
CCM
CCM
CAR
RPT
RPT

Sao Tomé
&
Principe

South
Africa

Sudan

MLSTPPSD
MLSTPPSD
MLSTPPSD
MLSTPPSD
ADI
PS
PS
Sopi
coalition
Sopi 2007
coalition
SPPF
SPPF
SPPF
SPPF

27/55
31/55
24/55
23/55
26/55

M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.
M. pl.

Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

84/120
93/140
89/120
131/150

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free

21/22
24/25
18/25
18/25

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free

SLPP
SLPP
APC
ANC
ANC
ANC
ANC
NCP
NCP

27/68
83/112
59
252/400
266/400
279/400
264/400
355/360
323/450

M. pl.
Dom.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Not free
Not free

N/A

55 Seats
are
indirectly
elected
and 10
seats
appointed
by the
King
186/232
202/231
206/232
186/239
36/81
79/81
72/81

N/A

Not free

Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
Dom.
M. pl.
Dom.
Dom.

Not free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Not free
Not free
Not free

Swaziland

Tanzania

Togo
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2007

TRS

Over 20 &
indpts

3

RPT

50/81

Dom.

Not free

2006

FPTP

6 & indpts

NRM

191/284

Dom.

Partly free

1991
1996
2001
2006

FPTP
FPTP
FPTP
FPTP

6 & 36
indpts
2
5
7 & 1 indpt
5 & 2 indpts

2
MMD
125/150
Dom.
5 & others
MMD
131/150
Dom.
8, others
MMD
69/150
M. pl.
& indpts
MMD
74/150
M. pl.
5 & indpts
Zimbabwe
1990
FPTP
5 & indpts
3
ZANU-PF
117/120
Dom.
1995
FPTP
7 & indpts
2
ZANU-PF
118/120
Dom.
2000
FPTP
3 & others
3
ZANU-PF
62/120
Dom.
2005
FPTP
5 & indpts 2 & 1 indpt
ZANU-PF
78/120
Dom.
Sources: African Elections Database, supplemented with IDEA Database, and IPU Database.
MPLA= Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
http://africanelections.tripod.com/electoral_democracies.html

Free
Not free
Not free
Partly free

Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia

Not free
Not free
Not free
Not free
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CHAPTER FIVE
IN-DEPTH COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES – MOST SIMILAR VERSUS MOST
DIFFERENT CASES

This chapter provides an analysis of elections and electoral behavior in six African
countries: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo. These countries are
purposefully selected based on the types of electoral systems used for the allocation of electoral
seats and/or policies preferences and their levels of post-election conflict. The chapter is
structured in five sections. The first section analyzes political institutions and voting behavior in
each of the six countries. The second section discusses democratic qualities of elections in
comparative perspective. The third section presents election sequencing, management, and
monitoring mechanisms in place in each the selected countries being studied. Section four
discusses the role of civil society and traditional authorities in promoting democracy and conflict
mitigation. The last section sums the chapter up with the discussion of consequences of electoral
systems and the rules of the game on democratic alternations.

5.1. Political Institutions and Voting Behavior in African States
Political institutions are commonly defined as a set of political structures or organizations
that aim to control or influence the behavior of people or groups of people (Dickovick and
Eastwood 2013, Janda, Berry and Goldman 2011-2012). Examples of political institutions
include, but are not limited to, the constitution, and the branches of government—the legislative,
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the executive, and the judiciary—political parties, elections, electoral systems and electoral
commissions.
These institutions “establish the rules by which policy is made, and thus how the policy
preferences of different groups are weighed in the process that determines the policy outcomes”
(Hiscox 2009: 287). The ultimate goal of almost all political parties is to have control over
policy-making processes and outcomes. In many democracies and democratizing countries,
political parties and/or candidates mobilize the electorate and ask for their support and votes in
order to win elections and set the future policy. In this section, I discuss how political institutions
shape people’s voting behavior in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Senegal.
5.1.1. A Brief Political History and Electoral Dynamics of the Cases
5.1.1.1. The Case of Benin
Although both Benin and Togo were former French colonies and had embarked on a
similar path regarding how to bring about democracy, they have different historical experiences
when it comes to vibrant civil society. In Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and
Togo, Heilbrunn contends that “In a society with a tradition of national associations, the state is
constrained by the interests of organized groups since attempts to ignore particular concerns may
result in unrest” (Heilbrunn 1993:298). He argues that while these national associations were not
present to help coordinate activities for change during the wave of democratization, they have
been influencing politics in Benin since independence. However, their early involvement in
politics did not prevent the country from experiencing multiple military dictatorships and
authoritarian regimes prior to 1990. A chronological overview of the Beninois political situation
is summarized in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1: Timeline of Political Situation in Benin
Timeline
Political Systems
1960-1961
Emerging Democracy
1961-1963
De Facto One Party State (PDU)
1963-1964
Military Regime
1964-1965
De Facto One Party State (PDD)
1965-1968
Military Regime
1968-1969
Restricted Democratic Practices
1969-1970
Military Regime
1970-1972
Restricted Democratic Practices
1972-1975
Military Regime
1975-1990
One Party State (PRPB)
1990-1991
Multiparty Transition
1991- Present
Democracy
Source: African Elections Database, 30 May 2011. Available at
http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html
A glance at Table 5.1 shows that from the early 1960s to 1990, military rule and oneparty system had alternated with restricted democratic practices in Benin. Between 1960 and
1961, Benin was an emerging democracy. Three political parties—Republican Party of Dahomey
(PRD), Dahomeyan Democratic Union (UDD), and Democratic Movement of Dahomey
(MDD)—were formed by the Beninois nationalists during the liberation struggle. These parties
had their representatives in the Territorial Assembly in 1959. However, during the December
1960 Presidential and National Assembly elections, the Dahomeyan Democratic Rally (RDD) of
Hubert Maga and the Dahomey Nationalist Party (PND) of Sourou-Migan Apithy strategically
coalesced and formed a strong political party called the Dahomeyan Unity Party (PDU), which
won the elections. Because of the coalition, only the two remaining parties (PDU and UDD)
dominated the political scene in Benin between 1960 and 1961.
The following three years were marked by the imposition of one-party system from 1961
to 1963 by the ruling PDU coalition government led by Hubert Maga and Sourou-Migan Apithy,
respectively President and Vice President of the country, followed by the installation of a strong
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military regime (1963-1964) (African Election Database 2011). Military dictatorships continued
until the early 1990s. In 1972, a military coup led by Mathieu Kérékou consolidated the
authoritarian rule in Benin for nearly two decades. Political parties, other than the ruling party,
Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB) were banned. Benin People's Revolutionary Party
(PRPB) was the only political party or the state party that was legally allowed to conduct
political activities throughout the country until 1990. As a result of the need for political
liberalization engrained in the third wave of democratization during the 1990s coupled with the
late 1980s economic downturn in Africa and other factors including the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Benin’s patron constrained the Beninois authoritarian regime to open up to the political
opposition and accept the instauration of a national forum (Heilbrunn 1993). This forum, known
as Conférence Nationale, put in place binding democratic rules, including the establishment of a
short period of a democratic power sharing transition between the regime in place and its
political opposition (Heilbrunn1993, Nwajiaku 1994), The Conference Nationale also
recommended that free and fair elections be held to end the transitional government.
Subsequently, the 1990 Constitutional Referendum and the 1991 National Assembly and
presidential elections were held (African Election Database 2011).
The incumbent president Kérékou with 32.27 percent of the votes lost the 1991
presidential election to the Prime Minister of the democratic transitional government, Nicéphore
Soglo, with 67.73 percent of the votes in the first round. The latter lost his power after his first 5year term in office to his former challenger Mathieu Kérékou through the 1996 presidential
election (Battle and Seely 2007, African Election Database 2011). President Kérékou
successfully played by democratic rules and presided over the country’s internal and external
affairs for another ten years and stepped down at the end of his second term. With over 74
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percent of the votes, Yayi Boni, who was not affiliated to any Beninois political party
whatsoever, and often called a “political outsider and independent” (CIA World Factbook 2012),
succeeded Kérékou and managed to win his second term on March 13, 2011 (African Election
Database 2011). As of 2010, the population of Benin was over 9 million divided among 42
ethnic groups, including Xwla, Fon, Adja, Yoruba, and Bariba, to name just the major ones (U.S.
Department of State 2012). The democratization process went smoothly in Benin, at least in part
thanks to “the growth of the independent press” (Ibelema 2008).

5.1.1.2. The Case of Ghana
Ghana (formerly known as Gold Coast) gained its independence from Great Britain on
March 6, 1957 (Adjei 2012, Gocking 2005). Ghana, which appears to be one of the rare stable
democratic states in Africa today, was pretty unstable starting from 1964 (when Osagyefo Dr.
Kwame Nkrumah, the First President of Ghana, changed the country’s political system from
multiparty democracy to one-party system) to the period leading up to the reestablishment of
multiparty system in 1992. Table 5.2 is a summary of Ghana’s political situation since
independence.
Table 5.2: Timeline of Political Situation in Ghana
Timeline
Political Systems
1957-1958
Democracy
1958-1964
Restricted Democratic Practice
1964-1966
One Party State (CPP)
1966-1969
Military Regime
1969-1972
Democracy
1972-1979
Military Regime
1979-1981
Democracy
1992-1996
Emerging Democracy
1996-Present
Democracy
Source: African Elections Database,16 November 2012. Available at
http://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html
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An analysis of Table 5.2 reveals that Ghana experienced several military coups through
1981 with the final military takeover by Captain Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings established
robust military rule in the country from 1981 to 1992. He dissolved the country’s Parliament that
was elected in 1979, banned all political parties, and put in place the Provisional National
Defense Council in 1981 (CIA World Factbook 2014, IPU 92). But with the new wave of
democratization and under both national and international pressure to establish democratic
institutions in Ghana, he lifted the ban on all political parties, authorized a constitutional
referendum in which voters overwhelmingly (92.59 percent of the votes) agreed on a new
constitution prior to subsequent elections (African Elections Database 2012). The country then
held a multiparty presidential election on November 3, 1992. Rawlings, who also contested that
presidential election as a civilian alongside a few opposition candidates, emerged as a winner
with 59.3 percent of votes (IPU 1992).
The parliamentary elections held on December 29, 1992 were boycotted by the main
opposition parties, including New Patriotic Party (NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC),
National Independence Party (NIP) and the People’s Heritage Party (PHP). However, some
independent candidates and small and pro-Rawlings political parties

such as National

Convention Party (NCP), and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) contested the
parliamentary elections with the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), which won 189
out of 200 seats (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 1994). With such a supermajority in
Parliament, NDC was not only able to secure Rawlings’s reelection in 1996 with 57.37 percent
of the votes against his main challenger John Kufuor (NPP), but also it maintained its dominance
in Parliament by winning 133 out of 200 seats against NPP (60 seats), PCP (5 seats), and PNC (1
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seat) during the parliamentary elections held simultaneously on December 7, 1996 African
Elections Database 2012, IPU 1996).
In 2000, Ghana witnessed its first and true democratic alternation when the ruling NDC
accepted defeat in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Kufuor (NPP), with 56.90
percent of the votes against John Evans Atta Mills (NDC), Edward Mahama (PNC), and George
Hagan (CPP), won the 2000 presidential elections. His NPP also obtained 100 seats in
Parliament. Kufuor was re-elected in 2004, and the NPP gained more seats than ever before.
However, one can observe a repetition of history when the incumbent party accepted defeat after
being in power for eight consecutive years. In 2008, NDC, led by Atta Mills, made a come-back
to power by winning 50 percent of the seats in Parliament and 50.23 percent of the votes in a
very close and highly disputed presidential election. With a slim margin of 0.23 percent of the
vote, Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP) lost the 2008 presidential election to Atta Mills, who died in
office on 24 July 2012 (African Elections Database 2012).
Subsequently after the death of President Atta Mills, Vice-President John Dramani
Mahama was sworn in as a “caretaker president” (Dalby 2012). This smooth transfer of power is
in line with Article 58 (6) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which stipulates that “Whenever
the President dies, resigns or is removed from office, the Vice-President shall assume office as
President for unexpired term of office of the President with effect from the date of the death,
resignation or removal of the President.” Mahama then assumed his constitutional duty by
finishing Atta Mills’s “unexpired term of office.” In the highly disputed 2012 presidential
elections held five months following the death of Atta Mills, Mahama defeated his main
challenger, Akufo-Addo with 50.7 percent of the votes while his NDC won 148 parliamentary
seats out of 275 (an increase of seats from 230 seats in 2008 to 275 in 2012 by the Electoral
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Commission) leaving NPP with 123 seats, CPP with one seat, PNC with one seat and other
smaller parties or independent candidates with the remaining two seats (IPU 2013). It is
important to note that the NPP, which criticized the Electoral Commission for favoring the NDC
with the creation of the 45 news seats in 2012, won 23 seats against NDC, which took the
remaining 22 seats (The Electoral Commission of Ghana 2012).
In all, NDC increased its share in the Parliament from 50 percent of seats in 2008 to 54
percent in 2012. The control of Parliament by NDC gives an edge to President Mahama to carry
out his political agenda without major obstructions from his political opponents. But the most
important thing was that the peaceful handling by the Supreme Court of the 2012 electoral
disputes between Akufo-Addo and President Mahama on the one hand and between Akufo-Addo
and the Electoral Commission on the other hand showed not only the strength and independence
of the Judiciary but also the maturity of Ghana’s democracy.

5.1.1.3. The Case of Guinea
Like other francophone countries in Africa such as Benin and Togo, Guinea experienced
an extended history of military dictatorship after the death of the country’s father of
independence, President Ahmed Sekou Touré in 1984 (CIA World Factbook 2014). In fact,
President Touré was also a dictator himself given that he presided over the country under
authoritarian rule facilitated by the sole legitimate state party, Democratic Party of Guinea
(PDG). Under Touré’s presidency, political opposition had no place in Guinea. He used a politics
of terror as a way to consolidate his power after breaking all relations with the French colonial
power. As a result of Conté’s dictatorship rule, “tens of thousands of people disappeared, or were
tortured or executed, during his 26-year regime” (BBC News Africa 2014). The use of fear
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mongering tactics by President Conté and his government created a psychosis among the
Guinean population and silenced opposition voices for nearly three decades of Conté’s
presidency. Table 5.3 provides a brief political history of Guinea since independence from
France in 1958.

Table 5.3: Timeline of Political Situation in Guinea
Timeline
Political Systems
1958-1984
One Party State (PDG)
1984-1990
Military Regime
1990-1993
Multiparty Transition
1993-2008
Restricted Democratic Practice
2008-2010
Military Regime
2010-Present
Emerging Democracy
Source:
African
Elections
Database,
3
March
2012.
Available
http://africanelections.tripod.com/gn.html

at

As it shows in Table 5.3 above, the one-party system established between 1958 and 1984
had been replaced by a military regime, which dominated the politics in Guinea from 1984 to
1990 (African Elections Database 2012). After a brief period of a democratic transition (19901993), Army General Lansana Conté, the incumbent president of the military regime, made sure
that there were no free and fair elections in Guinea until his death in 2008 (CIA World Factbook
2014).
Although a multi-party system was established in early 1990s, Conté’s Party of Unity and
Progress (PUP), the ruling party, not only managed to win an absolute majority in every single
legislative election but also ensured that President Conté retained the presidency. With 51.71
percent of the vote, Conté won the first democratic election held in 1993 against many
candidates of the Guinean political opposition parties including the Rally of the Guinean People
(RGP), the Union for the New Republic (UNR), the Party of Renewal and Progress (PRP), the
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National Union for the Progress of Guinea (UNPG), the Union for the Progress of Guinea
(UPG), the Dyama Party (DYAMA), and the Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic
Rally (PDG-RDA) (African Elections Database 2012). He was re-elected in 1998. Because of the
control of the National Assembly by his PUP, which obtained 41 out of 76 seats in the 1995
legislative elections, Conté was able to proceed with a constitutional amendment and increased
his mandate from five year terms to seven years with no term limits through a national
referendum in November 2001 (African Elections Database 2012).
The boycott by the main opposition party, RPG, of both the 2002 legislative elections and
the 2003 presidential elections helped the ruling PUP to maintain its dominance in the National
Assembly and allowed Conté to easily win the presidency with 95.25 percent of the votes
(African Elections Database 2012). Conté then accumulated and centered all powers in himself
and unilaterally exercised them until his death on 22 December 2008 after a “lengthy illness”
(Associated Press 2008). The causes of such an illness, according to the Associated Press, were
not disclosed to the public. As usual in Guinea, the constitution was never respected after the
death of a Head of State. As Conté himself took power via a military coup following the death of
President Touré, the junta under the leadership of Captain Moussa Dadis Camara also seized
power through a coup d’état (CIA World Factbook 2014, Arief and Cook 2009). Camara
suspended all political institutions, including the country’s constitution, the legislature, and
political parties as well as trade unions (Arief and Cook 2009). His efforts toward fighting
corruption, restoring social order, and establishing good governance were undermined by his
increasing ambition to contest the subsequent presidential elections set to take place in 2010
against the will of people of Guinea.
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Unhappy with Camara’s desire to perpetuate his power, the Guinean political opposition
and advocates of democracy took the matter to the streets and gathered on the national football
stadium, where they had engaged in anti-government demonstrations (Butty 2009). In the name
of maintaining social order, “Camara ordered the massacre of a pro-democracy rally where
numerous witnesses and human rights groups said 157 people were killed and soldiers raped
several women” (The Guardian 16 December 2009). In the view of Georgette Gagnon, Africa
director at Human Rights Watch, the massive killing at the stadium was a terror tactic used by
the junta to “silence opposition voices” (Human Rights Watch 2009). The decision to commit
such an onerous crime was planned and implemented by the Guinean security forces including,
but are not limited to, Presidential Guard troops and gendarmes (Human Rights Watch 2009).
Such a massacre of September 28, 2009 in Guinea was blamed on the former presidential
aide, Lieutenant Abubakar "Toumba" Diakite by the United Nations and human rights
organizations. This latter (Diakite), not only refused to accept responsibility for the crime, but
also he accused Camara of “a total betrayal of democracy” and personally shot him on December
3, 2009 (The Guardian 2009, Voice of America 2009, Newstime Africa 2011). This 2009
assassination attempt reveals how history repeats itself in Guinea, which has been ruled by
strong men and experienced several military coups since 1958. Thus far, according to 2010
Presidential Election Observers Mission (MOE) of Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy
in Africa (EISA), the 2010 presidential elections remain the first fair and competitive elections.
However, Guinean political history may have influenced political institutions and voting
behavior in the country. The election of Alpha Condé of RPG, a veteran political opponent to
Conté’s dictatorial regime, in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections with 52.52
percent of the votes against Cellou Dalein Diallo (UFDG) with 47.48 percent of the votes set the
tone for the democratization of Guinea.
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5.1.1.4. The Case of Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau is a West African country that is bordered by two countries (Guinea to the
east, Senegal to the north) and the Atlantic Ocean or Gulf of Guinea to the west (see Figure 5.1).
The country is well known for its cycle of military takeover. Since independence from Portugal
in 1974 under the leadership of African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
(PAIGC) (BBC News Africa, 13 February 2014), the political situation in Guinea-Bissau was
characterized by a lengthy pattern of one party system-military regime-one party system, a
shorter period of multiparty democratic transition, and a series of shorter patterns of democracy
and transitional governments. This Table 5.4 below provides an overview of political history of
Guinea-Bissau since independence.

Table 5.4: Timeline of Political Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Timeline
1974-1980

Political Systems
One Party State (PAIGC)

1980-1984
1984-1991

Military Regime and One Party State (PAIGC)
One Party State (PAIGC)

1991-1994
1994-1999
1999
1999-2003
2003-2005
2005-2012
2012

Multiparty Transition
Democracy
Transitional Government
Democracy
Transitional Government
Democracy
Military Regime

2012- Present Transitional Government
Source: African Elections Database, 1 June 2012
A critical analysis of Table 5.1 reveals a lack of regime stability in the country. In
addition, the frequency of military coups even during the era of electoral democracy in GuineaBissau made the case of Guinea-Bissau an exceptional one as compared to the other cases
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selected in this thesis. The wave of democratization of the 1990s helped the people of GuineaBissau to break away from one party system and adopt a multiparty system. As an immediate
consequence, PAIGC lost its state party status when the legislatures voted against the legitimacy
of the ruling party as the sole political party in the country (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014).
The multiparty transition of 1991-1994 paved the way for true competitive presidential
elections of July/August 1994 in which the incumbent president, João Bernardo Vieira, won 52
percent of the votes in the second round against seven political opponents, including his main
challenger, Kumba Yalá, the leader of Social Renewal Party (PRS), who lost the elections with
48 percent of the votes (African Elections Database 2012). The closeness of election results is an
indication of political polarization in Guinea-Bissau since the outset of the country’s
democratization process.
However, the results of the 1994 National People’s Assembly elections held
simultaneously with the presidential elections gave an absolute control of the legislative branch
to PAIGC with 62 percent of the total seats over its counterparts, the opposition political parties
such as Resistance of Guinea-Bissau- Bafatá (RGB-MB) with 19 seats, Union for Change (UM)
with 6 seats, PRS with 12 seats, Democratic Convergence Party (PCD) with one seat, and Front
for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING) with one seat. Equally important to note
is that two smaller opposition political parties, namely Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy
(FCG-SD) and United Social Democratic Party (PUSD), participated in the 1994 legislative
elections but failed to secure a single seat in the National People’s Assembly (African Elections
Database 2012, Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994). Despite report by the international observers
that the elections were “generally free and fair” (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994), the opposition
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cried fraud and under strict instructions of Yalá, the opposition parties except RGB-MB
boycotted Vieira’s new government (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994).
Five years later, PAIGC lost its power and accepted defeat in the 1999/2000 presidential
elections that Kumba Yalá (PRS) won handily with 72 percent of the votes. However, no
political party won a majority of seats during the 1999 National People’s Assembly elections.
The trend of a fragmented National People’s Assembly carried on to the 2005 legislative
elections with a surprising comeback of PAIGC, which won a plurality of seats (45 out of 102
seats) (African Elections Database 2012). Meanwhile, President Yalá was ousted by a military
coup in 2003 (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014). The deposing of Yalá helped former
president João Bernardo Vieira, who contested the 2005 presidential elections as an independent,
to win the presidency against Malam Bacai Sanhá, the leader of Vieira’s political party, PAIGC
(African Elections Database 2012). Because of his inability to solve internal political crisis,
President Vieira was assassinated following the killing of General Tagme Na Waie, the army’s
chief of staff in March 2009 (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014). Internal conflicts may have
been the rationale of the assassination of Vieira, but there were certainly other more proximate
reasons such as the desire to seize power as was always the case in Guinea-Bissau.

Figure 5.1: Map Illustrating the Location of Guinea-Bissau

Source: BBC News Africa, 13 February 2014.
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5.1.1.5. The Case of Togo
The political situation in Togo was quite similar to that of Benin in the early 1960s.
Between 1960 and 1962, four political parties—Justice, Union, Vigilance, Education,
Nationalism, Tenacity, Optimism (JUVENTO) or Togolese Youth Movement; the Union
Démocratique des Populations Togolaises (UDPT); the Parti Togolais Du Progrès (PTP), led by
Grunitzky; and the Comité de Unité Togolaise (CUT), led by the first democratically elected
president, Sylvanus Olympio—dominated the political activities in Togo (U.S. Department of
State, 2012). However, CUT, PTP, and a small party called Union of Chiefs and Populations of
the North (UCPN) had their elected representatives in the 1958 Legislative Assembly (African
Election Database 2011). With strong popular support, President Olympio banned other political
parties and established a one-party system two years after he was sworn into office. Table 5.5
below synthesizes the political history of Togo since the country’s accession to selfdetermination in 1960.

Table 5.5: Timeline of Political Situation in Togo
Timeline
Political Systems
1960-1961
Democracy
1961-1962
Restricted Democratic Practice
1962-1963
De-Facto One Party State (CUT)
1963
Transitional Government
1963-1967
Emerging Democracy
1967-1969
Military Regime
1969-1979
Military Regime and One Party State (RPT)
1979-1991
One Party State (RPT)
1991-1993
Multiparty Transition
1993-Present
Restricted Democratic Practice
Source: African Elections Database, 4 December 2010
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An analysis of Table 5.5 shows that the military was a heavy weight in politics in Togo
and that the country embraced more an authoritarian form of government than a democratic one.
A brief period of democracy (from 1960 to 1962) was reversed by a bloody military coup d’état,
which led to the assassination of President Olympio on January 13, 1963 by a group of Togolese
soldiers including Etienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé, a sergeant who served in the French Army, for
refusing to reintegrate into the Togolese army “626 Togolese, who had been serving in
metropolitan regiments” (First 1970, 2012: 208). As First (1970) notes it, these 626 soldiers were
sent back as a result of the French demobilization program of the late 1950s.
The complotters of the coup had no political leadership experience. They had to seek help
from outside the junta. Nicolas Grunitzky (the leader of PTP and a former Prime Minister of
Togo from 1956 and 1958), who unlike President Olyimpio wanted Togo to be an autonomous
entity within the French Community, was invited from exile in France to lead a transitional
government formed by the junta in 1963. Such a government was short-lived. It was soon
overthrown in a second military coup on January 13, 1967 by the young Lieutenant Colonel
Gnassingbé Eyadéma who established a strong military dictatorship with a one-party system
until 1991. Although opposition political parties proliferated during the early 1990s, the
Togolese Peoples Rally (RPT), the former state party and the party of Eyadéma, ruled the
country for over four decades and continues to dominate the politics in Togo until today under
another name, Union for the Republic (UNIR).
From the early 1990s to the present day, there have been over 20 political parties. The
major ones include, but are not limited to, the ruling RPT, Union of Forces for Change (UFC),
National Alliance for Change (ANC), Action Committee for Renewal (CAR), Democratic
Convention of African Peoples (CDPA), Pan-African Patriotic Convergence (CPP), Alliance of
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Democrats for Integral Development (ADDI), and Democratic Alliance for the Fatherland
(ALLIANCE). Most of these parties were relatively small groups organized around a patron who
led and financed them. Since 2007, only RPT, UFC, and CAR were represented in the country’s
2007 National Assembly with 50, 27, and 4 seats, respectively (African Election Database,
2011). As far as the social fabric is concerned, the Togolese population is culturally and
ethnically diverse. More than 20 ethnic groups live in the country. With the size of 56,785 square
kilometers, Togo is about half the size of Benin (116,622 sq. km) (U.S. Department of State
2012). The major ethnic groups are Ewe, Mina, Kabyès, Kotokoli, and Moba. While Ewe and
Mina are concentrated in the south, Kabyès, Kotokoli, and Moba populate the north.
As Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005) pinpointed in their comparative study of party
politics in Benin and Senegal, politics in the early 1990s in both Benin and Togo were
characterized by “rapid proliferation of political parties” (p. 473) and “ethno-regional cleavages”
(p. 474). These features also remained a reality and continue to shape politics in Togo since
1990. For example, in Togo, politics has been framed in terms of north versus south in general,
and Kabyè against southern peoples, particularly, the Ewé ethnic group. Therefore, there has
been a tendency by political leaders to create political parties based on ethnic and regional lines.
Heilbrunn observes, “Ethnic strife between Togo's northern and southern peoples aggravated
suspicions of the Kabyè, some of whom had benefited from the years of Eyadema's rule”
(Heilbrunn 1993:295).

5.1.1.6. The Case of Senegal
History reveals that Senegal has so far been ruled by civilians. For example, since
independence from France, three consecutive civilians [Leopeold Sedar Senghor (1960-1982),
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Abdou Diouf (1983-February 2000), and Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012)] presided over the
destiny of their country’s domestic and foreign affairs in addition to the Senegalese current
civilian president, Macky Sall. Transfers of power have always been peaceful in Senegal. The
country is known for its stability in West Africa in particular and in Africa in general. The
longtime stability of Senegal can in part be explained by a lack of military interventions in their
country’s political affairs and an endorsement of elections by all Senegalese as the legitimate
means of transfer of political power. Table 5.6 below contains a summary of political situation
of Senegal since independence.

Table 5.6: Timeline of Political Situation in Senegal
Timeline
Political Systems
1960-1963
Emerging Democracy
1963-1966
Restricted Democratic Practice
1966-1974
One Party State (UPS)
1974-1978
Restricted Democratic Practice
1978-2000
Emerging Democracy
2000-Present
Democracy
Source: African Elections Database, 13 July 2012
Unlike many African countries, as Table 5.6 indicates, Senegal reintroduced a multiparty
system as early as 1978 (African Elections Database 2012). Two opposition political parties,
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) led by Abdoulaye Wade and African Independence Party
(PAI) led by Majhemout Diop participated in the 1978 National Assembly elections against the
ruling Socialist Party (PS) led by Léopold Sédar Senghor (African Elections Database 2012).
Despite the participation of PAI and PDS in the legislative elections, PS was able to win 82 seats
leaving PDS with 18 seats, and PAI with empty hands.
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Since then, PDS maintained its presence in the political scene by leading opposition
parties with 27 seats in the legislature in 1993 and 23 seats in 1998. The 2000 Presidential
elections gave Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of PDS or Alternative 2000, a double digit victory
with 58.49 percent of votes against the incumbent President Abdou Diouf (PS) with 41.51
percent of the votes (African Elections Database 2012). The Alternative 2000 that brought Wade
to power became SOPI Coalition and won 89 out 120 seats against the opposition parties,
including but are not limited to, Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP), PS, And Jëf -African
Party for Democracy and Socialism (AJ-PADS), Union for Democratic Renewal (URD),
Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS), Party for Progress and Citizenship (PPC), Alliance for Progress
and Justice- Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ), National Democratic Rally (RND), and Independence and Labor
Party (PIT) (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 2001).
It is equally important to point out that AFP and PS got the lion share of the 31 remaining
seats left to the opposition parties by SOPI Coalition by winning eleven and ten seats,
respectively in the 2001 National Assembly elections. In all, ten political parties were
represented in the National Assembly. Even though Senegal has had multiparty elections since
Senghor’s last term in office, it was the 2001 legislative elections coupled with the acceptance of
defeat by former President Abdou Diouf that brought the country into the family of democratic
states. Wade’s subsequent defeat helped institutionalize democracy.
It is also important to note that since 1978, the number of political parties grew and
continues to grow at an increasing rate. It grew from three in 1978 to eight in 1983, to eighteen
in 1998, and to over forty in 2007, given that SOPI Coalition alone was composed of forty
political parties (African Elections Database 2012). During the 2007 elections, in spite of the
emergence of a myriad of coalitions of opposition parties including Takku Defaraat Senegal
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(TDS) coalition, And Defar Senegal (ADS) coalition, and Waar-wi coalition, SOPI candidate,
President Abdoulaye Wade was re-elected with 55.90 percent of the votes (African Elections
Database 2012). Additionally, SOPI coalition maintained its supremacy by winning 131 out of
150 seats in National Assembly against TDS coalition, ADS coalition, and Waari-wi coalition
each of which won only three seats (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 2007). Except Rally
for the People (RP), which won two seats, other smaller parties such as Front for Socialism and
Democracy-Benno Jubël (FSD-BJ), Alliance for Progress and Justice- Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ),
Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship (CRC), Authentic Socialist Party (PSA), National
Patriotic Union (UNP), Reform Movement for Social Development (MRDS) and Rally of the
Ecologists of Senegal-The Greens (RES- Les Verts) shared equally the eight remaining seats,
However, the swift shift of power from Wade to Macky Sall, hence from PDS to a broad Macky
2012 coalition during the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, demonstrates that
political leaders and their supporters have decided to embrace democratic values and consolidate
their democratization process in motion in Senegal since 1993.

5.1.2. Effects of Political Institutions on Voting Behavior
Despite the presence of ethno-linguistically diverse populations in Benin, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo, each of these countries adopted a unitary constitutional
design. This design indicates that in these countries, “power is not constitutionally divided
between layers of government but resides exclusively in the central government” (Dickovick and
Eastwood 2013: 179-180). Nonetheless, there are variations in the implementation of the unitary
constitutional design in each of these countries. For example in Togo, the government divides the
country into 30 prefectures, each of which is administered by a prefect appointed by the
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president or the Head of State. This style of administering a country is consistent with the French
unitary state model with the central government control exercised on behalf of the president at
the prefecture level. The main purpose of consolidating power is to limit the competition of local
politicians in order to avoid a possible destabilization of the central government. In my view, the
lack of local elections can negatively impact political socialization in the country and
consequently voting behavior in the country’s national elections.
Unlike Togo, Ghana has embarked in its decentralization process since 1992. In Benin,
the central government has been administering the country’s seventy-two communes through
elected local governments that are accountable to the Beninois government since 2002
(Bierschenk 2006). He argues that “the holding of local elections in 2002-03 can be seen as the
culmination of this turn to democracy” (p. 543). Such a politics of decentralization offers voters
a high feeling of ownership of the political process in their country and facilitates their voting
behavior.
In Guinea-Bissau, Article 2 of the 1984 Constitution, which was amended multiple times
in 1991, 1993 and 1996, stipulates that:
1. The national sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau lies in the people;
2. The people shall exercise political power directly and through the organs of
democratically elected power.
Despite the provision in the Article 2 that sovereignty belongs to people and that democratic
elections should be the means by which people get access to political power, military
interventions are often used in Guinea-Bissau as a tool to gain power. As I will discuss later in
this chapter, the frequency of military coups in Guinea-Bissau left the country with weak
political institutions that were unable to meet the expectations of voters.
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For instance, late President Kumba Yalá unilaterally dissolved the parliament, sacked
judges of the Supreme Court, and dismissed at his will four Prime Ministers during his short
term in office. A survey data on attitudes and opinions of the Bissau-Guineans regarding the
quality of democracy will help measure the level of trust in political institutions in GuineaBissau. So far the only database that provides survey data on “the quality of democracy and
governance in Africa” is the Afrobarometer, run by Michigan State University. But GuineaBissau is not yet covered in the Afrobarometer online data analysis. However, a decline in voter
turnouts from 87.6 percent in the 2005 presidential elections to about 60 percent in 2009
presidential elections shows voters’ uncertainty about who to vote for between two dictators: the
incumbent President Vieira and a former president Yalá, who abused his power by dissolving
the National People’s Assembly and dismissing judges and prime ministers as he wished. The
decline in voter turnouts is also indicative of a loss of trust in political institutions in the country
(African Elections Database 2012).
Unlike Guinea-Bissau, which experienced some brief periods of democracy, Guinea was
ruled solely by late president, General Lansana Conté, who concentrated all powers in his hands
as his predecessor President Touré did. None of the Guinean political elites was committed to
promoting democracy given that separation of powers among the branches of government was
never a reality in the country. Since 1990, not only were elections not held as scheduled, they
were also poorly organized and administered. Although the bad organization of elections was
across the board in many African states, the Guinean case was alarming. Between 1990 and
2010, only two legislative elections were held in Guinea, and even the latest elections conducted
in 2002 were boycotted by the principal opposition party, the RPG of Alpha Condé and other
parties including the UFR of Sidya Touré and the DYAMMA of Mansour Kaba due to the lack
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of transparency and fairness of such elections (IPU 1996-2010). Above all, the removal of
presidential term limits during the 2001 referendum held on November 11 constitutes the most
fundamental obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Guinea.
In Senegal, the creation of Sopi coalition, which calls for a broader change (constitutional
amendment, change of ruling government and its political instruments, etc.) helped bring about a
democratic alternation in 2000. The slogan “Sopi”, which means “change” in the Wolof
language, resonates well with the electorate who voted massively for Wade and parties of Sopi
coalition in order to end “40 years of single-party dominance” (Galvan 2001), or what Bingol
and Vengroff (2012) call “hegemonic rule by the PS” (p. 112).
As political parties can persuade voters to support a cause, they also have the ability to
convince them to oppose a cause. This was exactly what happened in 2007 when “Siggil Front,”
a coalition of opposition parties, boycotted the 2007 parliamentary elections, which saw a record
low turnout (34 percent as compared to 68 percent voter turnout in the 2001 National Assembly
elections) (IPU 2007).
Additionally, the Preamble of the Constitution of Senegal (ratified on January 22, 2001)
proclaims the principle of equality and separation of powers, and such powers should be
exercised via democratic procedures. In the Preamble, it also emphasized
the willingness of Senegal to be a modern state that functions according to loyal and
equitable game between a governing majority and a democratic opposition, and a state
that recognizes such an opposition as a fundamental pillar of democracy and an
indispensable player in a functioning democracy.
Even during the time of President Leopold Sédar Senghor’s presidency, Senegal was one of the
few African states that allowed a multiparty system. Since 1978, political activities of opposition
parties were also allowed (African Elections Database 2012, Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002). One
thing is to recognize opposition parties as vital parts of democracy, but the other thing is to
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provide opportunities that allow such parties to really contribute to the consolidation of
democracy. It was exactly what Senghor and his successor, President Abdou Diouf did, but in
different ways.
While the Senghor created an opposition that was loyal to him and help his PS to
maintain its hegemonic rule, Diouf on the other hand and because of increasing demands by
opposition parties for more political representation during the democratization wave that swung
across Africa in the 1990s, adopted strategies that later led to his demise as a result of the ability
of a more radical opposition to coordinate behind Abdoulaye Wade (Mozaffar and Vengroff
2002). Wade, who was hailed as a president whose only objective was to restore democracy in
Senegal, embraced many undemocratic practices during his presidency. For instance, during the
allocation of indirectly-elected senatorial seats, President Wade discriminated against opposition
parties by signing the “presidential decree 2006-1350 of 8 December 2006” (IPU 2007). Such a
decree gave more seats to smaller constituencies including Dagana, Kenel, Ziguinchor, Diourbel,
Vélingara, Linguère, Gossas and Kébémer at the expenses of a much larger district of Bakel
(IPU 2007). By striking down such a decree, the Constitutional Court demonstrated its
independence via-a-vis the executive branch. The independence of the court system in Senegal
has helped moderate the democratization of the country.
In the next section, I will discuss how democratic qualities of elections may help
consolidate the democratization process in each of the six African states: Benin, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo.
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5.2. Comparing Democratic Qualities of Elections
Democratic qualities of elections as identified by Lindberg (2006) include political
participation, electoral competition, and electoral legitimacy.
5.2.1. Political Participation
Linking political participation with elections, I used the Afrobarometer online survey
analysis Round 5 that covers about 84 percent of countries selected for the purpose of this study.
Guinea-Bissau was not covered by Afrobarometer. Other reliable sources such as African
Elections Database and Inter-Parliamentary Union Pipeline are used to help include GuineaBissau in my analysis. The two most important variables I considered when making the decision
to use Round 5 of Afrobarometer Online Data Analysis were “level of democracy: under
previous non-democratic regimes” and “level of democracy: ten years ago.” Such variables help
cover the time frame of the study (1990-2010) and also provide a broad picture for the sample of
countries selected for this comparative analysis.
Political participation is measured by two critically intervening variables such as “rights
and freedoms” and “political engagement” (Afrobarometer 2012). Rights and freedoms include
freedom of expression and speech, freedom to join political organizations of one’s choice,
freedom to choose who to vote for during elections, and freedom of press; on the other hand,
political engagement is measured by citizens’ interest in public affairs and how often citizens
discuss politics with relatives and friends (Afrobarometer 2012).
5.2.1.1. Rights and Freedoms
It is clearly stated in the article 2 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
“everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
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distinction of any kinds, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (UN.org 2014). However, it often
evident to see that respect for such rights and freedoms, which is an international law, is not fully
obeyed in many African countries. For example, a survey conducted in 34 Afrobarometer
countries shows that on average only about 50 percent of the 48,004 participants say that they are
completely free to say what they think in their countries while the other 50 percent are either
“somewhat free,” “not very free,” or “not at all free” (Afrobarometer 2012).
In comparing these descriptive statistics to the cases selected for this study, as expected,
the percentage of participants who think they are free to express their thoughts and ideas
increases as their country’s commitment to democracy increases. For example, while 73 percent
of people in Ghana and Senegal, 57 percent of Beninois, and 55 percent of Guineans say that
they are free to say what they think, only 21 percent of Togolese say that they are free to say
what they think without fear (Afrobarometer 2012).
When it comes to freedom to join political organizations, one can observe similar
scenarios. According to the same survey, Ghana and Senegal score very high (87 percent and 85
percent, respectively); Benin and Guinea score moderately high (68 percent and 69 percent,
respectively); and Togo scores very low (36 percent). The higher the score, the more people feel
that they are allowed to freely join political organizations or parties. Other concerns of political
scientists about the respect for political rights and freedoms are whether government should
allow freedom of press or not. The findings are included in Table 5.7 below.
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Table 5.7: Perception on Freedom to Vote for a Candidate, and Free Press
Variables

Benin

Ghana

Guinea

Senegal

Togo

Freedom to choose who to vote for a
party or candidate

84%

91%

81%

89%

60%

The media should have the right to
publish any view and ideas without
government control

51%

55%

48%

29%

55%

The government should have the right to
prevent the media from publishing things
that it considers harmful to society

49%

43%

50

68%

40%

Source: Afrobarometer Online Data Analysis, 2012

An analysis of Table 5.7 reveals that in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal, not only is there
freedom of expression, but there is also freedom to select one’s representative through elections.
It also shows that in Togo even though people are not free to say what they think, they, however,
are free to vote for the party or the candidate of their choice. Finally, Table 5.7 shows that with
the exception of Senegal, where overwhelming majority (68 percent) of people want their
government to regulate the media because of its past abuses of freedom, people fairly believe in
Benin, Ghana, Guinea, and even Togo that the government should allow the media to freely
publish ideas even if these views are against government policies.
It is equally important to note that the exception observed among the Senegalese
participants in the Afrobarometer survey does not necessary mean that people have been
advocating for an authoritarian regime in Senegal. It is perhaps an indication that people in
Senegal have a preference for a stronger government that should not only protect them from
harm, but also and most importantly, a regime with the ability to maintain order, given that a
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majority (56 percent) of Senegalese believe that the news media often abuses its freedom
(Afrobarometer 2012).
Although the Afrobarometer survey does not cover Guinea-Bissau, the classification of
the country by 2013 Freedom House in the category of countries that are not free provides us
with an image of how rights and freedoms are restricted and/or violated in Guinea-Bissau. Table
5.3 provides a summary of the result of a survey on freedom of the press in Guinea-Bissau. In the
survey, press freedom is referred to as the sum total of legal, political and economic
environments (Freedom House 2012).
The variable legal environment is moderated among others by independence of the
judicial branch, how government uses legal institutions to restrict news media, and freedom of
journalists to freely express their thoughts and opinions. Political environment includes
intimidation, arrest and assault of journalists, state censorship of the media in general and its
“control over the content of news media” in particular; economic environment stresses the effect
of the economic situation in a state on the growth of the news media (Freedom House 2012).

Table 5.8: Freedom of the Press in Guinea-Bissau
Years

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Legal
environment
(0 = best, 30
= worst)

Political
environment
(0 = best, 40
= worst)

15
23
15
27
17
27
15
23
13
17
14
19
15
23
15
22
15
24
Source: Freedom House, 2002-2010

Economic
Press freedom
environment
(0=best, 100=
(0= best, 30= worst)
worst)
18
18
19
17
17
15
15
15
15

56
60
63
55
47
48
53
52
54

Press status
(0-30 = free,
31-60 = partly
free, 61-100 =
not free)
Partly free
Partly free
Not free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
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In Guinea-Bissau, although the 1993 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and
freedom of press, journalists of privately-owned radio stations were subjects of constant
intimidation and harassment. Some of these journalists were even arrested for “refusing to hand
over tapes of a weekly news commentary” (Freedom House 2002). For instances in 2001, “two
journalists of the daily Diaro of Bissau were arrested.” Radio stations such as Diaro of Bissau
and Gazeta de Noticias, which operates on a weekly basis, were closed for being threats to social
order and “national security” (Freedom House 2002).
Additionally, in the name of maintaining social order, Radio Bombolom, the main
broadcasting medium of the political opposition parties in Guinea-Bissau, was frequently
“threatened to shut down” for accusing armed forces of facilitating drug trafficking activities in
the country. Defenders and advocates of human rights and journalists (in this case, those who
dare to criticize the government) were constantly assaulted. However, perpetrators of human
rights violations and abuses have never been punished (Freedom House 2009). As a result of
worsening political environment, the country’s press status increased from 52 percent in 2009 to
54 percent in 2010 as shown in Table 5.8 above. Such an increase in the press status score means
the lack of free press and freedom and expression and to some extent a violation of civil liberties
guaranteed by the constitution of Guinea-Bissau. I would argue that the restriction on the news
media has negatively impacted the political landscape in the country as people are not free to
express what they think about their government.
5.2.1.2. Political Engagement
Citizens’ interest in public affairs and their willingness to discuss politics determine their
political engagement. Again, there is a variation in countries’ levels of political engagement. In
Benin, for example, about 50 percent of people say that they are interested in public affairs while
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the other 50 percent are not interested in public affairs. Another important observation is that in
Togo only 45 percent of people say that they are interested in public affairs. The percentage of
those who identified themselves as having interest in public affairs is higher in the other study
countries: 52 in Guinea, 57 in Ghana, and 67 in Senegal.
However, when participants were also asked about whether or not they “discuss politics”
with their friends or family members, a slim majority in both Senegal (50 percent) and in Benin
(51 percent) say that they “occasionally” discuss politics with their relatives or friends while in
Ghana and Guinea, the percentages were 41 and 46, respectively. Somewhat as expected, only 35
percent of participants in Togo say that they discuss politics with their friends and family
members (Afrobarometer 2012).
These observations inform us of a country’s political culture. Countries with a high
percentage of people who discuss politics or who are interested in public affairs tend to have a
more participant political culture. However, countries tend to experience subject, and/or
parochial political cultures where such percentages are lower. From the analysis of the
Afrobarometer data, one can conclude that in Togo citizens have little to no influence on their
government policy processes when compared to their counterparts in Benin, Guinea, Ghana, and
Senegal.
However, when we discuss each case separately, and based on the statistics provided
about press freedom in Guinea-Bissau, it is safe to say that Ghana has a participant political
culture while Togo is dominated by a subject or parochial political culture. In Ghana for
example, because of positive effects of constitutional guarantees of both political rights and civil
liberties, the general populace has been very active in discussing politics. As illustrated by the
Afrobarometer surveys, 60 percent of Ghanaians believed that they discussed politics either
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occasionally (41 percent of participants) or frequently (19 percent of participants) with their
friends or family members. Although 39 percent of participants said that they never discussed
politics, the impact of the overwhelming majority of those who discussed political matters is
positively felt given that democracy has been consolidated in Ghana. Participant political culture
can be explained in part by the “institutionalization of the mode of contestation for political
power,” “the enhanced mode of political participation from the grassroots to the national levels”
(Boafo-Arthur 2006: 34), and the involvement of the Ghanaian general public in political
debates/ discussions in Ghana.
Such an ambiance observed in Ghana was absent in Togo, where the frequent use of
military repression by the Gnassingbés has silenced the political opposition parties and their
supporters. In 2013, during a luncheon with a group African scholars at the Association of the
Studies of Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) conference in Washington, D.C., when I introduced
myself as a Togolese born American, as a follow-up on my self-introduction, a colleague stated
that “it was a taboo to even say the name Eyadéma without further explanations.” A statement of
that nature shows how serious the violation of freedom of expression was in Togo under the
presidency of the late President Gnassingbé. Because of fear, the general populace in Togo was
less involved in their country’s political debates. This situation and other undemocratic factors
including military repressions provide strong incentives for political parochialism in Togo.
Senegal has a participant political culture as compared to Guinea, which has a political
culture that can be classified within the spectrum of participant-subject political culture. In
Senegal, a participant political culture can be explained by the ability of the Senegalese civil
society to mobilize the population and provide strong support for democracy. It is worth noting
that in Africa, Senegal has the highest statistic of citizens’ support for democracy (87 percent)
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(Afrobarometer 2012). In Guinea, the authoritarian regimes established by both Sékou Touré,
and Lansana Conté and the 2008 military dictatorship of the junta created little room for political
participation and civic-engagement, quelling interest in public affairs and/or discussions of
politics despite the fact that more than half the population of Guinea (52 percent) believed that
they were somewhat interested (20 percent) or very interested (32 percent) in public affairs while
about 47 percent said that they were not interested in politics (Afrobarometer 2012). This
situation undermined any prospect for democracy in Guinea since independence.
When comparing Benin to Guinea-Bissau, one can conclude that political culture in
Guinea-Bissau is a parochial one because throughout the history, politics was monopolized by
the military that created weak political institutions with little to no capabilities to protect
individual political rights and civil liberties. Therefore, engaging in political discussions in the
country was a risky endeavor for the general populace. A different phenomenon was observed in
Benin. The Béninois party system, which is characterized by extreme pluralism with no single
party dominating the political landscape since 1991, facilitated the political socialization, which
in turn moderated a participant political culture, a main determinant of the emergence and
survival of democracy in the country. In Benin, only 27 percent of citizens of Benin believed that
they never discussed politics versus 51 percent who said they it discussed occasionally, and 22
percent of them discussed politics frequently (Afrobarometer 2012).

5.2.2. Electoral Competition
Lindberg (2006) argues that “a decent level of electoral competition is central to the
realization of self-government, which in a representative democracy builds on the accountability
and responsiveness of elected representatives” (p. 39). Such an argument suggests that for a
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country to establish a true democracy, political competition, which is a fundamental requirement
of the emergence and consolidation of democracy or a “supply of democracy,” must be allowed
in that country.
The discussion on electoral competition in Guinea-Bissau is not as complicated as it is
the other five countries selected for the purpose of this thesis. If one looks back and analyzes the
political situation in the country since independence as revealed by Table 5.1, one can see that no
president in the history of Guinea-Bissau served a full term (five years) in office without being
deposed or assassinated. Even though electoral competitions were opened to all political parties
and independent candidates, military interventions have become a norm in Guinea-Bissau since
1994. Table 5.9, below, provides a chronological overview of a series of military coups in
Guinea-Bissau.

Table 5.9: Timeline of the Rise and Demise of Bissau-Guinean Presidents, 1990-2010
Name of Presidents
Joan Bernardo Vieira
Malai Bacam Sanha

Time in Office
August 1994-May 1999
May 1999-January 2000

Kumba Yala

January 2000-September 2003

Henrique Rosa

September 2003-June 2005

Motif of Departure
Deposed via military coup
Defeated in election by
Kumba Yala
Ousted by General Verissimo
Correia Seabra*
End of democratic transitional
government
Killed by a group of soldiers
Natural death

Joan Bernardo Vieira
July 2005
Malai Bacai Sanha
July 2009-January 2012
Sources: BBC News Africa 2014, IRIN 2010, IPU 2008
Note: 1. During his time in office, Kumba Yala appointed and dismissed four Prime
Ministers and left the country with no real government for months. He also dissolved the
National People’s Assembly and dismissed the Supreme Court Justice at his will.
2. General Verissimo Correia Seabra never served as a president but was later
assassinated by General Bonte Na Man’s soldiers.
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It is equally important to point out that military intervention has had more impact on the
presidency than the country’s National People’s Assembly. This fact is consistent with the fact
that many Africans have adopted a system of government in which the real power is held by the
president. Additionally, vote-buying was also common in Guinea-Bissau during presidential
elections (Lundy 2012). Moreover, with the exception of the 1999 legislative elections, the
National People’s Assembly in Guinea-Bissau has been a monopoly of PAIGC. It (PAIGC)
occupied the lion share of legislative seats in 1994 and 2008 and a plurality of seats in 2004
(African Elections Database 2012).
Even though these observations suggest a lack of true competitive elections in the
country despite the participation of opposition parties in every single election in Guinea-Bissau,
it is noteworthy that the fact that the PAIGC had only a plurality of seats in the 2004 National
People’s Assembly elections indicates some degree of competition.
Speaking of true competitive elections, Afrobarometer survey analysis shows that an
overwhelming majority (75 percent) of people in Senegal said that their last national elections
were “completely free and fair” as compared to one percent of those who said that the same
elections were “not free and fair.” A majority (52 percent) and plurality (46 percent) of
participants in Benin and Guinea, respectively, opine that their national elections were
“completely free and fair.” In Togo, the percentage of survey participants who said that their
national elections were “completely free and fair” and the percentage of those who said that the
elections were “not free and fair” are almost the same (28 percent versus 22 percent). But 19
percent of Togolese respondents said their elections were “free and fair, but with minor
problems” and 15 percent believed that their elections were “free and fair, but with major
problems.” On the other hand in Ghana, 39 percent of survey participants said that their last
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national elections were “completely free and fair,” and only five percent of them said that the
elections were “not free and fair.” Among the rest of the Ghanaian survey respondents, 40
percent of respondents believed their last national elections were “free and fair, but with minor
problems,” 10 percent said that their last elections were “free and fair, but with major” and the
remaining six percent had no opinion.
These descriptive statistics suggest a systemic lack of political competition in Togo, a
true competitive contest in Senegal, and a fairly political competition in Benin and Guinea.
Although the percentage of survey participants who believe that elections are “completely free
and fair” outnumbers the percentage of those who say elections are “not free and fair” in Ghana,
this result (only 39 percent said the elections were completely free and fair) is quite surprising
because among the six African countries selected for study, Ghana ranks better than any of the
others in terms of establishing a true democracy (Freedom House 2011). In comparative
perspective, as of December 31, 2010, Ghana ranked first with political rights and civil liberties’
scores of (1, 2) followed by Benin (2, 2); Senegal (3, 3); Guinea-Bissau (4, 4); Togo (5, 4); and
Guinea (5, 5) (Freedom House 2011). However, we must acknowledge that the freeness and
fairness of elections are necessary but not sufficient determinants of political competition in a
country. How the executive obeys laws and how far the government allows other political parties
to freely operate within a country also matter when it comes to determining whether political
competition is allowed or not.
In Ghana for example, an overwhelming majority (61 percent) of participants in the 2012
Afrobarometer survey asserts that presidents in their country never ignore laws. In Senegal as in
Benin, a significant majority of participants say that their presidents obey laws. Another trend
can be observed in Togo and Guinea where only 24 percent and 35 percent of participants,
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respectively, say that laws are always respected by their presidents. On the other hand as
expected, opposition parties are often silenced by governments in countries with restricted
democratic practices. As illustrated in the survey, 57 percent of participants in Ghana, 38 percent
in Benin, 33 percent in Senegal, 30 percent in Guinea, and 16 percent of participants in Togo
assert that opposition parties in their countries are never silenced by their governments. These
observations are significant because they support the Freedom House’s ranking of these
countries based on their level of democracy.
The next section turns to the discussion of another critically important quality of
elections, electoral legitimacy.

5.2.3. Electoral Legitimacy
If we defined legitimacy as popular acceptance of authority, then we should
operationalize electoral legitimacy in terms of the behaviors of both political leaders and their
supporters. Lindberg (2006) argues in his Democracy and Elections in Africa, “We can measure
elites’ behavior, but we lack reliable indicators of voters’ acceptance of the electoral process and
its results, since that would require a kind of voter survey or behavioral data that does not exist
in Africa—yet” (p. 43). The gap that existed when Lindberg wrote this book was filled by the
Afrobarometer database. The Afrobarometer database has been providing data from surveys that
allow common African people to voice their opinions regarding electoral processes in their
respective countries. However, it has yet to cover all African states.
Tables 5.10 through 5.21 provide some insight into the investigation of electoral
legitimacy of each of the three paired cases [(Ghana, Togo); (Benin, Guinea-Bissau); and
(Senegal, Guinea)]. Case # 1 shows that between 1990 and 2010 both Ghana and Togo held five
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presidential elections (Table 5.10 and Table 5.11). In the case of Ghana, all parties accepted
electoral outcomes in Ghana except in 1992 when the main opposition parties boycotted the
parliamentary elections and in 2008 when the candidate of the ruling NPP seriously challenged
the outcome of the presidential elections that gave victory to Atta Mills of the NDC.
Moreover, Ghana experienced three successful democratic alternations in which
incumbent political parties accepted defeat twice (NDC in 2000 and NPP in 2008). I will argue
that three main factors have helped reduce the level of electoral violence in Ghana. These factors
include 1) compliance with the 1992 constitution that was approved by 92.59 percent of
registered voters, 2) having the presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously, and 3)
acceptance of electoral outcomes by all parties
The first and the third factors are closely related. First, it is a well known fact that the
only way to gain access to political power in contemporary Ghana is via a popular suffrage, and
the guidelines of the rules and regulations governing any of the country’s political elections are
provided by the constitution. For political actors and the general populace to accept electoral
outcomes, institutions that provide the elections must also be viewed as credible and legitimate
institutions. In Ghana it has become a reality since 1992 that no one can unconstitutionally seize
power. Therefore, as Ninsin (2006) puts it, “both the political class and their follower or
supporters are gradually accepting election rules and regulations and procedure, and are learning
to abide by them” (p. 67). Hence, once electoral rules are accepted by all parties, chances are that
electoral outcomes that emerge as a result of the application of such rules, and regulations will be
accepted.
The respect the constitution by the political actors and other stakeholders including the
military facilitated a smooth transfer of power following the sudden death of President Atta Mills
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and hence helped avoid political instability in Ghana. Additionally, all highly disputed election
results (in 2008 and 2012) were resolved peacefully by legal and constitutional means. But in
Guinea as in Togo, where the presidents of the National Assemblies were denied their
constitutional rights to succeed the late presidents Eyadéma Gnassigbé in 2005 and Lansana
Conté in 2008, conflicts escalated following the seizure of power by the military in both
countries.
Finally, when both the presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the same
days, the Electoral Commission does not have to think of organizing them separately, and parties
and their candidates will only campaign for both types of elections at once. Debrah (2006) writes
“Democratic campaigns are periods for parties to debate the key issues, excite their supporters
with distinctive set of goals and programmes that anchor their expectations about democracy.
They engage in activities that are devoid of conflicts, acrimony, violence and insults” (p. 104).
Therefore, going through campaign seasons twice may increase the costs (time, money and
energy) associated with organizing and delivering such campaigns. In Ghana, having both the
presidential and the parliamentary elections concurrently has helped minimize such costs.
Additionally, the likelihood of occurrence of multiple campaign conflicts has also been reduced
to one simply by reducing the number of campaigns or electoral seasons.
On the other hand, in Togo, the opposition parties never accepted any results of the
presidential elections since 1993 when all the political opponents of the regime Gnasingbé (the
father) unanimously boycotted the elections (African Elections Database 2010). Because of the
lack of agreement among the opposition parties with regard to the presidential election results,
because of the lack of independence of the judicial system in the country, and because of the lack
of trust in the electoral commission, these parties and their supporters always show their
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discontent on the streets through anti-government protests and demonstrations. These
demonstrations were always repressed by government security forces resulting in high levels of
electoral conflict as shown in Table 5.5 and illustrated by the values 2 and 3.
At the legislative level, the opposition parties, except UFC, which boycotted the 1994
elections, took part in only two National Assembly elections: the 1994 and 2007 legislative
elections. In 1994, the coalition of two opposition parties (CAR and UTD) won the majority in
the National Assembly with CAR receiving 36 seats and UTD winning only six seats. But the
coalition was short lived because leaders within the coalition were divided over who should be
appointed as a Prime Minister between Yaovi Agboyibor of CAR and Edem Kodjo of UTD (IPU
1994). The political dinosaur, the late President Gnassingbé, profited from the disagreement
between the two former political allies and appointed Edem Kodjo as Prime Minister. Such an
appointment sealed a bitter division between the two opposition parties.
The situation frustrated Agboyibor and his CAR. They refused to participate in a
government formed by Kodjo. Additionally, the deputies of CAR boycotted the parliamentary
session that endorsed Kodjo’s Government (IPU 1994). I therefore argue that a little window of
opportunity offered by the 1994 legislative elections to end the longtime dictatorship and
hegemonic rule of RPT was sabotaged by the selfish behavior and the lack of coordination of the
leaders of political opposition, namely Kodjo of UTD and Agboyibor of CAR. As a result of the
lack of coordination, President Gnassingbé coopted Kodjo and bought out his political party
(UTD), which since then became an ally of the ruling RPT.
The participation of the opposition parties in the 2007 legislative elections was facilitated
by a series of political dialogues that established a political agreement among the main parties,
including, but not limited to CAR, UFC, RPT, and representatives of the civil society. This
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political agreement known as Accord Politique Globale (APG) or Global Political Accord did
little to bring about a democratic alternation in Togo given that the ruling RPT with its
supermajority (50 seats out of 81) in the National Assembly refused to perform institutional and
constitutional reforms identified in APG. Above all, because the opposition parties were
fragmented and disunited, because of the effective use of force by the ruling RPT, and despite
the death of President Eyadéma Gnassingbé in 2005, democratic alternations failed to occur in
Togo, and the dictatorial regime still prevails as a result of the use of the majoritarian electoral
system. The continued use of such a system has helped institutionalize the dominant party
system which made it difficult for opposition parties to gain power in the country.
Because of the inability of the opposition parties to coalesce and strategically coordinate
their actions in order to end the hegemonic rule of RPT, some of the parties including the radical
opposition party (UFC) that wanted power at all costs ended up being bought out in 2010 by the
Togolese government and remained in alliance with the RPT since then. It is important to point
out that not all members within the leadership of the UFC had accepted a deal with the RPT.
Some of the top leaders of the UFC including Jean-Pierre Fabre (a former Secretary General) and
Patrick Lawson (a former First Vice-President) were excluded from the party for being against
RPT-UFC historic agreement. These leaders (Fabre and Lawson) alongside other dissidents of
the UFC created a new right-wing party known as the ANC (Alliance National pour le
Changement or National Alliance for Change) on October 5, 2010 (Fabre 2010). Even though the
creation of the ANC brought about a new hope for a democratic alternation since 2010, the
majoritarian electoral system in use has not allowed the realization of such a dream given that the
number one enemy of such a system is the existence of multiple fragmented parties whose
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leaders’ main interest is only on gaining political power and not on establishing democracy per
se.
Next, I present and critically analyze electoral legitimacy in both Benin and GuineaBissau as illustrated by case # 2 (see Table 5.14, Table 5.15., Table 5.16, and Table 5.17). An
analysis of Case # 2 reveals that democratic regimes are more likely to survive in Benin than
they are in Guinea-Bissau for three main reasons. First, the authoritarian regime of President
Kerekou collapsed after the Conférence Nationale Autonome and was replaced by a transitional
government, which organized and held relatively peaceful democratic elections for a smooth
transfer of political power to a civilian government led by President Nicéphore Soglo. By
contrast in Guinea-Bissau, the dictatorial regime of President João Bernardo Vieira survived the
1994 wave of democratization but failed to persuade the opposition parties to participate in the
its new government because of a claim by the leader of the political opposition, Koumba Yala of
massive electoral fraud during the 1994 legislative elections (IPU 1994). Second, with the
exception of the 2000 presidential elections, which were relatively peaceful as a result of the
Abuja peace agreement that de-escalated the 1998 civil war, there was a predominance of
electoral violence during presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau as compared to the presidential
elections in Benin.
Third, the periodic occurrences of electoral violence in Guinea-Bissau are due to the fact
that political parties and their candidates had difficulties accepting electoral outcomes. In Benin,
however, election results are often accepted by all political actors at least during the country’s
National Assembly elections because democracy has been consolidated (see Table 5.10). Even
though Guinea-Bissau held three successful consecutive elections in which the ruling parties and
incumbent presidents were defeated, democracy was far from being consolidated in that country
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between 1990 and 2010. Numerous factors may have caused the breakdown in the democratic
process in Guinea-Bissau. However, in this thesis, I will argue that the failure of the
consolidation of democratization process in Guinea-Bissau is associated with the prevalence of
multiple military interventions. The latest military coup occurred on April 12, 2012 after the first
round of the presidential elections won by the country’s Prime Minister and a presidential
candidate, Carlos Gomes Junior of PAIGC, with 48.97 percent of the votes against his main
challenger Yala of PRS, who took the second place with only 23.36 percent of the votes (African
Elections Database 2012, DW.DE 2012). If there were no breakdown in the electoral processes,
Gomes Jr. was expected to win the second round of the presidential elections.
Factors that contributed to the military takeover between the two rounds of the 2012
presidential elections include “allegations of ‘generalized fraud’ by the opposition in the first
round of presidential elections on March 18” (GlobalVoices 13 April 2012); poor diplomatic
relations between Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces and General Feliciano dos Santos; the Angolan
ambassador in the country regarding his accusation in March 2012 of the Commander in Chief of
the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces, General Antonio Indjai, to stage a military coup in the
country (IRIN 2014, GlobalVoices 2012); and frustrations of the Bissau-Guinean military,
especially the army chiefs because of the presence in the country since March 2011 of 200
Angolan military mission troops known as MISSANG (IRIN 2014). Such a mission was
specifically tasked to provide training and technical assistance to Guinea-Bissau’s military (IRIN
2014). But in the minds of the junta, MISSANG was a “secret agreement between Carlos Gomes
Jr. and the Angolan government to ‘annihilate Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces’” (IRIN 2014).
Another factor of the 2012 coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau has to do with Gomes Jr.’s
political campaign promises that focused not only on democracy promotion and economic
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development, but also and most importantly on the reform of the security apparatus. Because of
the status of the military as the main decision-maker in Bissau-Guinean politics, any policy that
aims at reforming it will not be accepted by the armed forces. It is exactly what happened in
2012 when “tensions had also built between the military and the prime minister because of
Carlos Gomes’s official support for a long-overdue reform of the security sector, which would
involve reducing the size of the armed forces; retiring older soldiers; and building up the civilian
police force” (IRIN 2014). In view of frequent military interventions in the country, no BissauGuinean president served his full term in office without being deposed or assassinated (see Table
5.16) (BBC News Africa 2014, IRIN 2010, IPU 2008). Additionally, many military coups had
been successful in Guinea-Bissau since independence because the power has been wielded by the
military, which is dominated by the Balanta ethnic group (IRIN 2014, DW.DE 2012). Because
the real political power still remains in the hands of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, elections are
just window dressing.
Although Senegal experienced violent electoral conflicts during the 1993 and 2000
presidential elections, and very high violence during in the 1993 legislative elections, the scale of
violence in the country was relatively low compared to the level of electoral violence in 1993
and 1998 in Guinea (see case # 3: Table 5.12 through Table 5.15). While Senegal has been ruled
by civilian regimes, Guinea would have a civilian president only after the 2010 presidential
elections that elected President Alpha Condé. Unlike Senegal, where electoral outcomes tended
to be accepted by all parties (Table 5.12 and Table 5.13), election results had always been
disputed in Guinea since 1993 (Table 5.14 and Table 5.15).
However, one cannot overlook the bloody dispute between the ruling government and
PDS of Abdoulaye Wade over the validity of the results of the 1993 National Assembly
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elections. Such a resulting conflict led to the assassination of the Vice-President of the
Constitutional Court, Babacar Seye, whose constitutional duty is to confirm election results (IPU
1993). The ruling PS accused Wade of the crime, but he never accepted responsibility for it, and
the actual assassins of Seye have not yet been properly identified. Although three suspects were
jailed for the murder, Cornado (2012) notes that “many Senegalese remain convinced that full
truth has not yet come out about one the ugliest incidents in the country’s history after Mr. Wade
pardoned the assassins in 2002.” Another instance when electoral outcomes were challenged by
the opposition was in 2007 when the “Siggil Front”—a coalition of 17 opposition parties—
boycotted the National Assembly elections in order to show their strong opposition to Wade’s
2007 re-election results (Timeline of History 2014, IPU 2007).
Although the democratization process has not yet been consolidated in Senegal, because
of its past experiences of democratic practices and its recent elections (i.e. the 2012 presidential
election that gave a landslide victory to Macky Sall over the incumbent president, Abdoulaye
Wade), the country has a better chance than its counterpart, Guinea, when it comes to moving
toward democracy. This difference can be explained by the fact that Senegal has strong
democratic institutions that already produced two democratic alternations in 2000 and 2012
while in Guinea there is a lack of strong democratic institutions. As a result of the inability of
these weak political institutions to hold free and fair elections, none of the presidential and
legislative elections held between 1990 and 2010 was able to bring about a democratic change in
Guinea (see Case # 3, Table 5.19 and 5.21 below).
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Case # 1: Ghana versus Togo
Table 5.10: Electoral Legitimacy in Ghana’s Presidential Elections
Election years

1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
President
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

2
No
Yes
No
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
No
-2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
No
-1
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Yes* indicates elections too close to call. This situation almost resulted in a breakdown
the consolidation of democratization process in the country.
Table 5.11: Electoral Legitimacy in Togo’s Presidential Elections

Election years

1993
1998
2003
2005
2010

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
President
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

3
No
Yes
No
No
3
No
Yes
No
No
2
No
Yes
No
No
3
No
Yes
No*
No
2
No
Yes
No
No
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
No* here indicates the death of the incumbent president who was replaced by one of his
sons.
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Table 5.12: Electoral Legitimacy in Ghana’s Parliamentary Elections
Election years

1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Were the
Do all parties
Does the
Was the
Democracy?
elections
accept the
regime
ruling
peaceful?/level
electoral
survive?
party
of conflict
outcomes?
defeated?
2
No
Yes
No
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
No
-2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
No
-1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Table 5.13: Electoral Legitimacy in Togo’s National Assembly Elections

Election years

1994
1999
2002
2007

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
ruling
party
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

2
Yes
Yes
No*
No
1
No
Yes
No
No
2
No
Yes
No
No
0
Yes
Yes
No
No
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
No* indicates that the coalition of opposition parties obtained the majority in the National
Assembly, but it failed to keep their pre-elections political agreement resulting in the
dissolution of the coalition.
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Case # 2: Benin versus Guinea-Bissau
Table 5.14: Electoral Legitimacy in Benin’s Presidential Elections
Election
years

1991
1996
2001
2006

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
Democratic
incumbent
alternations?
President/party
defeated?

1
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0
Yes
No
Yes
No
0
Yes
Yes
Yes*
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Yes* indicates no incumbent president contested the election, but the candidate of the
ruling party was defeated.

Table 5.15: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea-Bissau’s Presidential Elections
Election years

1994
2000
2005
2009

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
President
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

1
No
Yes
No
No
0
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
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Table 5.16: Electoral Legitimacy in Benin’s National Assembly Elections
Election years

1991
1995
1999
2003
2007

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
party
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House

Table 5.17: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea-Bissau’s National People’s Assembly Elections
Election
years

Were the
Do all parties
Does the
Was the
elections
accept the
regime
incumbent party
peaceful?/level
electoral
survive?
defeated?
of conflict
outcomes?
1
No
Yes
No
0
Yes
No
Yes
0
Yes
No
Yes
..
Yes
No
Yes
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
The symbol (..) indicates a missing value.

Democratic
alternations
?

1994
1999
2004
2008

No
Yes
No
Yes

186

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

Case # 3: Senegal versus Guinea
Table 5.18: Electoral Legitimacy in Senegal’s Presidential Elections
Election years

1993
2000
2007

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
President
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

2
No
Yes
No
No
2
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
No
Yes*
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Yes* indicates restricted democratic practices by the PSD and Sopi Coalition

Table 5.19: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea’s Presidential Elections
Election years

1993
1998
2003
2010

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
President
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

3
No
Yes
No
No
3
No
Yes
No
No
1
No
Yes
No
No
2
No
No
Yes*
-Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Yes* indicates the death of the incumbent president, the overthrow of the leader of junta,
Dadis Camara, and the election of Alpha Condé
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Table 5.20: Electoral Legitimacy in Senegal’s National Assembly Elections
Election years

1993
1998
2001
2007

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
party
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

3
No
Yes
No
No
1
No
Yes
No
N0
0
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1
No
Yes
No
Yes*
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House
Yes* indicates restricted democratic practices by the ruling Sopi coalition.

Table 5.21: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea’s National Assembly Elections
Election years

1995
2002

Were the
elections
peaceful?/level
of conflict

Do all parties
accept the
electoral
outcomes?

Does the
regime
survive?

Was the
incumbent
party
defeated?

Democratic
alternations?

1
No
Yes
No
No
0
No
Yes
No
No
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House

Above all, how elections are sequenced, managed, and monitored also provide important
information regarding the qualities of elections.

5.3. Election Sequencing, Management, and Monitoring
It is a well-known fact that election sequencing is not the same for all countries in the
world. In Africa, for example, while some countries hold elections on average every four years,
the majority of African countries hold elections every five years. However, the frequency of
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elections across the continent is not often respected because of periodic political instability and
repeated cycle of violence (see Table 5.22).

Table 5.22: Legislative Election Sequencing and Management
Case #1
Case #2
Case #3
Ghana
Togo
Benin
GuineaSenegal
Guinea
Bissau
Election
Dec. 1992
June 1994
Mach 1991
July 1994
May 1993
June 1995
Sequencing Dec. 1996
March 1999 March 1995 Nov. 1999
May 1998
June 2002
Dec. 2000
Oct. 2002
March 1999 March 2004 April 2001
(irregular)
Dec. 2004
Oct. 2007
March 2003 Nov. 2008
June 2007
Dec. 2008
(irregular)
March 2007 (irregular)
(irregular*)
(regular)
(regular)
Election
Electoral
Independent Autonomous National
Autonomous Independent
Management Commission National
National
Elections
National
National
Bodies
(EC)
Electoral
Electoral
Commission Electoral
Electoral
(EMBs)
Commission Commission (NEC)
Commission Commission
(CENI)
(CENA)
(CENA)
(CENI)
Sources: African Elections Database 2014, AllAfrica.com 2012
Irregular* indicates a change in election scheduling as a result of constitutional
amendment in 2001

5.3.1: Election Sequencing
As shown in Table 5.22, during 1990 and 2010, elections had been regularly held in
Benin and Ghana. The irregularity noted in election scheduling in Senegal was a result of the
2001 constitutional referendum, which not only reduced the presidential term from seven years
to five but also abolished the Senate and adopted a unicameral legislature (also known as the
National Assembly) (African Elections Database 2012). These observations indicate that
electoral conflicts are less likely if election calendars are respected by all parties, and elections
are held as scheduled. Electoral conflicts often arise in countries that have a culture of noncompliance of election scheduling or electoral conflicts lead to rescheduling. For instance, during
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the 2000 legislative elections in Cote d’Ivoire, polling stations were disrupted in the northern
part of the country, and many members of the local election management body were subjected to
intimidation by supporters (especially the rebel forces) of Alassane Ouattara, who was
previously prevented from running in the presidential elections that were held on October 22,
2000 (IPU 1996-2011). Because of electoral of such incidents, elections were postponed on
January 14, 2001 for the 26 seats in the northern electoral districts (African Elections Database
2012). Additionally, the politics of ivoirité, which led to the denial of citizenship to Ouattara by
the Ivorian Supreme Court, also contributed to the delay in election scheduling since 2000. The
long-awaited presidential elections, which were finally held in October/December 2010, resulted
in a historic violent post-election conflict that required international intervention.
In Togo, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea, election calendars have never been predetermined/fixed, meaning that elections have not been planned ahead of time. In these countries
where elections were often long-delayed, electoral conflicts had been the actual results as
stakeholders (the ruling parties and the political opposition parties) tended to disagree on the
planning and management of elections. This disagreement was the case particularly of the
legislative elections in Togo. Elections had been also long-delayed in Guinea-Bissau as a result
of frequent military interventions. Elections had been irregularly held in Guinea because of the
long term authoritarian rule established by late Guinean president, Lansana Conté, and the
military coup by Captain Dadis Camara in 2008. If elections were to be held in each of these
countries, they would often have occurred under the pressure of international aid donors,
especially the European Union, and in disagreement with the ruling party and the opposition
parties.
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5.3.2: Election Management Bodies (EMBs)
The constitutional duties and responsibilities of election management bodies (EMBs) are
to organize free, fair, and transparent elections acceptable to all interested parties. However,
there are variations in how EMBs are established across the African continent. Their names vary
from country to country.
The EMB in Ghana is referred to as the Electoral Commission (EC). The EC was
established by Article 43, 44, and 45 of the 1992 Constitution (Electoral Commission of Ghana
2012). The independence of the commission was established by Chapter 007, Article 46 of the
Constitution of Ghana, which stipulates that “Except as provided in this Constitution or in any
other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the
Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority”
(The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992). Each of the seven members of the EC (a
Chairman, two Deputy Chairmen, and four other members) are appointed by the President of
Ghana in consultation of the Council of State as stipulated in Chapter 008, Article 70(1)20. The
appointment process of EC members is embedded with checks and balances that strengthen EC’s
independence in decision-making and instill confidence and trust in all parties that have vested
interests in Ghana’s elections.
By contrast in Togo, neither the 1992 Constitution, which was approved by 99.18 percent
of Togolese voters, nor the 2003 Constitution established the Independent National Electoral

20

It is equally important to note that the Council of State is also an independent political institution, which is
composed of a former Chief Justice, a former Chief of Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of Ghana, a former
Inspector-General of Police, the President of the National House of Chiefs, one elected representative from each
region of Ghana, and 11 other members. All members of the Council of State are appointed by the President in
consultation with Parliament (see Article 89).
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Commission (CENI).21 The composition of the CENI was imbalanced. For instance, in
preparation for the 2007 legislative elections, the CENI was composed of 19 members. Out of
these 19 members, 12 came from the ruling party thus dominating the other 7 members from the
political opposition coalition.22 The imbalance noted in the composition of CENI in the 2007
legislative elections and 2010 presidential elections was also a deciding factor in the 2013
legislative elections. The total number of members of CENI was reduced to 17. In this new
CENI, the opposition was given only three representatives, three to civil society, and 11 to the
ruling UNIR and political partner, UFC (Lidawo 2013). Given that the Togolese civil society is
often viewed by the opposition parties as an instrument of the ruling party (Lidawo 2013), its
three members also side with the 11 UNIR members in CENI when it comes to making major
decisions.
In Guinea, CENI was created in 2007 not by the constitution, but by a legislative action
known as Law L/2007/013/AN (CENI Guinée 2014). It was modified in April 2010 through a
political agreement that established Transitional National Council presided by General of
Brigade, Sékouba Konaté (CENI Guinée 2014). Whether it is the old electoral code or the new
one, the composition of the CENI remains unchanged. It is composed of 10 representatives from
the majority party, Party for Unity and Progress (PUP); 10 from political opposition parties;
three from civil society organizations; and two from the Ministry of Territorial Administration
and Political Affairs (MATAP), which provides technical assistance to CENI (CENI Guinée
2014, The Carter Center 2010).
21

The 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Togo is the amended version of the 1992 Constitution. It was
unilaterally amended by the ruling RPT via the Law No. 2002-029 of December 31, 2002. See World Intellectual
Property Organization [WIPO], “Togo: The Constitution of the IVth Republic (as amended by the Law No. 2002029 of December 31, 2002). (2014) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8112
22
Aimé Gogué, “This is How We Do Our Part,” MO5-Togo. (2011) http://www.mo5-togo.com/le-mo5-vous-donnela-parole/2859-professeur-aime-gogue-cest-notre-maniere-de-faire-notre-part-.html (accessed April 13, 2012).
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An analysis of the composition of the CENI shows that in the outset the distribution gives
an edge to the ruling government in Guinea with 12 representatives out of 25 in the CENI. This
distribution of membership in CENI can also cause a serious problem in case the Guinean civil
society becomes co-opted by the government. Nothing of that nature has yet happened, but
Cellou Dalein Diallo, a former Prime Minister and the main challenger to Alpha Condé during
the 2010 presidential elections, accused CENI of being biased. However, as The Carter Center
points out, “The partisan polarization of the CENI was a large factor in the inability of the
institution to produce timely guidelines and procedures, the delay of which undermined the
performance of electoral official across the country” (pp. 20-21). The polarization of the CENI in
Guinea is an immediate consequence of maintaining party loyalty and doing everything thing in
one’s capacity to protect the party’s interests. This focus caused a big dispute between President
Condé and Diallo in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections in Guinea. Because of
the closeness of the electoral outcomes, both candidates claimed victory. However, on December
2, 2010, the Supreme Court, a court of last resort, confirmed the results and declared Condé the
new president of Guinea with 52.52 percent (African Elections Database 2012, Voice of America
2010, The Carter Center 2010).
Similarly, in Senegal the Commission Electoral Nationale Autonome (CENA) was
created by legislation. It was established by the Law 2005-07 of May 2005 (AU-Senegal.com
2012). Contrarily to Guinea where members of the CENI are mostly appointed from political
parties, in Senegal the 12 members of the Commission Electoral Nationale Autonome (CENA)
are nominated via a presidential decree based on their “moral integrity, intellectual honesty,
neutrality and impartiality” (AU-Senegal.com 2012). Thus far elections in Senegal have been
successful because the CENA has been perceived as a competent agency and most importantly as
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an independent EMB. Additionally, the CENA did not have to intervene because election results
were accepted, albeit reluctantly, by the losers.
In the same purview, I will argue that elections failed to consolidate the democratization
process in Guinea-Bissau in part because of the weakness and the incapacity of National
Elections Commission (NEC). The main reason for this was that the NEC did not have full
control over the electoral administration process in the country. The NEC, which was created by
the Law 4/98, a Law on National Election Commission (AU 2014), shared its duties and
responsibilities with
•

the Ministry of Internal Administration in charge of domestic voter registration
issues;

•

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of registering Bissau-Guineans living
abroad and overseeing the voting of the diaspora;

•

the Supreme Court, which acts as a substitute of the Electoral Court of Appeal by
pronouncing on the eligibility of parties and their candidates and adjudicating
electoral disputes;

•

and the Head of State who announces the schedule of all elections and referenda.

This complex structure observed in the administration of elections in Guinea-Bissau
incapacitated the NEC to freely accomplish its tasks that include “voter registration, organization
of elections and referenda, voter education activities, and handles of complaints and protests”
(AU 2014). By contrast in Benin, the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) is
the sole independent election management organ in charge of organizing and administering all
political elections. It was established in 1994 as a result of lack of trust in the Beninese
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government, which traditionally was responsible for organizing elections in Benin (Fall,
Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011).
Unlike the NEC of Guinea-Bissau, the Beninois CENA’s members are nominated by the
government, the National Assembly, the judiciary, and the Beninois Human Rights Commission
(CBDH) (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011). It is important to point out that throughout
the period of 1990-2010 the vast majority of members of the CENA were nominated by the
National Assembly. What made the Beninois CENA to present a stark difference from other
African electoral commissions in general and the Bissau-Guinean NEC in particular was that
representatives of the Beninois civil society were allowed to chair the country’s CENA for the
management of the 1995, 1999, and 2008 elections (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011).
However, because the CENA of Benin has mostly been chaired and dominated by
representatives of political parties, its impartiality has been questioned during the 2011
presidential elections.
Table 5.23 below provides the current composition of each of the six EMBs discussed in
this section as well as the main functions that each plays in ensuring that peaceful democratic
elections are held in Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea, respectively. In
most cases membership to these electoral commissions is based on party affiliation. Benin,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo are evidence of countries where political parties are
represented in their electoral commissions. But because of possible biases in the number of seats
a party ought to have and the process of distribution of such seats in such commissions, the
question of independence of EMBs in these countries always remains current. Although political
representation is one of the main determinants of the survival of democracy in divided societies,
imbalanced representation of political parties within an EMB can hinge on the ability of that
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EMB to make impartial decisions that can help mitigate and/or prevent electoral conflict. Ghana
and Senegal move away from using the model of political representation in the composition of
their respective EMBs.

Table 5.23: Summary of Roles of Electoral Commissions
Country Denomination

Nature

Benin

Partisan 11

Autonomous
National
Electoral
Commission

Number
of
Members

Roles/Functions

•

•
•
•
•
•

Ghana

Electoral
Commission

Non7
partisan

•
•
•
•

•

The role of CENA is to focus
strictly on election management:
planning and preparation,
organization, administration, and
supervision of all political
elections and investigation of
electoral improprieties
To propose all election dates that
are promulgated by governmental
decree
To implement voters’ census;
To oversee designing and printing
the voter registry
To ensure the centralization of
election results
To only proclaim the results of
local elections but the legislative
and presidential elections (Article
45 of the law of November 2007);
it cannot draw electoral
boundaries.
To compile the voter registry
To draw electoral districts of all
elections (national and local)
To
divide
Ghana
into
parliamentary constituencies
To review such constituencies
within 12 months following the
publication of a national census or
at least every 7 years
To register political parties
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•
•
•
•
•
Guinea

GuineaBissau

Senegal

Togo

Independent
National
Electoral
Commission

Partisan 25

National
Electoral
Commission

Partisan 4

Autonomous
National
Electoral
Commission

Non12
partisan

Independent
National
Electoral
Commission

Partisan 19

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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To set presidential election dates
To organize, hold and supervise a
referendum
To supervise the election of the
Council of State
To create or merge regions of
Ghana
To provide civic education on the
electoral process
To update voter registration lists
To organize, administer and
supervise of all political elections
and referenda
To proclaim preliminary or
provisory election results
To oversee voter registration
To
organize
elections
and
referenda
To direct voter education activities
To address all complaints and
protests
To oversee
control and
supervision of elections, but the
Ministry of Interior is in charge of
the organization of all elections
The role of the CENA is to help
invalidate fraudulent voter registry
via the courts and tribunals within
the Ministry of Justice
To organize and supervise
electoral operations and referenda
To elaborate rules and procedures
to ensure the regularity, security,
and transparency of elections
To distribute elections materials in
polling stations
To register and publish the names
of candidates during various
election
To identify and nominate national
election observers
To centralize election results
To proclaim provisory election
results
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Sources: Electoral Commission of Ghana, CENA Senegal, CENI Togo, CNE GuinéBissau, Fall, I. M, Hounkpe, M., Jinadu, A. L., & Kambale, P. (2011). Electoral
Commissions in West Africa: A Comparative Study.Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Note: An electoral commission is referred to as a partisan commission if its members are
representatives of political parties. A non-partisan electoral commission is a political
institution whose members are not affiliated to any political parties.

In sum, the EMB in each of the countries being studied for the purpose of this thesis
suffered and continues to suffer the issue of political polarization. Many of their governments
lost their credibility to organize free and fair elections. Therefore, foreign aid donors and
international and regional organizations, as well as voters, lost trust in these governments and
had been relying instead on election observers (especially, international election monitors) as
credible arbiters that should report on the freeness and fairness of elections.
In the next section, I discuss the role of the main elections observers that monitored
elections, facilitated electoral processes, and/or helped mediate electoral disputes in Africa.

5.3.3: Election Monitors
Alongside civil society organizations and local elections observers, regional
organizations such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), and international election monitors including the European Union (EU), the United
Nations (UN), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and The Carter Center, played and
continue to play paramount roles “supporting, advising, and enhancing the credibility of ECs”
(Pastor 1999: 18). In addition to their supporting and advising missions, election monitors also
report on the legitimacy of elections.
198

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

A common theme that often emerges from the report of international election monitors
and observer missions deployed to monitor elections across the continent was that despite minor
incidents elections in many African countries were generally free and fair and occurred in
“generally satisfactory conditions” (IPU 1990-2010). In most cases, in my view, such
declarations by international election observers are often said in order to avoid further escalation
of electoral conflicts. Equally important is that elections monitors rarely cover the country,
especially rural and other remote areas. Therefore, most of their mission reports are an
overgeneralization of what actually happened in countries where they were deployed.
This analysis does not mean that international election observers have never questioned
the freeness and fairness of African elections. Indeed, since the wave of democratization, not
only were international election monitors critical of how elections were held and managed across
the continent, but they were also concerned of frequent occurrences of electoral conflicts in
Africa. For instance, they attributed the lack of transparency and fairness of elections to biases
in electoral codes as in the case of the 1993 National Assembly elections in Senegal (Pastor
1993), the electoral fraud and vote rigging in the 1993 presidential elections in Senegal, the 1995
National Assembly elections in Guinea, and the 1998 presidential elections in Togo and Guinea
(Pastor 1999).
Even though international election observers identified electoral improprieties in these
countries, because of states’ sovereignty they had no authoritative enforcement mechanisms to
make all parties comply with democratic rules of elections except for imposing sanctions that in
practice affect more the populations of these countries than their leaders. Nelson Madiba
Mandela, the late African nationalist and former president of South Africa, used to helplessly ask
his African audiences, “Why [do] elections in Africa need international supervision while
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elections in developed countries do not?” His question has never been answered, and it remains
current today.
Indeed, Mandela was never satisfied with the way the so-called international community
conducted its affairs with Africa. He may have been right. Africa may not need international
electoral observer missions to monitor elections across the continent if civil society organizations
and traditional institutions are strong enough and endowed with transparency to help facilitate
the electoral processes and African leaders are accountable to their populations. But this is rarely
the case across Africa.
Next, I turn the discussion to the role of traditional institutions and civil society
organizations in accompanying the realization of the democratization enterprise in Ghana, Togo,
Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea.

5.4. Role of Civil Society and Traditional Authorities in Promoting Democracy and Conflict
Mitigation
In Ghana, the promotion of democracy and the prevalence of low level of electoral
conflict can be attributed to many factors including the vibrancy of civil society and the
commitment of traditional institutions or authorities in “spreading a message of tolerance and
peace” (Adjei 2012: 248). They have been instrumental in political socialization of the
Ghanaians through civic education. As a palpable example, Adjei (2012: 248) notes that
The workshops on political behavior organized by the Center for Democratic
Development (CDD) and radio and television programs on peaceful elections that
included representatives of various civil society groups created awareness among the
population the need for Ghana to pass the litmus test in 2008.
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These civil society organizations (CSOs) receive strong support from the Ghana Civil Society
Centre (CSRC), which was created in 2007. The CSRC is sponsored by the United Development
Programme (UNDP). It provides technical assistance and training that can help CSOs to energize
the electorate by providing them with advocacy and civic education skills (CSRC 2009). In
Ghana, CSOs also work in collaboration with traditional institutions that are often referred to as
instruments of peace and development.
In his analysis on the role of traditional authorities in contemporary Ghana, Crook (2005)
defines traditional institutions as “forms of social and political authority which have their
historical origin in the pre-colonial states and societies, and which were incorporated by British
colonial rule into what is now Ghana” (p. 1). These traditional authorities are commonly referred
to as chiefs. Although these same institutions have often contributed to ethnic and political
conflict, especially in the northern part of Ghana, they continue to play a paramount role not only
in keeping cultural diversity alive, but also and most importantly in making sure that their
country develops economically and that democracy survives in Ghana.
As Crook (2005) points out, in order to achieve their aims, chiefs’ “control over land”
ensure the fertility of land and its distribution and represent their community before their national
government. According to Crook, a chief is a “symbolic leader and patron of
development/youth/hometown associations” (p. 2). At that capacity, chieftaincy organizations
have been mobilizing support for democratic change and economic development in Ghana since
1992 by participating in local government and district assemblies whose members are not
affiliated with any political party (Crook 2005).
Chiefs have always been strong advocates of peaceful elections in Ghana. For instance,
as Gyamfi II (2012) notes, the College of Christian Chieftaincies (which is a council of chiefs
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and queen mothers) assumed their role as conflict preventers and mediators by calling on all
Ghanaians to adopt “peaceful attitudes” throughout the 2012 electoral process in order to avoid
electoral catastrophe in Ghana.
In addition to chieftaincy organizations, there has also been a myriad of NGOs that have
been facilitating the democratization process in the country. Among others, one can cite Africa
Leadership Forum, Dialogue on Democratic Decentralization (DDialogue), Centre for
Democratic Development (CDD), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Centre for the
Promotion of Democratic Governance (CEPRODEG), Transparency International-Ghana (TIGhana), Civil Rights Education for Democracy and Human Rights (CREDHR), and many others
in the area of human rights and justice (WASIC 2014).
Unlike Ghana where civil society organizations were visible and their impact on the
democratization process was felt, Togo suffered and is still suffering a deficit of a vibrant civil
society. For example, in an interview with the journal le Soleil about the work of Togolese
CSOs, Mamadou Seck, the General Coordinator of Goreé Institute, said that
This is another big problem. Civil society suffers from credibility. She is young, weak, in
need of leadership and strong leadership to be heard. Bastilles to conquer, we must fight.
This is probably related to the youth of democracy still has not necessarily spaces of
interaction and evolution of civil society. At each stage of development, its civil society,
they say.

This observation suggests that for a democracy to emerge and flourish there must the presence of
a reliable civil society endowed with experience and strong leadership. However, in Togo, it is
the opposite. As Seck (2014) pinpoints it, the Togolese CSOs shines by their weakness and lack
of experience. It is also important to note that the Togolese press, which should serve as a
medium of communication of these young CSOs, is also young and highly controlled by the
High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) (Seck 2014).
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In Benin, factors such as “popular mobilization” and Conférence Nationale brought about
the collapse of the Kérékou regime in 1989 (Alen 2014). The rule of law has been restored and
human rights and civil liberties have been established by a new constitution. Because of the
constitutional guarantee of these rights and liberties, a plethora of civil society organizations
have been active in many domains including the promotion of democracy and good governance
and the protection of human rights and justice.
In the area of democracy and good governance, one can pinpoint the organizations such
as Association Béninoise de Droit au Developpement, Association de Lutte Contre le Racisme,
l’Ethnocentrisme et le Regionalisme (ALCRER), Dialogue on Democratic Decentralization
(DDialogue), Front des Organisations Nationales Contre la Corruption (FONAC), Observatory
of Democracy and the Good Governance in Africa, Reseau des ONG Béninoise pour la
Gouvernance Democratique, and Transparency International-Benin (WASCI 2014). When it
comes to ensuring that there is justice and that human rights are respected, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) including Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture, Groupe
d’Action pour la Justice et l’Egalité Sociale, Monde-Vie-Liberté, AJPDE ONG, Que Choisir
Bénin, Coalition Human Rights Task Group, Société Africaine de Droit International et
Comparé, and Grande Dignité Humaine, Solidarité Sans Frontieres (WASCI 2014). Arguably,
these NGOs have been instrumental in consolidating democracy in Benin.
The vibrancy of civil society noted in Benin is almost absent in Guinea-Bissau. Nonetheless, the
effort by Caritas Guinea-Bissau, Liga Guineense des Direitos Humanes (LGDH), and the Legal
Information and Orientation Centre in helping protect human rights and justice in Guinea-Bissau
must be acknowledged (WASIC 2014).
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As Seck (2014) notes, Senegalese civil society has tremendously contributed to the
democratization process in the country. Examples of these organizations include Forum Civil,
Institut African pour la Démocratie (IAD), Institut Panos Afriques de l’Ouest (IPAO),
Transparency International-Senegal, Fahamu, Vivre Caprec, and Rencontre Africaine pour la
Defense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) (WASIC 2014). The devotion of these CSOs and
NGOs to the promotion of democracy prompted the sitting president of the United States to pay a
visit to his Senegalese “homologue” (counterpart) and encourage these organizations in their
endeavors.
Indeed, on June 27, 2013, President Barack Obama met with civil society leaders in
Gorée Island, Senegal, where he emphasized the important roles that civil society organizations
ought to play for democracy to emerge and survive in a country. In his remarks, President
Obama stated
Democracy and good governance involves the need for transparency and accountability
on the part of government, but also active citizens who are monitoring what the
government is doing, that are speaking out. It involves a free press, freedom of assembly,
rule of law. And it also involves organizations like this that aren't just working politically,
but are also working to increase youth employment, helping to empower women, making
sure that children and other vulnerable populations are protected. That's all part of the
democratic process.

Not only does this quote from the President’s remarks summarize the conditions for
democratization and democratic consolidation, but also it explicitly pinpoints how the civil
society leaders should help create opportunities for political participation within democratizing
countries. Such opportunities include “youth employment,” women’s empowerment, and
protection of “vulnerable populations” such as women and children (Obama 2013). President
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Obama’s visit to Senegal is indicative of the fact that the country may be on the right track when
it comes to meeting democratic standards and values.
Contrary to the Senegal case, where there is a panoply of NGOs that promote democracy
and good governance, Guinea suffers a shortage of vibrant CSOs and youth associations as it has
never experienced any democratic alternations before 2010. The only visible NGO, Research
Institute on Democracy and Rule of Law, which should facilitate the democratization process in
the country, was weak because of the consolidation of all powers around the late Guinean
president, Lansana Conté. But if there were any independent NGOs, they might be operating
underground in order to avoid harsh punishments and persecution. Whether President Alpha
Condé will allow NGOs and CSOs to freely operate in Guinea remains to be seen.
In the next section, I address a critically important question, that is, “What are the
consequences of electoral systems and the rules of the game on democratic alternations?”

5.5. Consequences of Electoral Systems and the Rules of the Game on Democratic
Alternations
In this section, the consequences of electoral systems are discussed through the lens of
representation, which is determined by the rules of the electoral game. However, as Pastor
(1999) puts it, “the fair and effective administration of the rules is often as important as the rules
themselves” (p. 6). This thesis discusses how such rules were implemented and the impact of
their implementation on the representation of political parties in the legislative elections in
Ghana and Togo, Benin and Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea.
To explore the consequences of electoral systems, I use Michael Gallagher (2014)’s
election indices dataset, which provides the values of critically important variables including the
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least squares index (LSq) indicating the disproportionality between the percentage of votes and
the percentage of seats won in a parliamentary election, the effective number of parties at
electoral level (EffNv), and the effective number of parties at legislative level (EffNs).23 Since
1990, the average value of LSq in parliamentary elections in Ghana was about 5, and the average
value of LSq in Togo was above 16. However, the mean value of EffNs (2.02) in Togo in 2007
was about same as the average value of EffNs (2.12) in 2008 in Ghana (Gallagher 2014).
These observations indicate that although Ghana and Togo used majoritarian electoral
systems, the dominant party system in Togo had not allowed more opposition political parties to
be represented in the National Assembly. Additionally, in a single-member plurality (SMP)
system as in the case of Ghana, which used the First-Past-The Post (FPTP), parties have equal
chance of being represented in or excluded from the parliament. In Ghana, the FPTP system
might be a deciding factor in the loss of parliamentary majority status in 2000 and 2004 by the
incumbent party (NDC), and in 2008 and 2012 by the NPP. Because the two-round system
(TRS) majority parties favor stronger parties, if a minority party faces a majority party in the
second round it has a lower chance of winning the electoral contest. Arguably, this lower chance
might be one of the many reasons why the ruling RPT maintained its dominance in Togo given
that the political opposition and smaller parties also failed to act strategically to gain power.
Also, an analysis of the average values of EffNs in Ghana and Togo shows the real effect of the
use of majoritarian systems that is the establishment of two party systems. While a two-party
system was established by the 1996 parliamentary elections, Togo briefly experienced a two
party system for the first after 2007 legislative elections (African Elections Database 2012).

23

The lower the value of LSq, the more proportional is the electoral formula used to allocate legislative seats, and
the higher the value of EffNs the better, the higher the number of legislative parties. It is also important to note that
EffNv and Effs are positively and highly correlated, as I discussed it in chapter 3.
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In Benin, the average value of LSq was about three, and the mean value of EffNs was
above 8. By contrast, in Guinea-Bissau, the average value of LSq was about 13, and the average
value of EffNs was about two (Gallagher 2014). These observations reveal that, although these
two countries used List-PR systems, there was a huge disproportionality in the distribution of
electoral outcomes in Guinea-Bissau compared to Benin. The analysis of the value of EffNs
shows that while the multiparty system was being consolidated in Benin, Guinea-Bissau was
dangling or swinging between a one-party system and a two-party system.
Indeed, in Benin the 1995 Electoral Law established 83 seats that must be contested in 24
multi-member electoral districts. Such districts correspond to the 24 departments of the country.
The law also stressed that electoral seats be distributed to party lists based on the rule of the
largest remainder method (LRM) (IPU 1996-2013). However, Benin used the Hare quota (HQ)
with Highest Average in the 1991 National Assembly elections. With the Highest Average
Method, “when a seat is allocated, the original vote party that wins it is reduced by division”
(Reynolds, et al. 2008:177-178). In Benin, D’Hondt formula was used in 1991, and the electoral
votes received by each party were divided by one, two, three, four … in order to distribute seats
to the party.
According to Reynolds, et al. (2008), the D’Hondt formula tends to discriminate against
smaller parties. However, that was not the case in the 1991 given that the Kérékou regime
collapsed as a result of popular pressure for a democratic change. No party was able to gather a
majority of seats. The Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal (UDFP-MDPS-ULD)
headed the list of parties in the National Assembly with 12 seats out of 83 (African Elections
Database 2011, IPU 1991).
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A more proportional formula, Largest Remainder Method (LRM), was used in the 1995,
1999, 2003, and 2007 National Assembly elections. This method allowed no single party to have
a monopoly over the political process in Benin. I would argue that the electoral system used at
the legislative level in Benin facilitated independent presidential candidates to win the
presidential contest in 1996 with President Kérékou, and in 2006 with President Yayi Boni.
Additionally, the democratization was consolidated in Benin not only because of five successful
democratic elections, but also because of increased political representation of opposition parties
in the National Assembly.
On the other hand in Guinea-Bissau, the 1985 Electoral Law not only created 27 multimember constituencies, but also it invalidated any electoral outcomes if voter turnout was less
than 50 percent in each of the districts (IPU 1996-2013). Unlike Benin where civil society
organizations were vibrant and the List-PR system helped create a multiparty system, in GuineaBissau, despite the use of PR system, a dominant-party system was institutionalized by various
military and authoritarian regimes established since independence from Portugal.
The value of LSq in Senegal’s has increased from 11.19 in 1993 to 12.40 in 1998 and to
19.28 in 2001 before decreasing to 13.54 in 2007 (Gallagher 2014). The increasing value of LSq
between 1993 and 2001 was caused not only because Senegal used an electoral system that
increases disproportionality, but also more importantly because it used a Party Block Vote (PBV)
formula to allocate the plurality seats in multi-member districts (Vengroff 2008).24 While the
plurality seats were allocated by using a PBV formula, the PR seats were distributed by a
“Largest Remainder Method with the Hare formula” (Vengroff 2008: 109). By definition, the
Largest Remainder Method (LRM) is designed to ensure that smaller parties are represented in
24

With Party Block Vote formula, voters vote for parties rather than casting their ballots for candidates. The party
with the most votes carries out all seats in the multi-member electoral district.

208

A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

Edoh Agbehonou

the parliament. But during the 2012 legislative elections, the value of LSq has increased one
more time from 13.54 in 2007 to 19.80 (Gallagher 2014). This increase in the value of LSq
suggests that a dominant party system has been institutionalized in Senegal with use of its mixed
(MMM) electoral system.
In the 1993 National Assembly elections, opposition parties were able to collect 36 seats
out of 120, leaving the ruling Socialist Party (PS) a landslide victory with 84 seats. Out of the 36
seats won by the opposition, only six were plurality seats. The 44 remaining plurality seats went
to PS. In all, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of Abdoulaye Wade came second with 27
seats followed by Jappoo Liggeeyal Senegal Coalition and Democratic League-Labour Party
Movement (LD-MPT) with three seats, respectively. Other smaller parties such as Independence
and Labour Party (PIT) and Senegalese Democratic Union-Renovation (UDS-R) won two and
one, respectively (IPU 1993).
In 1998, the total number of seats was increased by 20 seats. The ruling PS was again
able to maintain its majority by winning 93 seats out of 140. With the division within the
opposition, the PDS lost four seats of 27 it previously won in the 1993 elections. In 2001, despite
the use of the Parallel system in Senegal, the Sopi Coalition (which brought Wade to power)
reversed the course of things and ended the PS rule by winning 89 seats out of 120 (formerly 140
seats). One might think that the Parallel mixed system, which Wade was very critical of while
serving as the leading figure of the opposition, would be replaced when he gained power.
Surprisingly, he embraced the system and used it in the 2007 National Assembly elections,
which the Sopi Coalition won handily with 69.21 percent of the votes. With that percentage, Sopi
Coalition gained all the 90 plurality seats and won 41 PR seats (IPU 2007).
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Although the value of LSq decreased from 19.28 in 2001 to 13.54 in 2007 (Gallagher
2014), the number of seats collected out of 150 by the opposition parties was insignificant
compared to their share of seats in previous National Assembly elections. Additionally, the value
of EffNs of 1.31 obtained in 2007 is an indication that the party system in Senegal is moving
toward a two-party system.
Guinea also used a mixed electoral system (Parallel or MMM) but with different electoral
formulas to translate votes into elected seats. The electoral law enacted on December 23, 1991,
established the mode of designation of the 114 Deputies of the National Assembly. According to
that law, 38 seats out of the 114 must be directly elected by plurality in single-member electoral
district, and the remaining 76 seats must also be directly elected but by proportional
representation and using a Hare quota formula by dividing the total valid votes by the total
number of PR seats, in this case 76. What is interesting about the way Guinea uses its Parallel
system is that parties that do not have the most votes also are awarded seats if there are unfilled
seats after the process of applying the Hare quota formula to PR seats (IPU 1993-2013).
The first time this variant of the Parallel system was used in Guinea was in the 1995
National Assembly elections. The ruling Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) won the
parliamentary majority with 71 seats in which 41 are PR seats and 30 are plurality seats. The
Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) came second with 15 PR seats and 4 plurality seats. The
Union for the New Republic (UNR) and the Renewal and Progress Party (PRP) won each nine
PR seats and two plurality seats. The Union for the Progress of Guinea (UPG) obtained only two
PR seats, and smaller parties won the remaining four PR seats after the process of Hare Quota.
However, no single opposition party was able to win a plurality seat in the 2002 National
Assembly elections in Guinea. The PUP, with its supermajority in 1995, was able to use the
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system to its advantage. It swept all the 38 plurality seats and won a landslide victory in the 2002
elections with 85 seats out 114 (IPU 1996-2010). In a comparative perspective, while the Parallel
system used in Senegal tended to establish a two-party system, the Guinean Parallel system
institutionalized a dominant party system. This point is very important because it helps us
explain the question why democracy failed to emerge in Guinea and why the country
experienced high level of electoral conflict between 1990 and 2010 as compared to its
counterpart, Senegal.
In all, democracy tends to flourish more in countries such as Benin, Ghana, and Senegal
where the levels of electoral conflict were relatively low than it does in countries such as Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, and Togo where the levels of conflict were high. Given that these three low level
conflict countries used different electoral systems [majority/plurality system in Ghana and Togo,
PR systems in Benin and Guinea-Bissau, and mixed systems (MMM) in Guinea and Senegal] in
the last two decades, this analysis shows that electoral systems are not the main determining
factors of conflict. Additionally, as revealed by the Round 5 Afrobarometer survey, 72 percent of
Africans believed that democracy is better than any other form of government despite the
occurrence of periodic electoral conflicts in many African states. But there are variations when it
comes to support for democracy in individual African countries. For instance, support for
democracy remains very high (87 percent in Senegal, 82 percent in Ghana, 77 percent in Guinea
and Togo, and 76 percent in Benin) (Afroborometer 2012). These observations indicate that there
no link between electoral systems and support for democracy.
With the consequences of electoral systems and the rules of electoral game are being
discussed in this chapter alongside the role of CSOs and traditional authorities, the democratic
qualities of elections and the effect of political institutions, the next chapter concludes with
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possible recommendations regarding how to prevent electoral conflicts in Africa and beyond and
discusses the limitations in this study.
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CHAPTER SIX
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, I discuss the impact of electoral systems on conflict management and
resolution with a particular emphasis on the prevention of post-election conflicts. Using the
discussion of the effects electoral systems have on the democratization process in Africa, the
chapter lays out and discusses a series of policy implications and recommendations. These need
to be looked at when it comes to finding ways to prevent post-election conflicts across Africa.
Based on past electoral improprieties in Africa’s elections, chapter 6 discusses elections as
learning experiences and suggests a variety of approaches for promoting “true” democracies
across the continent. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the limitations of the study
and establishes the ground for further inquiry into post-election conflicts beyond Africa.

6.1. Electoral Systems and Conflict Prevention
As Reynolds et al. (2005) put it, “It is clear different electoral systems can aggravate or
moderate tension and conflict in a society” (p. 6). The quantitative regression analysis of this
thesis supports that claim. Even though the results of the study are not as significant as
hypothesized, they suggest that some electoral systems are more prone to electoral conflict than
are others, at least in the context of African elections.
It is important to emphasize that majoritarian electoral systems generally allow only
stronger parties to win elections. Proportional representation systems and to some extent mixed
electoral systems allow for greater representation of parties, women and minority groups. But it
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is troubling to observe that in many African countries where majoritarian systems were used
during the period between 1990 and 2010, a myriad of political parties tended to enter electoral
races ignoring (and/or in most cases without knowing) the impacts their electoral systems might
have on electoral outcomes. Or they entered the race for other reasons such as the hope of being
brought into the winning coalition. For instance, in Togo where the levels of electoral conflict
were often high, over 20 political parties competed in the 1994 election, and more than 35 parties
participated in the 2007 legislative elections. In contrast, in Ghana where the level of electoral
violence was relatively low, an average of six political parties and some independent candidates
contested parliamentary elections since 1992.
Additionally, there is a strong relationship between majoritarian electoral systems, party
systems, and social cleavages in these countries. In Ghana, the issue of socio-political cleavage
has been a major concern for many Ghanaian scholars including Ayee (2006) and Drah (2006).
These scholars examine electoral behaviors in different constituencies in the 2004 elections.
Ethnicity appears to play a major role in politics in Ghana. Using the case study of the Akan,
Anlo, and Keta electoral districts (all three located in the Volta Region), Ayee (2006) finds that a
strong majority of votes in all three constituencies went for the NDC in the 2004 elections. These
results confirm the dominance of the NDC over its counterpart (the NPP) in the Volta Region
since 1992. But Drah’s (2006) study of voter participation in the Okaikoi South and Ayawaso
constituencies (both located in the Greater Accra Region) shows that “over four-fifths of
respondents in Okaikai South (OS) and a little under half in Ayawaso Central (AC) opted for
NPP followed distantly in OS but more respectably in AC by the NDC” (p. 135). These
observations indicate that regardless of the incumbency status of the two major parties (the NDC
and the NPP), most social groups in Ghana have been consistent in their voting behaviors. An
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analysis of the 45 newly created constituencies in 2012 in the ten regions shows that while the
NPP won handily in the Accra Region (five seats against two seats for the NDC), Eastern Region
(five to null for the NDC), and Ashanti Region (seven to one for the NDC), in contrast, the Volta
Region, the Brong Ahafo Region, the Northern Region, and the Upper East Region remain solid
for the NDC. The distribution of seats in the recent elections in these newly created
constituencies confirms the voting patterns of ethno-linguistic clusters in Ghana.
In Togo for instance, the opposition parties tend to get the lion’s share of votes in the
southern constituencies mostly populated by Ewe-speaking ethnic groups, which include Ewe,
Ouatchi, Mina, Ehoue, Fon, Adja, Pla, and Pedah. But most of the votes from the northern
constituencies that are heavily dominated by Tem-Kabre ethnic groups (Kabye, Cotokoli, Losso,
Lamba, Bassari, and Tamberma), and Paragourma (Moba, Gourma, Konkomba, Tchamba, and
N’Gam Gam) and the majority of votes of Central Togo ethnic groups (Akposso and Akebou) go
to the ruling RPT (the present day UNIR). Because of inability of the extremely fractionalized
Togolese political opposition parties, which have their strongholds in the southern electoral
districts, to coordinate their efforts for democratic change, they have created many opportunities
for the ruling party to maintain its dominance in the political scene since 1990. This ethnic
politics has been reinforced by the use of a majoritarian electoral system that institutionalized a
dominant party system in Togo. As expected, when the cleavage element is included, electoral
system type produces a specific type of party system. Both the dominant-party systems and the
two-party systems observed in many African states are the immediate consequences of the use of
majority/plurality systems or mixed electoral systems (especially, MMM) in which the plurality
variant dominates the PR variant as is the case of Senegal and Guinea.
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Therefore, to minimize the occurrence of electoral conflict in majoritarian countries,
especially in places that experienced a long period of hegemonic single-party rule as in the case
of Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe, to name just a few, political leaders need to
understand that creating multiple parties and presenting multiple candidates to contest elections
instead of forming strong coalitions of parties are not the best ways to go. Because the
majoritarian electoral system (which is the winner-take-all system) tends to discriminate against
smaller parties, chances are high for deep-rooted ruling parties to always maintain their
dominance in countries where these types of electoral systems are used. Post-election conflicts
are likely results if losers are not willing to accept the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.
It is equally important to note that the way a majoritarian system works in one country
may not necessary be the same in other countries with different social and political conditions
(Reynolds et al 2005). The case of Ghana confirms just that. The institutionalization or
consolidation of a two-party system and the vibrancy of both the traditional authorities and the
civil society have been very helpful in minimizing the negative consequences of the use of such
an electoral system in the country.
Proportional representation systems have been praised for providing room for including
women and minority groups as in the case of Benin. However, it failed to provide expected
results in Guinea-Bissau because of repeated military intervention and the establishment of the
one dominant-party system, which was translated into high disproportionality measured by the
least squares index (LSq) of 12.85 in the 1994 National People’s Assembly elections and by LSq
of 13.15 in the 2008 legislative elections (Gallagher 2014). These rates are consistent with those
for the First-Past-The-Post systems in general. MMM systems tend to produce results like those
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of FPTP systems. The exclusion of these smaller parties in Guinea-Bissau had been at the core of
periodic high levels of electoral violence in the country.
Similarly, the mixed electoral system failed to include a variety of opinion in the
legislature in Guinea because of protracted military and civilian dictatorship rule of Conté and
his ruling PUP. However, it somewhat worked in Senegal not only because of the vibrancy of
Sopi coalition, but also and most importantly because the ruling PS provided incentives for
opposition parties to co-exist with it and actually compete in elections. This was a divide and
rule strategy of the PS which backfired as the opposition parties learned how to play the game
over time.
In all, as Reynolds et al (2005) stated “Wherever possible, whether in divided or
relatively homogenous societies, the electoral system should err on the side of including of all
significant interests in the legislature” (p. 160). The inclusion of all stakeholders in decisionmaking processes is a key factor to success of any organization. In the context of elections, postelection conflicts are more likely to be prevented if all parties are fairly represented in the
legislature than if they are excluded from the legislature. When it comes to the representation of
parties in the legislature, PR systems, including MMP but not MMM systems do a better job than
the two other types of electoral systems.

6.2. Policy Implications
With some isolated cases including Botswana and Ghana where post-election conflicts
have been minimal since1966 and 1990 respectively despite their adoption of majority/plurality
electoral systems, both the quantitative regression analysis and the in-depth comparative analysis
of this thesis demonstrate that proportional representation systems are the best electoral systems
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when it comes to mitigating and preventing post-election conflicts in divided societies such as
the case in many countries in Africa.
Just as an illustration of why proportional representation systems are the “best” electoral
systems and the fact that mixed electoral is a combination of majority/plurality and proportional
representative system, I purposefully used one legislative election held after the national
conference in Benin and one legislative election held after political agreement in Togo for the
calculation of disproportionality indices. In fact, normal practice suggests that at least three
elections are required before these generalizations can be made. The main reason for using these
two elections is that the national conference and the global political accord were held to increase
the inclusion of all parties in political decision-making processes Benin and Togo, respectively.
However, since the occurrence of these two political developments there were no major changes
in Benin and Togo. Togo consistently used a majoritarian system with the ruling RPT/UNIR as
the dominant party, which maintained over 60 percent of legislative seats in the National
Assembly and Benin used a PR system with no change in electoral rule or formula. My findings
suggest that the electoral systems in Benin and Togo are built in with low and high
disproportionalities, respectively (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.4). There is also a higher level of
representation in the legislative body in Benin than is the case in Togo (see Table 6.2 and Table
6.5). In all, while Togo’s Freedom Score, which is the average of civil liberties score (4) and
political rights score (5), is 4.5, Benin scores 2, with 2 as the civil liberties score and 2 as the
political rights score (Freedom House, 2011). These freedom scores classify Togo and Benin
partly free and free, respectively.
The “free” status awarded to Benin is a result of many factors, including the
constitutional and electoral reforms in the early 1990s and respect of constitutional guarantees of
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freedom of press, speech, and freedom of assembly. These constitutional rights allow a myriad of
news organizations to emerge and politicized Beninois press to be very critical of both the ruling
coalition government and the political opposition leaders. Because of respect of freedom of
assembly in Benin, “all political parties, regardless of ethnic or regional affiliation, operate freely
throughout the country” (Freedom House, 2011). Since 1990, Benin has held six parliamentary
elections using a party-list proportional representation system and five presidential elections
using a majority popular vote Two-Round system. Both the parliamentary and the presidential
elections were not only relatively peaceful but also free and fair. This feat has earned Benin a
reputation as a stable democracy.
Unlike Benin, Togo is still struggling to meet democratic standards including free and
fair elections. But based on its past history, the choice of the majoritarian electoral system did
not allow the country to achieve that goal. The reason is that, in this electoral system, elections
are always viewed in terms of the winner-take-all or what realists would refer to as zero-sum
gains or win/lose situations. With this in mind, in most cases, parties use any means just to win
elections without thinking of collective interests of their country. This situation has resulted in
post-election violence in Togo since 1990 due to vote rigging, intimidation, and the repeated use
by the regime in place of military and security forces to severely repress peaceful protests and
demonstrations in the name of restoring security and order.
The 1998, 2003, 2005 and 2010 post-election political unrest illustrates that well. In these
elections, many voters felt that they were cheated and, therefore, their votes were nothing but
wasted. An electoral system in which elections are viewed as win-win situations and allows for
fair representation of various groups, including both social groups and political parties, would be
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a better solution to prevent post-election conflicts that are undermining the prospect of
democracy in Togo.
The 2007 legislative election results in Togo clearly show how smaller parties are
discriminated against in the SMP majoritarian system (see Table 6.3). Therefore, I recommend
that Togo adopt a party-list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies for its
legislative elections. To ensure that this PR system mirrors the Togolese population, the quota
systems, preferably the Droop quota (DQ) can be used as a tool for transferring votes into seats
(see Table 6.9 and 6.10). Smaller parties such as Democratic Convention of African Peoples,
Patriotic Pan-African Convergence, Party of Democrats for Renewal, and many others that were
not able to win seats under the SMP system, will gain seats when both the Hare Formula-Largest
Remainder and the Droop quota (DQ) systems have been applied in the 2007 elections in Togo.
The use of such formula and systems will also contribute to participation and increased support
for small parties as voters realize that they are not wasting their votes by supporting them.
To be more specific, Togo may now adopt the PR electoral system and use the Largest
Remainder-Hare formula to allocate seats so as to prevent future post-election political instability
(one of the main hindrances of democracy). The main reason is that, as Farrell puts it, “lower
quotas result in more seats to parties receiving a full quota and fewer being allocated by
remainders, and therefore somewhat less proportional results” (Farrell 2011: 69). Given that the
Largest Remainder-Hare formula has the largest quota, smaller parties may not necessarily win
seat(s) during the “full quotas” distribution stage, but they have another good chance of getting
seat(s) allocated by the remainders.
Given that during the 2011elections (parliamentary and presidential), there were reports
of minor irregularities and incidents, there is also a need for Benin to continuously seek to
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improve its electoral system implementation. Comparing the results of how the two quota
systems address the issue of equity in allocating seats using the 1991 parliamentary elections in
Benin as an example (see Table 6.6 and Table 6.7), Benin will still be better off if it maintains its
current Largest Remainder-Hare formula. In order to strengthen its democracy, there should be
no immediate need for Benin to change its formula for translating votes into seats. However, it
may want to look carefully at how elections are being monitored and managed so as to increase
people’s trust in Beninois electoral institutions.
6.3. Recommendations
Based on these specific findings, I recommend that a series of electoral conflict
prevention mechanisms be put in place in African countries. First and foremost, African states
may find ways to address the issue of unequal distribution of wealth, which is one of the many
sources of socio-political conflicts across the continent. The most effective way of doing that is
to adopt an electoral system that favors the representation of various socio-ethnic cleavages in
the decision-making institutions, especially the parliaments or national assemblies. However, if
such a policy recommendation is correctly implemented, it will help prevent a single ethnic
group from dominating politics and, therefore, monopolizing the control of resources in many
African states.
Additionally, there ought to be a strong willingness and commitment of African leaders
to realistic economic development programs to help sustain Africa’s emerging democracies.
Indeed, “modernization theory,” which links democratization to economic development, seems
to hold in many countries including South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina and Chile. In the context of
Africa, countries that have embraced economic development agenda seem to be moving toward
democracy and, therefore, experience fewer post-election conflicts. Benin, Botswana, Cape
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Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tomé & Principe, and South Africa are palpable
examples of African states that not only have experienced economic development in the last
twenty years as revealed by their growth domestic product (GDP), which is measured in terms of
their purchasing power parity (World Bank Database 2011), but also have been classified as full
democracies (Freedom House 2012). However, one has to be cautious regarding the cause-effect
relationship between democracy and economic development because the sequencing is
important.
Modernization theory does fail to explain change in countries such as China and India.
Even though India is the world’s largest democracy, it is certainly not yet fully developed. While
China’s economy has grown tremendously during the twentieth century and continues to grow in
the twenty-first century, the country failed to meet minimum democratic standards. The
modernization theory also does not apply in the case of Singapore, which is known for its
economic boom.
Second, if countries had been under military rule for so long as in the case of GuineaBissau, Guinea, Ghana, Togo, to name just a few, there is a need to convene a sincere dialogue
between the population and the military so as to improve civil-military relations before and after
elections. This dialogue will also help to bring trust between civilians and security forces. Third,
institutional reforms are much needed in many African countries now more than ever. Such
reforms should also include the security apparatus, which should be trained as instruments of
protection of populations rather than serving as tools for regime maintenance as they currently
are in a number of African countries. In many African states, the dominant parties tend to co-opt
the security apparatus as much as they can in order to perpetuate their powers. For that reason
many dominant parties are skeptical of a true civil-military dialogue or any calls for military and
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institutional reforms. True institutional reforms require inputs from all stakeholders including
stronger and weaker parties who are willing to reach mutually acceptable solutions. The findings
in both the quantitative research and the qualitative comparative analysis of this thesis suggest
that majority/plurality electoral systems provide little to no room or opportunities of political
participation and representation for smaller parties or representation of women and minorities
whose contributions are essential not only for the survival of democracy but also for successful
and lasting institutional reforms.
Fourth, countries can review their constitutions through national forums and submit the
amended proposals to their respective populations for approval through constitutional referenda
rather than through legislative actions. In such constitutional proposals, the main tenets of
democracy such as separation of powers among the branches of government and basic individual
rights must be guaranteed and that the duties and responsibilities of each branch are clearly
defined. The judicial branch, which plays a paramount role in the litigation of election-related
disputes in many countries, can assume its tasks with a total independence if there is a separation
of powers between the executive and the judiciary. Additionally, the constitutions should
empower the judiciaries with the power of judicial review, which will allow them to declare
whether certain presidential decrees or parliamentary acts are unconstitutional. The judicial
review will serve as additional checks and balances on both the executives and the parliaments or
National Assemblies. The use of judicial review has been prominent in many western countries
including the United States where democracy was consolidated for over 200 years now. The
constitutions should also limit the presidential terms in office. Putting a cap to the number of
terms a president or a head of state can serve in office may not only guarantee democratic
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alternations in a country, but also it may give opposition parties a hope that they too can come to
power if all stakeholders play by the rules.
Fifth, it may be apt to proceed with electoral reforms to insure greater permissiveness and
representation of various social groups, including minorities (women, ethnic and religious
groups, etc.). Increased representation is critical when it comes to preventing electoral conflict in
plural and highly heterogeneous societies. In these societies, a multilateral approach should be
given to the design of electoral systems. Such an approach, which puts emphasis on collaborative
effort of all stakeholders or actors, will help create legitimate electoral systems acceptable to all
actors. This approach is in line with one of the key pieces of advice that Reynolds et al (2005)
provide to electoral system designers. According to Reynolds et al (2005: 161),
All groupings which wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel that the
electoral system to be used is fair and gives them the same chance of electoral success as
anyone else. The paramount aim should be that those who ‘lose’ the election cannot
translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself or use electoral system
as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation.
In many African countries, losers in elections have difficulty accepting electoral outcomes as a
result of not only the lack of trust in their electoral systems, but also because of the lack of
confidence that such systems are built with fairness to provide transparent and acceptable
outcomes. For example, in Benin, Ghana, and even post-apartheid South Africa where electoral
systems are widely accepted by all parties, losers are more likely to accept defeat than in
countries where the fairness of electoral systems is questioned.
Another reason for reforming electoral system is that plurality/majority system provides
incentives to stronger parties to engage in “crude ethnic politics” (Ayelazuno 2011: 22). Because
the plurality/majority electoral system facilitates the establishment of a (M+1) -party system, any
of the main parties that emerge as a result of the use of such a system may use any available
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resources to its advantage so as to win elections. In Africa, the most prominent resource that
politicians often resort to in their quest for political power is arguably “ethnicity.” Ethnic cards
have been played by political parties and their candidates in many electoral contests in Cote
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Togo, Zimbabwe, and even in Ghana where the two dominant parties NDC and
NPP have been locked in ethnic politics since 1996. Because of that, Ghana’s fledgling
democracy almost collapsed after the 2008 elections although its electoral system seems to be
working. I argue that things can go wrong at any time if the country’s electoral system is not
carefully looked at.
Using Ghana as an example, I recommend that African countries that use a majoritarian
electoral system (FPTP system, especially) overhaul their systems with an objective to deincentivize stronger parties that may want to use ethnic identity cards as a tool to gain political
power. This can be done if these countries introduce an absolute majority formula instead of
plurality or FPTP electoral rule. The absolute majority electoral rule provides opportunities for
the runoff parties to coordinate strategically with minority parities whose voters may vote
strategically for the party that have a chance of winning in the second round. A strategic alliance
formation can help parties refrain from playing ethnic cards during political elections.
Another example of country where the majoritarian electoral system has caused a major
contention among key actors since 1990 is Togo. Despite a Comprehensive Political Agreement
(an Accord Politique Globale reached between the ruling RPT and some key opposition parties
in 2006), which stressed the necessity of institutional and electoral reforms before the 2007
legislative elections, such elections were held without required reforms.
It is unfair to charge the plurality/majority system as the only factor responsible for postelection conflict in contemporary Africa. The mixed electoral systems (especially the MMM
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variant) also can be blamed for Africa’s electoral problems. In the 1990s in Senegal, Abdoulaye
Wade (then the leader of the Senegalese political opposition) and his PDS never accepted defeat
in elections in part because according to him the Parallel system used in Senegal was not a fair
electoral system (Vengroff 2005). If its other political institutions, particularly the military which
stayed out of the process, were not strong, Senegal would have slipped into protracted electoral
violence in the 1990s. Even though this was a rare incident, it was a wakeup call for leaders and
electoral system designers to always opt for electoral systems that are built on the premises of
inclusion of all socio-political cleavages.
Sixth, African countries that experience periodic electoral conflicts must revise the
processes and procedures for selecting members of their election management bodies (EMBs) to
ensure credibility and independence of the electoral institutions in charge of planning,
administering and supervising all political elections. The independence of EMBs should be
guaranteed by the constitution of each country as it is in Ghana. As the Article 46 of 1992
Constitution of Ghana stipulates it, “‘In the performance of its functions, the Electoral
Commission not be subject to the control or direction of any authority’ except as provided in the
constitution or any other law not consistent with the constitution” (The Electoral Commission of
Ghana 2012).
Furthermore, in case of an eventual conflict that needs to be mediated by a third party,
choose an impartial or a neutral third party mediator to address differences between parties
taking part in elections prior to the actual elections. This choice will help avoid conflict of
interest on the side of the mediator and increase the chance of success of the mediated accords or
agreements. In addition, the mediator must not only be knowledgeable about democracy but also
he/she must have prior experience when it comes to democracy and democratic elections. In this
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regard, any president or head of state who comes to power through a military coup should not be
considered to serve as a mediator in an electoral conflict. Because of the lack of impartiality in
the mediation of many conflicts in Francophone Africa, including Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali
and Togo, these conflicts had been put on hold for a time being instead of being resolved or
managed. However, in places such as Senegal and Ghana where electoral commissioners appear
to be independent or neutral, these commissioners have successfully played and continue to play
the role of third party mediators in the mitigation of electoral crises.

6.4. Elections as Learning Experiences
The literature on elections as instruments of democracy suggests that for a democracy to
emerge and sustain itself, it takes more than three consecutive successful free and fair elections.
This fact is often ignored by many politicians across Africa where elections are viewed as the
end of the world. Learning from mistakes and mastering the rules of the game remain key factors
underpinning democratic success in Africa’s emerging democracies. In Lesotho, the first two
foundational elections held in 1993 and 1998 under FPTP electoral system were catastrophic as
they failed to provide opportunities for opposition parties to be represented in the parliament.
However, with a series of mediations under the auspices of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the Lesotho government and its opposition parties were able
to establish an Interim Political Authority (IPA). Arguably, the IPA created stronger and more
democratic institutions (for example, MMP electoral system) for subsequent elections. Since
2002, the MMP system has helped increase the representation of political opposition parties and
moderate the consolidation of democracy in the country. It is also worth noting that alongside
electoral systems that play a major role in influencing electoral behaviors in many African
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countries, other institutions including civil society organizations and constitutions also shape
electoral behaviors and electoral outcomes (Menocal 2014).
Other examples of African states that learned from experience include Benin, Ghana, and
Senegal. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, these countries cultivated a long
process of democratic culture and created political systems that earned the trust and confidence
of their respective political actors. They adopted rigorous democratic constitutions with tighter
amendment processes as a result of constitutional checks and balances. For instance, in Benin,
according to the Article 154 of the constitution, a three-fourth majority of members of the
National Assembly is required to approve the constitution revision proposed by the executive
branch in consultation of the legislative branch. To become the law of the land, the amended
constitution shall be ratified either by a national referendum or by a four-fifth majority vote of
the legislators (Article 155 of the constitution of Benin). Given that the Beninois party system is
characterized by an extreme pluralism, not only is it difficult to approve a proposal for a
constitutional amendment, but also it is extremely difficult and nearly impossible to obtain a
four-fifths majority vote of the members of the National Assembly for the ratification of the
constitution.
In Ghana, the complexity of the constitutional amendment process makes it very difficult
for any single political party to alter the country’s constitution. As stated in the Article 290 of the
Constitution of Ghana, to amend the entrenched provisions including, the sovereignty of the
state, which shall be exercised by the people of Ghana, civil rights and civil liberties, and the
Parliament’s limitations to enact policies that establish a one-party system, the bill shall
•

be referred by the Speaker to the Council of State who shall provide advice on it within thirty
days of receipt of the bill;
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be introduced to the Parliament after being published in the Gazette for sixty days to allow
voters to be acquainted with the content of the bill;

•

be approved by a national referendum of at least forty percent of voter turnout with over 75
percent popular votes in support of the proposed amendment.

In addition to this lengthy process, the Parliament shall pass the already approved bill at the
referendum before the President signs it into law. However, when it comes to the amendment of
any other provisions, it requires at least two thirds vote of the Parliament in favor of the bill
before the President can sign it into law (Article 291 of the Constitution of Ghana). Having a
complicated amendment process may serve to thwart the efforts of anti-democracy forces to
change their country’s constitution when they come to power.
Unlike Ghana where the amendment process is not only complex but also transparent, in
Senegal, the process is simpler and less transparent. The amendment of the constitution can be
approved by a referendum or a three-fifths vote of the National Assembly. Because of the
dominant party system in Senegal, the ruling party or coalition was able to win more than threefifths seats in the National Assembly; therefore, three-fifths votes of members of the legislature
required for the amendment of the constitution would not be difficult to get. But because of its
past democratic experiences and its vibrant civil society, many constitutional amendment
attempts by the Wade regime to perpetuate Wade’s power in Senegal failed.
Because vibrant civil society is known for promoting democratic cultures and values, it is
an imperative for African policy makers and leaders of political parties to find ways to help
increase labor unions and civil society organizations’ involvement in the process of
democratization and democratic consolidation across the continent. And the most effective way
to do so is to have not only constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and assembly to
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citizens to freely form and participate in trade unions and other social and political organizations,
but also and most importantly an electoral system, which allows diversity and pluralism given
the pluralistic nature of many African societies.
Democracy needs constructive allegiances that not only bind people together but also
help them get involved in democratization processes. Civil society, defined in this thesis as a
way society learns a culture of democracy, must be both vibrant and effective for a democracy to
survive or to be consolidated. History has shown that in countries where civil society has been
effective, there have been successful democratic transitions and democratic transfer of political
power. Beyond the boundary of the African continent, one can cite Poland as a palpable example
of a country that has an effective civil society. A success in Poland’s democratic process has
been credited to the Solidarity Movement with impressive membership (over 10 million people
claimed membership to Solidarity Movement within a short period of time in the late 1980s).
In most countries in the Global South or developing countries, it is quite difficult to
distinguish civil society organizations from political parties. For example, in Egypt, where civil
society organizations are more likely to be ideological in orientation, the wave of democracy that
swept throughout the country during the 2011 Arab Spring seems to be paling. In Tunisia, on the
other hand, where the civil society organizations appear to be secular, the struggle for a
democratic transfer of power by the Tunisians seems to be succeeding. In all, for a true
democracy to survive in a country, civil society organizations should not only be separated from
political parties, but also they must not be controlled by the government. Their independence will
help them achieve their primary functions such as helping citizens participate in the democratic
process, protecting human rights, and empowering women. 25
25

The presentation by Ambassador Roland Rich, Executive Head of the United Nations Democracy Fund, under the
auspices of the Humpty Dumpty Institute on 18 February 2014 at Savannah State University on the theme:
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However, those who are skeptical of the association of electoral systems and electoral
conflicts will argue that it does not matter what types of electoral systems a country chooses for
allocation of seats and policy preferences. What matters though is the fairness of the system and
the transparency in the entire electoral process. This thesis opines that the system that seems not
only to mirror the social fabric of a country, but also to address the issue of fairness in political
process is arguably the proportional representation system. Does the government control the
media? Are there any opportunities for political participation? A lack of such opportunities
remains one of the prime obstacles to political representation of parties and minority groups
including women in parliaments or National Assemblies, and hence may be a source of postelection conflicts in many African states and beyond. From the regression analysis (see Chapter
3) and the comparative analysis (see Chapter 5), I find that the occurrence of post-election
conflict increases in countries where citizens’ freedom of assembly and association are severely
restricted compared to in countries where such freedoms are protected by governments.
Additionally, the unfair distribution of legislative seats also remains a major explanatory factor
of post-election conflicts across Africa. Furthermore, the results of the multivariate regression
analysis (see Chapter 3) support the three hypotheses investigated in this thesis. Despite the fact
that the results of the regression analysis are not as strong as hypothesized, one can carefully
conclude that in Africa, (i) countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems; (ii)
countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election
conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems; and (iii) countries that use PR
systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed

“Pathways to De Democracy: The Work of the United Nations Democracy Fund” enlightens this discussion on the
relationship between vibrant civil society and democracy promotion.
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systems, MMM, especially. However, more studies need to be done regarding the association of
post-election conflict and electoral systems in contemporary Africa.

6.5. Limitations of the Study
As in any research project, this study has some limitations. First and foremost, it heavily
relies on secondary data, which may not be up-to-date. To minimize possible biases associated
with the use of such data, I used multiple reliable sources as a way to cross-check for the internal
validity of any pieces of information used in this thesis. However, the sample size N= 324, which
includes 171 legislative/parliamentary elections and 153 presidential elections used in the
quantitative phase of the study, and the sample of 25 legislative elections used in the in-depth
comparative analysis, are not large enough to allow a greater inference or generalizability of the
findings beyond the African continent.
Secondly, because of governments’ secrecy or the lack of transparency in election results
in many countries in contemporary Africa, in most legislative elections investigated in this study,
governments intentionally chose to only release the number of seats won by political parties and
independent candidates rather than releasing both the number of votes and the number of seats
won by parties that contested such elections. This state of things made the calculations of
disproportionality indices, which are one of the key variables that help determine whether an
electoral system ensures political representation of all sociopolitical cleavages in a country,
extremely difficult.
Finally, in addition to the inaccessibility of data, another limitation of the study was the
language barrier. Although the language issue was the least significant limitation of this study, it
remains a critical one when it comes to gathering information on Guinea-Bissau where
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Portuguese is the official language. My intermediary level of Portuguese was not enough to
make a whole lot of sense of news published on Bissau-Guinean local websites. Therefore, I
heavily relied on English and French translations, which may lack or misinterpret important
details.
Because of these limitations, further studies are needed on post-election conflict
prevention in contemporary Africa and beyond. As a way forward, I will concentrate my future
research agenda on the study of organization of political parties in the context of Africa, Middle
East, and Asia. How parties are structured and funded may have consequences on both the
promotion of democracy and the mitigation of electoral conflicts. Do political parties in
developing countries have democratic structures? How are leaders of political parties selected?
Are they democratically elected by members of their parties or societies? Or are they leaders
because they are the founders of the parties? Are they life time leaders of their parties? Or do
parties have constitutional term limits on party leaders? What qualities and skills do these leaders
possess? How do opposition political parties relate to one another, to the society and to the ruling
party or coalition? The nature of the relationship of parties may help ease or escalate conflict
before, during, and after elections in these countries.
Another critical area that needs to be researched is the organization of political
oppositions in developing countries. Who shall be the leader of opposition parties in a given
country, and how shall such a leader be selected? Although researchers such as Erdmann,
Basedau and Mehler (2007), Gyimah-Boadi (2007), Bogaards (2003), Mozaffar, Scarritt and
Galaich (2003), Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) already ignited the debate on party systems and
organization of African political parties, questions raised in this thesis for future research are yet
to be answered to cover parties in all developing countries. As a way forward, I will investigate
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these questions with a particular attention on the types of electoral systems used for the
allocation of legislative seats and how both the organization and the funding of political
opposition parties affect the likelihood of post-election conflict in developing countries with
dominant-, two- and multiparty systems.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Table 6.1: Calculation of Disproportionality in Benin
Party/Coalition

% of
Votes

% of
Seats

(% of
Votes% of
Seats)

(% of Votes-% of
Seats) squared

Union for the Triumph of Democratic
Renewal (UTRD)

18.86%

18.75%

0.11

0.0121

National Party for Democracy and
Development-Democratic Renewal
Party (PNDD-PRD)

11.72%

14.0625%

-2.3425

5.48730625

Social Democratic Party-National
Union for Solidarity and Progress
(PSD-UNSP)

9.84%

12.50%

-2.66

7.0756

National Rally for Democracy (RND)

12.08%

10.9375%

1.1425

1.30530625

Our Common Cause (NCC)

10.13%

9.375%

0.755

0.570025

National Movement for Democracy
and Development-Movement for
Solidarity, Union, and Progress-Union
for Democracy and National
Reconstruction (MNDD-MSUPUDRN)

8.40%

9.375%

-0.975

0.950625

Union for Democracy and National
Solidarity (UDS)

7.08%

7.8125%

-0.7325

0.53655625

Rally of Liberal Democrats for
National Reconstruction (RDLVivoten)

5.62%

6.25%

-0.63

0.3969

Alliance for Social Democracy-Bloc
for Social Democracy (ASD-BSD)

3.47%

4.6875%

-1.2175

1.48230625

Alliance for Democracy and ProgressDemocratic Union for Social Renewal

3.76%

3.125%

0.635

0.403225
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(ADP-UDRS)
National Union for Democracy and
Progress (UNDP)

3.07%

1.5625%

1.5075

2.27255625

Popular Republican Union-National
Labor Party (URP-PNT)

1.99%

1.5625%

0.4275

0.18275625

Democratic Union for Social and
Economic Development (UDES)

2.51%

0%

2.51

6.3001

Builders and Managers of Freedom
and Development (BGLD)

1.49%

0%

1.49

2.2201

Total

100

100

30.9860581

D = √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2) = √1/2(30.9860581)=

3.936118526

Table 6.2: Calculation of Effective Number of Parties in Benin
Party/[Coalition]

(% of
Number
Votes)Squared of Seats
(64)

% of
Seats

18.86%

0.03556996

12

18.75%

0.035156

National Party for
11.72%
Democracy and
Development-Democratic
Renewal Party (PNDDPRD)

0.01373584

9

14.0625%

0.019768

Social Democratic PartyNational Union for
Solidarity and Progress

0.00968256

8

12.50%

0.015625

Union for the Triumph of
Democratic Renewal
(UTRD)

% of
Votes

9.84%

(% of
Seats)Squared
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(PSD-UNSP)
National Rally for
Democracy (RND)

12.08%

0.01459264

7

10.9375%

0.01196289

Our Common Cause
(NCC)

10.13%

0.01026169

6

9.375%

0.0087890625

National Movement for
Democracy and
Development-Movement
for Solidarity, Union, and
Progress-Union for
Democracy and National
Reconstruction (MNDDMSUP-UDRN)

8.40%

0.007056

6

9.375%

0.0087890625

Union for Democracy
and National Solidarity
(UDS)

7.08%

0.00501264

5

7.8125%

0.00610351562
5

Rally of Liberal
Democrats for National
Reconstruction (RDLVivoten)

5.62%

0.00315844

4

6.25%

0.00390625

Alliance for Social
Democracy-Bloc for
Social Democracy (ASDBSD)

3.47%

0.00120409

3

4.6875%

0.00219726562
5

3.76%
Alliance for Democracy
and Progress-Democratic
Union for Social Renewal
(ADP-UDRS)

0.00141376

2

3.125%

0.009765625

National Union for
Democracy and Progress
(UNDP)

3.07%

0.0094249

1

1.5625%

0.00244140625

Popular Republican
Union-National Labor
Party (URP-PNT)

1.99%

0.0039601

1

1.5625%

0.00244140625
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2.51%

0.0063001

0

0%

0

Builders and Managers of 1.49%
Freedom and
Development (BGLD)

0.0022201

0

0%

0

Total (S)

0.12359282

0.126945481

N=1/S

8.09

7.88

LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA INDEX
1. Effective Number of Parties
a. LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS) N = 1/∑ si2
N= 1/0.126945481 = 7.88
b. ELECTORAL PARTIES (VOTES) N = 1/∑ vi2

N = 1/0.12359282 = 8.09

2. The Threshold of Exclusion
a. Upper Threshold = 100% /(M + 1), with M = 13.8
= 100% /(13.8+1)
= 100%/14.8
=6.76%
3. The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion)
a. Lower Threshold = 100%/(2M), with M = 13.8
= 100%/(2*13.8) = 100%/27.6
= 3.62%

4. The Effective Threshold (Teff)
Teff = (Upper Threshold + Lower Threshold)/2
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= (6.76% + 3.62%)/2
= 10.38%/2
= 5.19%

Table 6.3: The 2007 National Assembly Election Results in Togo
Parties

Votes

% of
Votes

# of Seats

% of Seats

Rally for the
Togolese People

922,636

39.4

50

61.73

Union of Forces
for Change

867,507

37.0

27

33.33

Action
Committee for
Renewal

192,618

08.2

4

4.94

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

38,347

01.6

0

0

Patriotic PanAfrican
Convergence

43,898

01.9

0

0

Party of
Democrats for
Renewal

24,260

01.0

0

0

Others

254,842

10.9

0

0

Total

2,344,108

100

81

100

Source: Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive. Retrieved from http://psephos.adamcarr.net/countries/t/togo/togo2007.txt
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Table 6.4: Calculation of Disproportionality in Togo
Parties

% of Votes- % of Seats

(% of Votes- % of
Seats)squared

Rally for the
Togolese People

-22.33

498.6289

Union of Forces for
Change

3.67

13.4689

Action Committee for 3.26
Renewal

10.6276

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

1.6

2.56

Patriotic Pan-African
Convergence

1.9

3.61

Party of Democrats
for Renewal

1

1

Others

10.9

118.81

Total

648.7054

D = √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2) = √ (1/2 (648.7054) = 18.01
D= 18.01
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Table 6.5: Calculation of Effective Number of Parties in Togo
Parties

% of Votes

(% of
Votes)
Squared

% of Seats

(% of Seats) Squared

Rally for the
Togolese People

0.394

0.155236

0.6173

0.38105929

Union of Forces
for Change

0.37

0.1369

0.3333

0.11108889

Action
Committee for
Renewal

0.082

0.006724

0.0494

0.00244036

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

0.016

0.000256

0

0

Patriotic PanAfrican
Convergence

0.019

0.000361

0

0

Party of
Democrats for
Renewal

0.01

0.0001

0

0

Others

0.109

0.011881

0

0

Total

1

0.311458

100

0.494589

1. Effective Number of Parties
a.
LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS)
N= 1/0.494589= 2.02
b.

N = 1/∑ si2

ELECTORAL PARTIES (VOTES) N = 1/∑ vi2
N = 1/0.311458= 3.21

2. The Threshold of Exclusion
Upper Threshold = 100% /(M + 1), with M = 1
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= 100% /(1+1)
= 100%/2
=50%

2. The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion)
Lower Threshold = 100%/(2M), with M = 1
= 100%/(2*1) = 100%/2
= 50%

3. The Effective Threshold (Teff)
Teff = (Upper Threshold + Lower Threshold)/2
= (50% + 50%)/2
= 100%/2
= 50%
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Appendix B

The 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Benin

HARE FORMULA - LARGEST REMAINDER
Quota = Total Votes Cast/Seats, and the total number of seats = 64
Quota = 1,030,017/64
Quota = 16,094

Table 6.6: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Hare Formula-Largest Remainder
Party/(Coalition) Number of
Votes
Union for the
Triumph of
Democratic
Renewal (UTRD)

194,213

National Party for
Democracy and
Development120,705
Democratic
Renewal Party
(PNDD-PRD)
Social
Democratic
Party-National
Union for
Solidarity and
Progress (PSDUNSP)

Full Quotas

Remainder

Seats +
Remainder

12

1085

12 + 0 = 12

7

8047

7+1=8

4784

6+0=6

101,348
6

National Rally for 124,392
Democracy
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(RND)
Our Common
Cause (NCC)

104,347

National
Movement for
Democracy and
DevelopmentMovement for
Solidarity, Union,
and Progress86,556
Union for
Democracy and
National
Reconstruction
(MNDD-MSUPUDRN)
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7

11734

7 +1 = 8

6

7783

6+0=6

5

6086

5+0=5

Union for
Democracy and
National
Solidarity (UDS)

72,899

4

8523

4+1=5

Rally of Liberal
Democrats for
National
Reconstruction
(RDL-Vivoten)

57,852

3

9570

3+1=4

Alliance for
Social
Democracy-Bloc
for Social
Democracy
(ASD-BSD)

35,700
2

3512

2 +0 = 2

Alliance for
Democracy and
Progress-

38,684
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2

6496

2+0=2

National Union
for Democracy
and Progress
(UNDP)

31,601

1

15507

1+1=2

Popular
Republican
Union-National
Labor Party
(URP-PNT)

20,490

1

4396

1+0=1

Democratic
Union for Social
and Economic
Development
(UDES)

25,893

1

9799

1+1=2

Builders and
Managers of
Freedom and
Development
(BGLD)

15,337

0

15337

0+1=1

Total

1,030,017

57

112,659

64

DROOP QUOTA
Quota = Votes/(Seats + 1) and the total # of seats = 64
= 1,030,017/(64 + 1)
= 1,030,017/65
A= 15,846
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Table 6.7: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Droop Quota System
Party/Coalition

Union for the
Triumph of
Democratic
Renewal (UTRD)

Number of
Votes

Full Quotas

Remainder

Seats +
Remainder

194,213

12

4061

12 + 0 = 12

7

9783

7+1=8

6272

6+0=6

7

13470

7 +1 = 8

6

9271

6+0=6

5

7326

5+0=5

National Party for
Democracy and
Development120,705
Democratic
Renewal Party
(PNDD-PRD)
Social
Democratic
Party-National
Union for
Solidarity and
Progress (PSDUNSP)

101,348
6

National Rally for
Democracy
124,392
(RND)
Our Common
Cause (NCC)

104,347

National
Movement for
Democracy and
Development86,556
Movement for
Solidarity, Union,
and ProgressUnion for
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Democracy and
National
Reconstruction
(MNDD-MSUPUDRN)
Union for
Democracy and
National
Solidarity (UDS)

72,899

4

9515

4+1=5

Rally of Liberal
Democrats for
National
Reconstruction
(RDL-Vivoten)

57,852

3

10314

3+1=4

Alliance for
Social
Democracy-Bloc
for Social
Democracy
(ASD-BSD)

35,700
2

4008

2 +0 = 2

Alliance for
Democracy and
ProgressDemocratic
Union for Social
Renewal (ADPUDRS)

38,684

2

6992

2+0=2

National Union
for Democracy
and Progress
(UNDP)

31,601

1

15755

1+1=2

Popular
Republican
Union-National
Labor Party
(URP-PNT)

20,490

1

4644

1+0=1
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Democratic
Union for Social
and Economic
Development
(UDES)

25,893

1

10047

1+1=2

Builders and
Managers of
Freedom and
Development
(BGLD)

15,337

0

15337

0+1=1

Total

1,030,017

57

126,795

64
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The 2007 National Assembly Elections in Togo

Table 6.8: The 2007 National Assembly Election Results in Togo
Parties

Votes

% of
Votes

# of Seats

% of Seats

Rally for the
Togolese People

922,636

39.4

50

61.73

Union of Forces
for Change

867,507

37.0

27

33.33

Action
Committee for
Renewal

192,618

08.2

4

4.94

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

38,347

01.6

0

0

Patriotic PanAfrican
Convergence

43,898

01.9

0

0

Party of
Democrats for
Renewal

24,260

01.0

0

0

Others

254,842

10.9

0

0

Total

2,344,108

100

81

100

Source: Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive. Retrieved from http://psephos.adamcarr.net/countries/t/togo/togo2007.txt

HARE FORMULA - LARGEST REMAINDER
Quota = Total votes cast/seats, and the total number of seats = 81
Quota = 2,344,108/81
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Quota = 28,939

Table 6.9: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Fare Formula-Largest Remainder in Togo’s
2007 Election Results

Parties

Votes

Full
Quotas

Remainder

Seats + Remainder

Rally for the
Togolese People

922,636

31

25,527

31 + 1 = 32

Union of Forces
for Change

867,507

29

28,276

29 + 1 = 30

Action
Committee for
Renewal

192,618

6

18,984

6+1=7

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

38,347

1

9,408

1+0=1

Patriotic PanAfrican
Convergence

43,898

1

14,959

1+ 0 = 1

Party of
Democrats for
Renewal

24,260

0

24,260

0+1=1

Others

254,842

8

23,330

8+1=9

Total

2,344,108

76

144,744

81
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DROOP QUOTA
Quota = Votes/(seats + 1) and the total # of seats = 81
Quota = 2,344,108/ (81+1)
Quota = 28,586

Table 6.10: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Droop Quota System in Togo’s 2007 Election
Results
Parties

Votes

Full
Quotas

Remainder

Seats + Remainder

Rally for the
Togolese People

922,636

32

7,884

32 + 0 = 32

Union of Forces
for Change

867,507

30

9,927

30 + 0 = 30

Action
Committee for
Renewal

192,618

6

21,102

6+1=7

Democratic
Convention of
African Peoples

38,347

1

9,761

1+0=1

Patriotic PanAfrican
Convergence

43,898

1

15,312

1+ 0 = 1

Party of
Democrats for
Renewal

24,260

0

24,260

0+1=1

Others

254,842

8

26,154

8+1=9

Total

2,344,108

76

144,744

81
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